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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.

S. AUG. EPIST. ccxxxviii. AD PASCENT.

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THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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THE CAUSES OF THE JANSENIST HERESY.

Controversiarum de Divinæ Gratiæ Liberique Arbitrii Concordia, Initia et Progressus enarravit Gerardus Schneemann, S. J. Friburgi Brisgovix: Sumptibus Herder.

GREAT historical facts are not the results of spontaneous causes, nor are they to be attributed to one man, with whose name they may be identified. The ideas, long before they take effect, lie, perhaps unconsciously, in the human mind; they gradually shine forth, change traditional views and belief, direct the desires and aspirations of the age, till one man is sent by God to open the new depths of the soul for the glory of the Most High and the joy of man, or is permitted by Divine Providence to let loose the tides of long-cherished and hidden errors as a new proof of human frailty and malice and a warning to coming generations. Three great powers move through the stream of human events: Divine Providence, which orders all things, never allowing chance, fate, or blind force; free will, unimpaired by the eternal decrees of the Almighty; and the ever active spirit of evil, permitted by God to entice and to seduce the soul by the unreal good. Without tracing the bright and dark periods of human history to the germs of their greatness or decline, historical understanding and knowledge are impossible.

Jansenism is the outgrowth of Protestantism, both in its spirit and in its doctrine. Great heresies, being favored by the spirit of

the time,—for otherwise they could not succeed,—not only withdraw thousands of souls from the bosom of the Church, but also infect the remaining faithful, who too are children of the age, with their poison. Thus Semipelagianism sprang from Pelagianism, thus modern Old Catholics from German rationalism in history and theology, thus Jansenism from the Reformation. We see the same break with theological tradition, the same exclusive turning towards one author,—St. Augustine,—the same hatred of spiritual authority, the same courting of the mighty of this earth. The Church then as now was stern and resolute, the heretics changeable and deceitful. Jansenism is at the same time the precursor of the Encyclopedists and of the Revolution. The names of Calvin, Jansenius, Arnould, Quesnel, Voltaire, and Robespierre, only express the same idea in its different phases. The long religious dissensions brought forth as a final result the infidelity which was ripening amid the religious strife. “Few men to-day know the history of the Church during the seventeenth century, and yet it alone contains the key to all the religious events accomplished in the course of the following two centuries.”¹

Every heresy—Protestantism and Jansenism more than any other—subverts the true notion of the divine or human nature. Man either disappears before God, or he overrules God, but always the creature is either emancipated or deified. “Either the objective truth is confounded with the subjective man, and then we have pantheism; or the soul is confounded with the body, and then we have materialism; or the image of God is rejected from the soul, and then God is declared unknown and unknowable.”² The two great dogmas of original sin and redemption, in their Catholic sense, form the balance against the intellectual, moral, and social disorder on earth.

The struggles of life, the restless aim towards an unknown end, the yearning of every soul after rest and peace, only prove the words of St. Augustine: “Thou hast made us for Thee, O God, and our heart is disturbed until it rests in Thee.”³ To the ancients they were an enigma; we seek in vain for a certain hope of immortal life beyond the grave; despair is the gloomy picture of the thinking mind, pleasure the repose of the ignorant. “There was wanting the consciousness of sanctity in God, and the need of sanctification in man.”⁴ Christianity opened to man the true pathway to his glorious destiny. The dualism staring from every pagan philosophy was overcome by the Incarnation, and the Incarnation had its reason in original sin, its term in the Redemption. The creature was ele-

¹ Dom Guéranger: *Inst. Lit.*, vol. ii., ch. 17, p. 43.

² Ullathorne: *Endowments of Man*, ch. i., p. 8.

⁴ Döllinger: *Heidenthum und Judenthum*, p. 633.

³ *Confess.*, p. 1.

vated to oneness with the Creator; the Church became the fruit of that union; the blessed Eucharist the source of grace. The "Reformers" and the Jansenists broke this bond of harmony. Exaggerating the fearful chastisements of the first man, they plunged human nature into an abyss of nothingness; God and humanity were separated by the denial of the Real Presence, for the wants of the soul could not be satisfied, because the Blessed Sacrament was no more the consolation of poor human life; the union of Christian nations was dissolved by the withdrawal from Rome, the centre of unity; the basis of the social order was shaken by loosening the sacred tie of marriage. Wavering and confusion became the marks of science, for reason lost its guide; nations were thrown into a chaos of intellectual and moral decay, the result of which is only known to God alone. In fine, the "Reformation" was a rebellion against the unity of faith and spiritual authority. "*Elle était essentiellement révolutionnaire*," says Guizot.¹ Jansenism fed this spirit of contempt and disregard during the following century, till its disciples embraced atheism and the worship of reason. "*On vit ses adeptes passer de plain pied de la doctrine de Saint-Cyran et de Montgeron à l'athéisme et au culte de la raison.*"²

The essence of the conflict between the Church and the world is the combat of truth and error, of the spirit and the flesh. The weapons used by the world are always the same; "they have been; are, and always will be the civil power;"³ the final end is its supremacy. Distrust and varying suspicion were kept alive against the Church of God from the beginning; they never could avert *her* from the path of her divine mission, but they often misled parts of her flock and of her pastors. Fraud and violence thwarted her earnest endeavors in selecting true guardians of faith; servility only too often stains the policy of the clergy; they join only too often the unscrupulous abettors of pride and ambition. Still the holders of one office in the Church never became the prey of human intrigue, never discarded a hair's-breadth of the heavenly treasure given to their trust; the Papacy is built on a rock, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail. Thither the enemy turns his zeal. What a joy, if he could overthrow that "stumbling block." "Christian faith and morals fall with the fall of Rome; Christianity without the Pope is only a human belief, unable to breathe into the heart the lofty ideas of eternal truth and wisdom."⁴

Jansenism could never have found its stronghold in French society without the league with Gallicanism, which summed up its tendency in this one idea, "to make the Pope the first of bishops,

¹ *Civil. en Europe*, lec. 12.

² Guéranger: l. c., p. 45.

³ Manning: *Miscell. Essays*, 17.

⁴ Maistre: *Du Pape*, p. 449, ed. 1821.

but to allow him nothing higher than that primacy of honor."¹ In the days of faith and piety the Church often allowed the clergy to choose their bishops, and conceded a wide influence to the secular power, because both were working in one spirit. But soon passion and private interest prevailed; the glory of God had to yield to the glory of man. This unfortunate spirit was manifested in the Pragmatic Sanction; monarch and parliament excluded Rome from the government of the Church. Dishonesty, simony, and violence penetrated the French clergy. The Church, complains Pius II., is like a hydra with many heads, and its unity is thereby totally destroyed—"si iudex iudicium Romanus Pontifex, iudicio Parliamenti subjectus est; si hoc admittimus, monstruosam ecclesiam facimus et hydram multorum capitum introducimus et unitatem prorsus extinguimus."² Leo X. annulled the Pragmatic Sanction, yet its sting remained. The outcry against the Papacy arose on all sides: "Rome's tyranny has abolished a system long in force in the Church of France!" A lawless independence, the overthrow of the religious system of the Middle Ages, became the ideal dream of the intelligent throughout the kingdom. Their words were not, perhaps, as violent as those of the "Reformers;" they still professed an outward union with the head of the Church, but the disguised opposition was not less forcible in their hearts. This despotism of self-will afforded ample provision for Jansenistic insolence and haughtiness.

The world of letters furnished defenders of the fatal system. Mark Anthony de Dominis, archbishop of Spalatro, published in the year 1616 his work on the "Christian Republic," which, though not a product of Gallicanism, fully exhibits its doctrine and was eagerly used by the Jansenists as an armory against the Holy See. Dominis, refusing to pay a pension imposed on him by Paul V. with his consent before his election to the metropolitan see of Spalatro, went to England, where he published his work to take revenge on the Pope. It is a strange compound of Protestantism and Catholicity; above all, it annihilates the primacy and jurisdiction of St. Peter's chair. St. Paul is equal to the Prince of the Apostles; the Protestant theory of an ideal church without any outward manifestation of the essence of the Church, appears in the confusion of church taught and church teaching. Dominis called his work "Christian Republic," because the Pope should only be the minister, and in some sort the delegate of the Christian community.

When the condemnation of the book was to be passed by the Sorbonne, Richer,³ formerly syndic of the theological faculty, refused to be present because five years before he himself had published

¹ Darras; *Gen. Hist.*, vol. iv., p. 325, Eng. trans.

² Spalding; *Reform.*, vol. i., p. 63, note.

³ Cf. Baillet; *Vie de Richer*.

a similar work "on the ecclesiastical and civil power," wherein he pretended to expose the true sentiments of the Gallican church and the Sorbonne; he afterwards retracted his errors, but his writings remained. His reasonings are only the re-echo of the repeated charges made against Rome. The plea of foreign encroachments on the national church naturally led to the rejection of the universal authority of the Pope.

This hostility against Rome produced absolutism at home. The "Reformers" refused obedience to the Pope; they soon had to recognize the temporal prince as their spiritual head. The French bore divine authority unwillingly; they soon had to accept the dictum, "*l'état, c'est moi.*" The sphere of the civil power now extended over man's will and conscience. The Catholic princes, especially the Bourbons, could not go as far as their Protestant neighbors, but they indemnified themselves by severing the state from the Church, making the former supreme and independent in its own domain.¹ It happened, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, that French jurists publicly burned the writings of Suarez and Bellarmine, because these two Jesuits maintained the grand principles of the Middle Ages, which favored neither despotism nor anarchy.² They taught that the sovereign power comes from God, but kings are liable to lose it, and their subjects may, under certain circumstances, be freed from the allegiance due to them.³ The deputies of the States General of 1614 proposed to make it a national dogma that the king receives his authority immediately from God, and only death alone or free resignation can relieve him of his power. The clergy and nobility, under the leadership of Cardinal Duperron, opposed the presumptuous undertaking. The parliament, however, from the midst of which the motion originally came forth, approved the proceeding of the third estate, and many a difficulty had to be surmounted by the clergy to withhold the king's assent. Strange to say, the meeting of 1614 was the last before the French Revolution, before the regicides. Sad indeed was the state of affairs in France. The bishops opposed the Pope to maintain their supposed episcopal rights, the jurists made themselves the defenders of the Gallican liberties, both against the Pope and the bishops. "Protestant in the sixteenth century," says De Maistre,⁴ "with the Fronde and Jansenism in the seventeenth, philosophical at length, and republican in the last years of its existence, the parliaments but too often appeared in antagonism to the true fundamental maxims of the state. The seeds of Calvinism, fostered in

¹ Ketteler: *Freiheit*, p. 156, 5599.

² Cf. Rohrbacher: *General History*, vol. 23, p. 247.

³ Cf. Balmes' *Civil.*, ch. 51, vol. 3.

⁴ *L'église Gallic.*, translation taken from Darras, l. c., p. 331.

that great body, became far more dangerous when its essence changed its name and was called Jansenism. Then conscience was set at ease by a heresy which proclaimed the principle, 'I do not exist.'" The poison reached even those illustrious names in the magistracy of which foreign nations envied France the possession. Then all errors, even errors hostile to each other, being always ready to unite against the truth, the new philosophy in the parliaments leagued with Jansenism against Rome. If we take into consideration the number of magistrates in all parts of France, that of the tribunals which made it a duty and a point of honor to walk in their footsteps, the many clients of the parliaments, and all that blood, friendship, or mere ascendancy drew into the same gulf, we shall easily perceive that there was material enough to form in the heart of the Gallican Church a formidable party against the Holy See.

The religious wars and political disorders did not wield the best influence on the lower clergy. The wish of the Council of Trent, that each diocese should have its own seminary, remained an empty word. There are only three such institutions mentioned till 1600: Rheims, Bordeaux and Carpentras. The young theologians were deprived of the training necessary for ecclesiastical life. They lived in the world without any practical instructions in moral and mystical theology, without conferences and retreats. The admission to holy orders was granted without the necessary trials. The people were without religious instruction; the sacraments were not sufficiently administered; the preparation for them neglected; sermons were rare, without zeal and effect; Christian charity had almost vanished; to be called a priest was a sort of contempt and insult. "Selon la commune opinion du monde, c'était alors une espèce de contumélie et d'injure, que de dire à quelque ecclésiastique de qualité qu'il était un prêtre."¹ The grievous disorder of lukewarmness in the divine service increased the strength of heresy and indifference shooting forth from the spiritual lethargy in which so many lived.

Thus Arnault's proclamations against frequent Communion had a deeper foundation than mere words. Dark clouds of error and weakness in faith had settled thickly around the throne of our Divine Saviour since the "Reformation."² To see the Holy Sacrament despised and trodden under foot, to behold ghastly shapes with priestly character, should fill every noble mind with horror and disgust. But unhappy the man who, wincing under the taunts of the enemy and overawed by that dread sanctity, turns away without hope of mercy. Such men were, or, what is more likely, pretended to be, Arnault and his followers.

¹ Abelly: *Vie de St. Vincent*, p. 3.

² Müller: *Mass*, p. 14.

It was the design of Divine Providence to raise an Olier and a St. Vincent de Paul to restore the clerical life in France; the cancer, however, was too deep to be impeded at once in its fearful ravages.

"Een serpent in den eegen boezem"—a serpent in one's own bosom, was the title the Catholics received from the states of Zeeland in 1672. Holland was the bulwark of Protestantism on the continent of Europe, a formidable power sought and feared by every nation. The prestige Spain had held on the sea was ceded to the Dutch. Their cities became the asylums of all the Protestant refugees and malcontents of Europe; the Puritan and the Huguenot, the Socinian and the Bohemian found a hiding shelter on Dutch soil. Graswinckel and Salmasius defended there the rights of the kings; Ulrich Huber proclaimed democracy as the natural and only form of true government; Spinoza enjoyed in Leyden his gloomy and fantastic dreams of the eternal substance of all things. Amsterdam, Utrecht, and Leyden opened their presses for all pamphlets proscribed in other countries. Europe was full of the anonymous and pseudonymous writings of the firm of Cologne and Pierre Martineau. And strange, says Treitschke, an unsuspected author, the sectarian spirit of the people finally penetrated the old Church: the Jansenists of Utrecht rebelled against the infallible Pope—"und seltsam der sectirerische Geist des Volkes drang endlich sogar in die alte Kirche hinüber; die Jansenisten von Utrecht lehnten sich auf gegen den unfehlbaren Papst."¹ The bold disputers were sometimes stirred up by a thunderbolt from the Hague, but as long as the stomach and counting-house were safe, said Buzenval, there was no need of making great bustle about the matter. When Descartes' philosophy was threatening the peace of the university of Leyden, the wise counsellors commanded the arguments to be taken from law or medicine, and not from theology. It is but natural that the Jansenists looked upon Holland as their promised land, where the broad ideas "left room enough for their treachery and deceit." Their poisonous literature, prohibited in France, found ready publishers in the Dutch republic, and there linger till to-day the remnants of that sect.

The salvation of the faithful is the object so sublime for which God pours out His abundant graces. If the want is extraordinary, extraordinary means are employed to lead the faithful to truth and virtue. Thus the great fathers of the Church were sent against the numerous heresies of their times; thus the Benedictines to civilize the renewed west; thus the Jesuits to fight against the "Reformers." St. Ignatius, contemplating our Saviour's Incarnation, was convinced that it had no other object but his own perfection and the sanctification of man, and chose these two sublime intentions as the fitting

¹ Die Repub. der Niederlande, hist. polit. Aufsätze, vol. li. p. 593.

and only object of his institute.¹ To grow in virtue and to lead others to God, their eternal end, was the only desire of the saint and his followers. Seeing the Church filled with contemplative orders, he was inspired to found a society, as he said, "like a kind of flying camp, that should be ready at the least alarm."² To preserve the pure faith, to defend it against heresy, and to carry the Gospel into countries deprived of it, became its great task; perfect subordination to the superiors and unconditional obedience to the Pope its distinguishing marks. The spirit of the Society was entirely opposed to that of the "Reformers." Wherever their principles met one had to yield—the Jesuits to force, the Protestants to persuasion. No order ever endured more persecution than the sons of Loyola. They were accused of perverting the youth, of revolt, despotism, and regicide. Father Guignard expired on the scaffold, an innocent victim of blind fury. The whole Order was banished from France because the assassin, John Châtel, had studied for a short time in a Jesuit college. This was the masterpiece of the policy of the Huguenots; they called the day of the "arrêt" lucky—"il fut compté au nombre des jours heureux"³—and erected a monument to immortalize their glorious deed. Henry IV., however, took a decided stand in favor of the Society, which checked the violence of the Calvinists. Yet outward steps, how favorable soever, do not change so suddenly the minds of men; French society remained to a large extent as hostile to the Order as ever.

The *ratio studiorum*, causing a destructive contest between the Jesuits and Dominicans, roused the resentment still more. The sons of St. Dominic regarded St. Thomas as the absolute standard of theological science. St. Ignatius, on the contrary, allowed the members of the Society the use of authors treating *ex professo* on questions purely philosophical, scriptural, or canonical; and if in the course of time a theological work more appropriate to the wants of the age should be composed, the Order could accept it with the approbation of the General. "Legetur doctrina scholastica divi Thomæ, . . . sed si videtur temporis decursu alius auctor studentibus utilior futurus, ut si aliqua summa vel liber theologiæ scholasticæ conficeretur, qui his nostris temporibus accommodatior videretur, gravi cum consilio et rebus diligenter expensis per viros, qui in universa societate aptissimi existimentur, cumque Præpositi Generalis approbatione prælegi poterit."⁴ The learned Lainez was even commissioned to write such a work. St. Ignatius disliked two opinions of St. Thomas—those about the Immaculate Conception and the solemn vows. His views were afterwards, as we know,

¹ Cf. Bartoli: *Life of St. Ignatius*, vol. ii., p. 20.

² Rodriguez: *Chr. Perf.*, vol. iii., p. 4.

³ Duplessis: *Mém.*, tome ii., p. 500.

⁴ Const. IV., cap. 14.

confirmed by the Church. The bull "Ascendente Domino" did not require solemn vows as an essential condition of an Order, and the dogma of the Immaculate Conception must to-day be believed by every Catholic. St. Ignatius did not exclude the idea of a clearer understanding of theological problems in the course of time. Herefrom we shall trace the cause of the Thomistico-Molinistic controversy, which afterwards served the Jansenists as another pretext for exerting their ardor against the "subtle novelties" of the Jesuits, thereby propagating their own pernicious doctrine. Thus the hatred which the doctors, magistrates, and Dominicans caused to break forth against the Society was left to the rising Jansenists. Damped, but never extinguished, hardly appeared in one period when excited anew in another, it was made a kind of theological virtue for the higher classes of the French kingdom.¹

It is well known how much the union of the Humanists with the "Reformers" contributed to the spread of Protestantism.² Both hurled the shaft of their ridicule at the scholastics, not so much for the barbarous Latin some of them used, as because the orthodox theologians often condemned the most elegant style for its spurious contexts. The whole scholastic theology was thrown overboard. St. Augustine had to hold forth as a shield of Protestant brawling. "I am the whole Augustine," said Calvin; the same boasted Luther. This partial and defective system soon entered into Catholic schools. Two young professors in Louvain, Michael de Bay (Bäius) and John van Löwen (Hessels), left the scholastic method, devoting themselves entirely to Scripture and St. Augustine; Protestant errors on grace and liberty were the result. Jesse Ravestein, Ruard Tapper, the chancellor of the university, and other distinguished doctors perceived the danger. Tapper, being himself well versed in St. Augustine's works, often disputed with Bäius, who was unable to answer the objections. "Read and study the scholastics, especially St. Thomas, and you shall easily understand me," usually replied the chancellor. Bäius was a man of learning and exemplary life. His authority was very great, both among professors and students. Philip the Second sent him as one of his theologians to the Council of Trent. After his return Bäius published his greater works, renewing his errors, known already before the council. They were condemned by Pius V. in the bull "Ex Omnibus Afflictionibus." Bäius's friends asserted that the propositions in their proper sense were erroneous, but could be sustained in the sense intended by the author. Bäius himself sent a long apology to the Pope, but the Pontiff, after a sufficient

¹ Cf. Daxes : *Des Jesuites ligueurs*, p. 36.

² Cf. Janssen : *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*, vol. ii., p. 66.

deliberation, confirmed his former judgment, intimating to Baius that he had incurred an irregularity by his proceeding. The professor then withdrew his heresy, but after the death of Pius V. he started his defence again, till he finally, in consequence of a repeated condemnation by Gregory XIII., abjured his errors at the feet of Francis Tolet, afterwards the first cardinal of the Society of Jesus.¹

The hinge of the Baian heresy is that two powers inevitably govern the freedom of man: theological charity, by which he loves God above all, and concupiscence, by which he turns towards creatures as his last end. There is a threefold state of human nature—innocent, fallen, and restored. The state of innocence displays nature in its perfect integrity, immortal and predestined to the intuitive vision of God; nay, it was but just and becoming that God should create angels and men to eternal happiness. Adam by his fall lost all gifts of the first grace; nature, now subject to concupiscence, had no other power but of committing sin. In the state of reparation every good work by its very nature merits eternal life; the justification of the sinner does not consist in the infusion of grace, but in the obedience to the commandments; the motions of sensitive pleasure, though not consented to, are transgressions in the just, yet God does not impute them; there are no venial sins; the penalty of sin is forgiven, not the fault. The act of absolution only affects the first; God alone, who suggests penance, can take away the guilt. The liberty sufficient for moral works is the freedom from constraint. In fine, Baius, like Luther and Calvin, denies all free will, and misrepresents the true notion of the merits of Christ and the merciful providence of God. Jansenius embraced the same errors, trying to soften them by the name of his work, "*Augustinus*."

The Baian troubles being hardly settled, another conflict arose intimately connected with them.² The Jesuits at Louvain were open rivals of the university. Their professors, Bellarmin, Lessius, and Hamelius, could not help warning the students against the errors openly proclaimed in the university. Their polemics, though not personal, roused the wrath of Baius and his friends. The humiliation of abjuring his errors into the hands of a Jesuit increased the rancor. Besides this the Jesuits, having received the power of granting degrees, refused any fees for them, whilst the university imposed them. The contest between the two bodies broke out in the year 1587. In the week after Easter the professors of the university secretly collected several copies of Lessius's lectures on Scripture and theology. Three weeks after they showed him

¹ S. Liguori: *Hist. of Heresies*, p. 364.

² Cf. Duchesne: *Hist. du Baianisme*, p. 195.

thirty-four propositions, asking whether he would acknowledge them as his own doctrine. Lessius declared them to be mutilated, offered thirty-four other propositions, and demanded a public dispute. This was refused, and Lessius was condemned. The Jesuits abstained from further quarrels till Rome would have decided the question. Their enemies in the meantime seized every opportunity to undermine the authority and reputation of the Order. Still many students remained faithful to the Society, which caused frequent rows between the academical youth. Baïus, Jansen, and Cuccius were the chief promoters of the intrigue. They were especially "provoked" by the *scientia media*, then already proclaimed by Lessius. They charged the Jesuits with Pelagianism, but Rome disapproved their action.¹

Let us remember that Jansen was the protector of Jansenius and DuVerger during their stay at Louvain. Both venerated Baïus as a saint, adorned his picture with the aureola, and regarded his works as the infallible source of theological science. Under such circumstances, it is plain that the two founders of Jansenism were imbued with the spirit of the traditional errors, plots, and contrivances.² Here we enter into the famous Thomistico-Molinistic controversy.

Before we continue the subject, let us first state the question and ascertain the teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, who frequently were misunderstood and misrepresented in the heat of the contest.

The work of man's regeneration was defined by the Council of Trent as being performed by the mutual co-operation of the human nature with divine grace. The fallen man retains moral and religious faculties, by which he becomes responsible for his actions. The Divine Spirit suffers human freedom, because an unconditional interference with that freedom would bring about the annihilation of the moral order of the world which Divine Wisdom had founded on liberty.³ The gap between the two is infinite. The best use of our intellectual and moral force will not raise us to God nor merit grace unless God gives it freely; then both pervading each other accomplish the one "theandric" act of justification. The words of the Council are: "If any one maintains that the free will of man, inspired and excited by God, does not co-operate, by its consent, with God exciting and calling, whereby it disposes and prepares itself for receiving grace of justification; or if any one maintains that the will cannot refuse its consent when it pleases, but, like something lifeless, does not act at all, remaining merely passive, let him be anathema."⁴

¹ Cf. Schneemann's Thomistisch-Molinistische Controverse, i., 125.

² Tournelly: De Gr., i., 321.

³ Möhler: Symbolism, i., 122.

⁴ Sess. vi., can. 4.

According with this doctrine, Catholic theologians distinguish different phases in the working of divine grace. The sinner, unable to merit, or even to desire, grace, is awakened by God (*gratia excitans*); giving his consent to the divine call, he gradually advances with assisting grace (*gratia adjuvans*), which, giving strength to his good intention, enables him to acquire a true and perfect power (*gratia sufficiens*); that he, finally, by efficacious grace (*gratia efficax*), may infallibly produce the justifying act. Herein all agree, though differing about the nature of the various graces. The question arises: Wherein consists the union of efficacious grace with the consent of man? How is it possible for this grace infallibly to produce the justifying act, whilst the human will is able to resist? Does the efficiency come from the *exterior* cause, namely, the foreknowledge of God that each created will, by the use of its liberty, will consent, when God should give the necessary grace—*scientia media*—or from the *interior* cause, namely, the irresistible power of efficacious grace itself? Is there any connecting link between the free will and that which precedes it?

The great controversy itself is a sufficient proof that neither St. Augustine nor St. Thomas has solved the problem. Great and saintly theologians, earnestly devoting their whole lives to the study of the two holy doctors, they nevertheless arrived at thoroughly contrary conclusions. This is certainly not derogatory to the greatness of the two saints; the essential point of the question was not stated with the same precision in their ages as in more modern times. St. Augustine's writings on grace, being chiefly directed against the Pelagians, who denied the necessity and gratuity of grace, principally dwell on these two qualities, and hence, by the nature of the combat, differ from the question stated above.

The words of the Apostle, "As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned . . . so, also, by the obedience of one many shall be made just,"¹ sufficed for St. Augustine. This is the foundation of the Christian faith, one and One; one man by whom the ruin came, and another Man by whom the construction.² All men suffered by Adam's fall, but the essence of human nature remained. Who of us should say that by the sin of the first man free will perished from the human race? Freedom, indeed, perished, but that freedom, which was in paradise, of having full justice and immortality.³ The essence and sufficiency of human liberty are two different things; the will often wishes what it cannot perform, and not always wishes what it can perform; liberty consists in the power of determining our mind to one thing or another; but from

¹ Rom., v., 12-19.

² Sermo 30, de verb. ap. n. 5.

³ Cont. duas Ep. Pel., lib. i., cap. 2, n. 5.

the determination does not follow the ability of executing the intention.¹ This regards the act of justification. Our end is to see God face to face; human nature cannot, by its own force, reach the supernatural order. Hence arises the necessity of grace to enlighten the understanding, to inspire the will, to heal it, to prepare it, for even to desire grace is beyond human power; "provided," Pelagius concedes, "that God not only aids the natural strength in man; but when he (Pelagius) recognizes that the will itself and the action are assisted by God, and assisted in such a way that without His help we neither could wish nor do any good, there would be no reason for dissent between us."² The operation of grace is both physical and moral. The Pelagians and semi-Pelagians only admitted the extrinsic inducement on the part of God, abhorring the subjective elevation of man. Grace is the internal, hidden, wonderful, and ineffable power of God, whereby He not only operates true revelations, but also good wishes,³ for God has a greater power over the human will than man himself.⁴

All theologians agree that, according to St. Augustine, efficacious grace properly is exciting grace itself. The Jansenists herefrom concluded that our will is forced by necessity either to do the good or to fall into sin, according to the greater or lesser degree of earthly or heavenly delectation. The Molinists prove from St. Augustine that man is perfectly free to give or to withdraw his consent. The other schools float, as it were, between these two extremes. There are, no doubt, many obscure passages in the saint's works which, taken by themselves, may lead to some misunderstanding. He says himself: "That question, where we dispute about free will and the grace of God, is so hard to understand that when free will is defended the grace of God seems to be denied, and when the grace of God is asserted free will is apparently taken away,⁵ and yet both are true, but few are able to comprehend it."⁶ The only way to understand St. Augustine is to discern the spirit breathing through all his writings, comparing the contested texts with others of the same kind.

Let us find out his definitions of delectation and efficacious grace, and we shall have the key to the most difficult passages in his works. "Quod amplius delectat id nos operemur necesse est—we necessarily perform what us more delights"—is the famous text on which Jansenius based his victorious delectation. This and similar texts do not prove the irresistible determination of the delight. St. Augustine always supposes the *deliberate* love of complacency actually predominating in our will. "C'est l'amour

¹ De Sp. et Litt., n. 53.

³ De Gr. Chr., c. 24.

⁵ Lib. de Gr. Chr., c. 47.

² De Gr. Chr., c. 47, n. 52.

⁴ De Corr. et Gr., c. 14.

⁶ Lib. 2, contr. Litt. Pel., c. 84.

dominant de la volonté, laquelle commande suivant la disposition," says Fénelon.¹ Thus, when God draws us,² when He sometimes gives a victorious delectation to the saints, that they may know, it is not from themselves but from Him who is the light and truth,³ the pleasure only precedes the consent. For what is concupiscence and pleasure, if not the willful assent to what we wish for; and what is fear and sadness if not the willful dissent from what we do not desire?⁴ God delights by teaching, not by imposing the necessity.⁵ St. Francis de Sales beautifully explains this thought. "We present nuts to a child," says St. Augustine, "and it feels itself attracted, not by an exterior force or a foreign violence which acts on the body, but by the attraction of the heart, or pleasure which never exists without some degree of love. Such is the conduct of God in our regard; He attracts by the delights which accompany His inspirations, not by the force of obligation or compulsion. He insinuates spiritual pleasures into our hearts, and these act as baits, inducing us to let ourselves be taken, and disposing us to receive and to relish His doctrine. Our will is not constrained by the omnipotent strength of the hand of God which touches it; grace urges, but does not compel, and notwithstanding its great power, we can yield or resist its influence as we please."⁶

God acts in the heart of man, performs the motion of his will, yet "I did not what, with an incomparable affection, pleased me more,"⁷ says the holy bishop, and there is no contradiction in his words. "Facit ut faciamus, præbendo vires efficacissimas voluntati"⁸—He acts that we may act, by offering a most efficacious power to the will"—is a general and most decisive key for the strongest texts in St. Augustine's works.⁹

The doctrine of *predestination* rests on the doctrine of grace. We have to distinguish between predestination to grace and to glory. The great mystery of the dogma consists in the predestination to grace. Though it is certain¹⁰ and undeniable that God has reasons on which to act, yet it is far above our comprehension; human speculation cannot dive into it. "If any one should bind me to scrutinize that depth why one is so charmed that he is persuaded, another not, I have only two things to answer: O the depth of the riches! And is there iniquity in God?"¹¹ All agree that the predestination to grace is wholly gratuitous, because free will cannot perform any meritorious works without and before

¹ Instr. sur la grace, tome i., lettre 5.

³ De Pec. Mer., c. 19, n. 32.

⁵ In Joh., c. vi., v. 27.

⁷ Conf. i., 3, c. 8.

⁹ Fénelon says: "Voilà une clef générale et décisive des textes les plus forts de St. Augustin que ce Père présente de sa propre main." L. c., lettre 8.

¹⁰ St. Francis of Sales, l. c.

² In Joh., c. vi., v. 26.

⁴ De Civ. Dei, lib. xiv., c. 6.

⁶ Love of God, book ii., c. 12.

⁸ De Lib. Arb., l. 3, c. 16.

¹¹ De Sp. et Litt., c. 34.

grace. This is the truth, for the defence of which St. Augustine so earnestly and successfully fought. Further, all agree that the predestination to glory necessarily supposes the merits flowing from grace, and, as such, on account of the gratuity of grace, is also a free gift. The dispute begins whether God, in the act of predestination, considers the meritorious works or not? Which, by its nature, precedes in the mind of God, the foresight of the good works or the simple predestinating act? Whether and how far is the foreknowledge an essential element in the eternal decree? "At non isto sensu disputatur inter theologos, an prædestinatio ad gloriam sit gratuita, sed alio, nempe utrum fiat ante vel post prævisa merita gratiæ."¹

The thought of the Divine Providence so completely swayed in St. Augustine's mind that, on the slightest occasions, he perceived the incomprehensible wisdom and goodness of God. He looked upon the fall of the Roman Empire, but he was not crushed in the grasp of the conqueror. "As all human powers seemed dissolving visibly before him, his eyes fixed themselves more and more intently upon another vision, transitory, indeed, in one sense, in that it was passing in time, but springing from the council of God, ordained before time, and flowing on till the full tide of its waves is gathered into eternity"²—he wrote his *City of God*. There he traces the two commonwealths emerging into life from Adam, and passing away into an eternity they choose. God disposes of the minds of men; of the issues of their conduct; what they are responsible for, what will cause their reward is their good will. The moral worth of their actions is in their hands; their result is ordered by God as He finds best for His providential designs. God's foresight does not cause the thing foreseen. "He who foreknew the causes of all things certainly could not ignore our will which He foreknew to be the cause of our actions."³ "We do not sin because God foresees it, but because we sin God knows it."⁴ Predestination and foreknowledge cannot be separated, though foreknowledge can exist without predestination, as, for instance, in every sin;⁵ hence the definition: Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefices, by which those are most certainly saved whosoever are saved.⁶ We will now understand why St. Augustine calls God the Author of good and evil. "God delivers men to shameful passions, God sends the operation of error, that they may believe the lie; it is thus He operates in the hearts of men in any direction He pleases for the good or the

¹ Tournelly: De Deo, vol. i., qu. II, art. I.

² Allies: Formation of Christendom, vol. i., p. 209.

³ De Civ. Dei, lib. v., c. 9.

⁴ De Civ. Dei, lib. v., c. 10.

⁵ De Præd. 55, c. 10.

⁶ Lib. de Dono Persev., c. 14.

evil,¹ not because God is the author of sin, or withdraws sufficient grace, but because He permits sin." It is difficult to suppose that, after St. Augustine, the eternal decree concerning our salvation is made without any regard to human worthiness. God wishes all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth, but not so that He should deprive them of their free will, for the good or bad use of which they shall be rightly judged.²

Many passages, indeed, seem to favor the opinion that grace efficaciously attracts our will, human consent seeming to be imperceptible; the rise of the one apparently overwhelms the other. The only reason for such and the like objections is that the saint had not yet determined the inmost relation between both. Besides, the difficulty is increased by the promiscuous use of predestination to grace and glory. The different schools quote the *same* texts in favor of their systems.³

It suffices for us to have shown that the downright predestination couched in the doctrine of Jansenius and the dangerous principles of the extreme Thomists have no foundation in St. Augustine's works. He nowhere upholds the constraining force of the spirit of good or evil in the vast scene of contending mankind; man has to wrestle with his heart; he is responsible for his freedom; the consent is neither extorted nor compelled. Disorders spring up from the perverse will, but are directed to a final order; eternal goodness is vindicated by eternal justice "until the loveliness of this whole temporal dispensation, of which the subordinate parts are those which suit each their own times, runs out like some grand composition of an unspeakably perfect artist, and from it those who, even in the time of faith, rightly worship God pass into the eternal contemplation of Him, face to face."⁴

There is a twofold order in every movement of God's providence; the primal cause, which is God's will itself, ordaining all things to their final end, the secondary causes implanted in His creatures. The irrational creatures are governed by the laws of necessity; the rational by the moral law of God, who never impedes the use of their free will. The operations are necessary, and fall upon God alone; when performed by the former, they are contingent; when enacted by the latter, the will necessarily tends towards beatitude, the universal good is its object.⁵ The natural striving after happiness becomes the motor of all our actions, because it is natural that the immovable principle, namely, beatitude, on which the actions of the will are based, should become their cause.⁶ Yet

¹ De Gr. et Lib. Arb., c. 21, n. 43.

² De Sp. et Litt., c. 33.

³ Cf. Hurter: Theological Dogma, vol. ii., p. 86; Scholion, numb. 2.

⁴ Cp. 1385, translated by Allies, l. c., p. 206.

⁵ I, 2 qu. 1, a. 3.

⁶ I, qu. 82, a. 1.

various may be the nature of the good we desire, good in its essence or only its appearance; it may or may not have any connection with true happiness, and thus the will, though necessarily determined to the end, is not necessarily determined to the means.¹ To transfer the necessity of the irrational creation to human nature would pervert the whole character of the divine government; man would only act as he is acted upon by an unchangeable law. The dominion the will has over his acts, whereby it is in his power to wish or not to wish, excludes the determination to *one* thing.² It is, therefore, not repugnant to the goodness of God to allow evil, because, if sin should be debarred, divine providence would not govern man according to his nature,³ and God does not destroy, but preserves, the nature of things; His motion is appropriate to the being to be moved.⁴ The divine goodness is one and single, and is the root of all the goodness that is to be found in created things. But, as individual creatures can but faintly represent the goodness of God, and each only in particular ways, it was needful that He should represent it in many different things, which, by their unity of relation with one another, should reflect in a certain sense the unity and simplicity of the Divine perfection, that each in that endless gradation of creatures might partake of it according to its own nature and capacity.⁵ Thus the contingency on our part does not arise from the nature of the secondary cause itself, but from the efficiency of the divine will, by which we are created under such circumstances. God wishes that one thing should happen necessarily, another accidentally and voluntarily. His infallible foreknowledge and the contingency of human acts perfectly agree; they are moved by God like instruments, their free choice being respected.⁶ Even if God should infringe our deliberate determination, there is no reason why our will should not be influenced by Him who gives to it the power of determining itself.⁷

The indifference of the will is not an absolute one, the tendency towards the universal good being innate, but the election of the object, which seems best, is fully in its power. Ullathorne, reproducing St. Thomas, says: As the material and unreasonable creatures, devoid of free will, are governed by the laws of necessity, it is the noble plan of God that man, however divinely assisted, can accept that help, and work out his lot with the use of his freedom. For God has endowed him with a cause that must operate with the supreme cause in determining his course. He can choose the good that is offered to him, whilst the providence of God gives

¹ I, 2 qu. 10, a. 2.

³ Comp. theol., c. 142.

⁵ Comp. theol., c. 102.

⁷ De Malo, qu. 3, a. 2.

² Contra Gent., i., 68.

⁴ De Malo, qu. 3, a. 2.

⁶ De Vero, qu. 21, a. 1.

him the means to achieve it.¹ The operation of God may be in a certain way determined or modified by the free creature. "*Causa primaria plus dicitur influere in quantum ejus effectus est intimior et permanentior in causato, quam effectus causæ secundæ; tamen magis similatur causæ secundæ, quia per eam determinatur quodam modo actus causæ secundæ ad hunc effectum.*"² The whole creation exhibits a gradual progress of perfection, the lowest creature reflects the image of God, but the nearer the creature approaches the Creator, the greater becomes its power of determination and the less does God incline it.³ The self-determination of man requires the non-determination of God.

St. Thomas accepts St. Augustine's definition of predestination.⁴ It would be absurd to suppose that our merits *induce* God to raise us into the number of His elect. Whatever in human nature has any relation to the supernatural, belongs to the effects of predestination. Yet, if all our actions were only the result of God's motion, then one man were not better than another, and there could be no difference of reward on earth, nor of glory in heaven.⁵ It is erroneous to say that human actions and events are not subject to the divine foreknowledge and predetermination; and not less erroneous is it that necessity is enjoined by them. God ordains things as they act; what is decreed from eternity happens in time according to the disposition of the proper cause.⁶ The providence of God overrules that life, giving to everybody what he deserves; man's free will works out God's intention.

St. Thomas, like the great bishop of Hippo, defends human freedom, whenever in contact with divine grace, but where and why both join each other remains undecided.

We add this paragraph to complete the preceding one. The "Summa," written for beginners,—*ad conditionem incipientium*⁷—has been explained in its minutest details. Many and great are the names of the commentators, both among the Dominicans and other theologians. Till Francis Vittoria, however, and Dominic Bañez, the founders of the so-called Thomistic school, we do not find any deviation from St. Thomas's teaching on grace and liberty. Our Holy Father, Leo XIII., recommending in his grand Encyclical on St. Thomas the scholastic doctrine, ordered at the same time the edition of his works containing the commentaries of Cajetan and Ferrariensis. Both belong to the elder Thomistic school; and to avoid long and tiresome quotations, we only shall produce the opinions of these two authors.⁸

¹ L. c., ch. iv.

² De Vero, qu. 22, a. 4.

³ II dist., 25, qu. 1, a. 1.

⁷ Prologus.

² De Vero, qu. 5, a. 9.

⁴ Lect. Pi. Rom. 8.

⁶ Decl. contra Græcos, c. 10.

⁸ Cf. Schneemann, l. c., Anhang.

Of Cajetan it was said that, if the works of St. Thomas could ever have been lost, they would have been found again in Cajetan's memory. He expressly says that the motion of the first cause undergoes a *modification* in the secondary cause. God does not operate by a previous motion; it suffices that He intrinsically co-operates in the choice and illumination of the intellect; man is free to use or to refuse God's influence.¹ God indeed gives power to the will, suggesting in every act the desire of the good, but the will determines itself to the particular good proposed by God.² Referring to our controversy, the cardinal says: "I have not found anything in St. Thomas concerning this doubt, for I do not recollect that he ever touched it, but he always was anxious to save the contingency of free-will."³

Ferrariensis, in his celebrated commentaries on the "Summa contra Gentiles," gives the same judgment. Distinguishing between *agi simpliciter*—to be simply moved—and *agi secundum quid*—to be moved indefinitely, he says, that whenever the inclination determines the hitherto indifferent power to a definite act, it simply moves; when the action is moved in such a way that it still remains free to act or not to act, it is moved without a determinate end. The operation of the Holy Ghost is of the second kind, because we have it in our power to follow or to withdraw.⁴

The same were the views of the theologians at the time of the Council of Trent. Schneemann says: "The universal doctrine was that God operates in us the consent through grace, provided we freely co-operate, and only in this manner the grace of God becomes efficacious."⁵

The *ratio studiorum* laying, as we have seen, great stress on theological tradition, gave a new impulse to theological studies. The Jesuits, accepting the fathers and scholastics, tried to shape the whole Catholic doctrine in one harmonious system. Their first great theologians and St. Ignatius himself were educated in the spirit of the older Thomistic school. They and their disciples regarded the *scientia media* as a necessary implement of St. Thomas's theology. We have seen that Lessius maintained it before Molina. Stapleton wrote to the Bishop of Middlebrough that he had heard all the propositions of Lessius twenty-five years before in the lectures of Father Toletus in Rome. The first Jesuit, however, who exhibited the whole doctrine of the order in its full extent was Louis Molina. Born in Cuença, he entered the Society at the age of eighteen, in the year 1555; having finished his studies

¹ In. i., qu. 14, a. 13.

² In. i., qu. 9, a. 3.

³ In. i., qu. 22, a. 4 ads.

⁴ In lib. 4, c. 22, lib. 3, c. 161.

⁵ L. c., i., p. 102. Father Kleutgen, in his great "Theologie der Vorzeit," maintains the same doctrine.

at Coïmbra, he was made professor of theology at Evora. He died in Madrid at the age of sixty-five, renowned for his modesty, piety, and learning. His principal works are a Commentary on the first part of the "Summa," a treatise on right and justice, and the famous "Concordance of Grace and Free-will," published in 1588.

In order to solve the great question, Molina starts with the definition and minute description of human liberty, for the obscurer the subject the safer the way of choosing what is near at hand. Free will is certainly more known and better understood than the hidden working of grace. Molina's definition is that of the scholastics: We are free, because we may do one thing or another; freedom formally lies in the will, but it supposes the judgment of reason, hence it is called "*liberum arbitrium*." The grace given to the angels and the first man was not efficacious by itself, but changeable (*versatilis*). It became efficacious in those angels who stood the trial; in man it remained inefficient, because he resisted it. Still the essence of human nature was not injured by Adam's fall. Man can perform good actions of the natural order, but neither can his intellect conceive nor his will desire anything proportionate to the supernatural. The supernatural is to be taken in the strictest sense; it is above both angels and men. The least meritorious act is impossible without an actual help of grace. The supernatural actions, though they are such not only by reason of their origin, but by virtue of their essence, retain, nevertheless, a close relation to the soul, because they come forth from its inmost depth and are performed by the faculties of human nature, many natural circumstances coinciding with their accomplishment. Supernatural in their essence and completion, they notwithstanding totally belong to man and totally to God, not, indeed, as if the will had any influence on the supernatural, for anything meritorious attributed to the will requires the touch of grace, but because the human consent is the condition without which grace cannot start to act. The foreseen consent is not by any means the reason or motive why God should pour out His blessings; His aid is entirely gratuitous; He may reserve His grace even if He foresees the consent of man. The *scientia media*, therefore, is the link between efficacious grace and human will. It is necessary to understand fully the meaning of this word.

Molina and his followers distinguish a three-fold science in God: simple intelligence—*scientia simplicis intelligentie*; visions—*scientia visionis*, by which He sees the things existing and to come; the science lying between both, *scientia media*, whereby he sees what would happen if certain conditions were fulfilled. The question is not, whether *scientia media* can be reduced to one of the other two; that would be only a play of words, because the condition which

the *scientia media* includes is merely possible, and thus known by the knowledge of simple intelligence; or the condition will be sometimes realized, and then the knowledge arises from vision. The centre of the controversy rests on the point, whether God in the formulation of His decrees is directed by the *scientia media*, that is, whether He predefines any actions of man without taking notice of human liberty.¹ With that knowledge, says Molina, God predestines the one to glory, the other to reprobation. He actually and sincerely desires the salvation of all men, provided they themselves correspond with the graces received. By reason of that will He sent His only begotten Son on earth to be the Saviour of mankind. He does not predestine by a decree efficacious of itself and antecedent to the prevision of the free consent of man; there is no predestination to glory before the prevision of the merits of man; no reprobation without the foreknowledge of the sins that will be committed. Yet there is no coördination of God and man. Whenever something supernatural is attributed to the human will, God is the principal, man only the subordinate cause. The efficiency of grace does not depend in its nature on the will, which cannot contribute anything to the supernatural power; the consent only is the condition that grace may unfold its wonderful works. God, however, can place the will under such circumstances and give such graces that the assent immediately follows, and on this ground Molina also accepts the predestination before the foreseen merits.

The fundamental principle of Molinism is: The nature of grace sufficient and grace efficacious is only one and the same thing. The grace takes effect through the consent of the human will; without it grace remains only sufficient, the same as the sacraments by themselves are channels of grace, but do not operate if the necessary conditions on the part of man are neglected. Molina distinguishes between efficacious grace in the first act (in *actu primo*), where the human consent is wanting; and in the second act (in *actu secundo*), where the consent is given. The difference between the first and inefficacious grace is this, that the first one is given to those whose assent God foresees, whilst the other is given to those who will refuse it. Thus, the *gratia efficax in actu primo* is a far greater benefit than the *gratia inefficax*, because the one will bring forth its fruit, whilst the other will remain barren. Of two men, therefore, who receive the same amount of grace under the same circumstances, the one may coöperate, the other resist; Bossuet, though not a Molinist, clearly showed the wide difference between Molinism and Semipelagianism. That heresy, he says,² objected that the necessity of grace ruined the freedom of man, extinguishing all zeal for virtue; the

¹ Tournelly : De Deo, qu. 7, c. 5.

² Second Avertissement aux Protestants.

Molinists admit the necessity and gratuity of grace, but deny the antecedent decree of predestination. Molina himself, answering the objections against *scientia media*, says that their opinion at first may seem probable; still, when we consider that God, having foreseen the disposition of our will, makes *this* the measure and rule of His choice, and thus confers the help and means for our salvation, fixed from all eternity, there is no cause for any prejudice against His omnipotence or foreknowledge.¹

Great theologians like Maldonat, Stapleton, Lessius, Vasquez, Sfondrati, Franzelin, accept the Molinistic system, and St. Francis de Sales calls it old and of authority;² not less honorable is the enmity of the Jansenists against Molina's doctrine. When the Concordance was published, the Jesuits as a body never accepted the book, but they defended the *scientia media*, opposing the efficiency of grace by itself.

The *scientia media* met most vigorous adversaries in the Dominicans, who charged Molina with Pelagianism. Other reasons added to the animosity between the two orders. The Jesuits, though a new order, had gained an immense influence in Spain and other countries. Their constitution was entirely different from that of the older orders; the very name Jesuit intimated hypocrisy, if not blasphemy. Melchior Canus saw in them the coming Antichrist and preached in Salamanca against the associates of the devil. The bull "Ascendente Domino," and finally the Concordance brought on the fierce combat.

At the head of the Dominicans stood Dominic Bañez, professor *primarius* in the University of Salamanca, a man of great learning, virtue and energy, ready to carry his point to the extreme. The shield of the Louvain professors was St. Augustine, that of the Dominicans St. Thomas. The exclusive partiality for one author, and that propensity to attribute to St. Thomas what *they* thought to be his opinion, increased here as well as in Louvain the heat of the dispute. The original founder of the Thomistic school was Francis Vittoria, an intimate friend of St. Ignatius, Faber, and Toletus, whose teacher he was. His commentaries on the "Summa" are not printed. Schneemann used a copy of his lectures, preserved in the Vatican library. From these it appears that Vittoria forms a kind of transition from the older to the modern Thomists. Schneemann says, if we consider his doctrine, we see that he is completely opposed to Bañez, who rejected what with Vittoria all ancient and modern theologians accept. Yet there are at the same time certain propositions which, taken by themselves, directly lead to the system of Bañez.³

¹ Disp. I., qu. 23, a. 4, ct. 5.

² Letter to Lessius, 26 August, 1618.

³ L. c., II., p. 223.

The fundamental principle of the Thomists is: God is the first cause of all things; He sustains the creature in its being and operation; it is repugnant to His dignity to await the determination of the creature, and make it the rule of His decrees. God Himself is the efficacious cause of everything good, and thus efficaciously wishes the end and the means leading to it, for no secondary cause can operate unless it is efficaciously moved by God. He not only wishes the act, but decrees it to be free, and thus His motion does not draw the will as something lifeless, but enlivens it and disperses the clouds from the intellect for the better choice of the object. Since God, together with the freedom of the act, determines its existence, His foreknowledge arises from its causality. The disposition of the creature cannot have any influence on Him, nor be the condition of His efficient gifts, *because that very disposition is the work of God*. Bañez's whole system will be best understood in his doctrine on Divine permission of sin. Denying the *scientia media*, he was compelled to say that the permission *precedes* the foresight of the refusal on the part of man. Thus going to the extreme, he maintained that God *probably* does not wish the salvation of all men.¹ He elected some for eternal life, some He disdained and despised, yet this contempt is nothing else than the will to allow them to fail in their last end. Bañez's followers, Billuart, Lemos, Alvarez, Bellarmin, and the others did not accept the harshness of this doctrine, which can hardly be excused from heresy. The Thomists rejected the severe conclusions of their master, but having the honest persuasion that Molina was renewing the Pelagian heresy, they followed the great Dominican in the struggle against the Jesuits.

The Inquisition found no fault in Molina's work. Bañez's complaints, brought before Rome, ended in prohibiting the mutual charges of heresy and imposing silence on both parties. The Dominicans, however, continued their attacks with a violence which even the ardor of dispute could not excuse. The Pope finally decided to bring the whole question before a tribunal, called the *Congregatio de Auxiliis*. The public sessions and disputes were without avail. Pope Paul V. dismissed both parties, advising them to wait till the Holy See should decide the problem at some future time. The general impression, however, the *congregatio* left was a condemnation *in petto* of Molina's system, which, in fact, was almost accomplished on two occasions. The first session took place January 2d, 1598; the last, August 28th, 1607. The question remained unsettled. The Jansenists pretended that their vicious delectation does not vary from the grace efficacious of

¹ Qu. 23, a. 23.

itself, taught by the Dominicans, but the difference between the two is great. The victorious *indeliberate* delectation of the Jansenists destroyed the freedom of the will; the efficacious grace of the Thomists means an enlightenment of the intellect and a strengthening of the will. The great controversy, and the Thomists above all, had to serve as a cover for the propagation of the subtlest heresy ever known in the Church.

Whether or not there was between St. Cyran, Jansenius and the others a secret association, a common plan of attack against the Church, drawn up by the sectaries at Bourg-Fontaine, is one of those problems which history has not solved satisfactorily.¹ Though from the evidence known thus far we are inclined to answer in the affirmative, the question is practically of not much importance, and beyond the scope of our essay. It is certain that all the causes enumerated met, like many strings tied in one knot, at Port Royal, the headquarters of Jansenism. The simple and solitary life of its inhabitants, the precision and elegance of their works, before unknown in the French language, generally increased the strength of that heresy. Nothing seduces more than a beautiful style combined with an apparently earnest doctrine and the fame of a virtuous and austere life led by its author. But foul ambition, conspicuous by its rigorism and contemptuous perseverance in errors repeatedly condemned by the Church, overshadow the glory of Port Royal. Its members proved themselves deplorably ignorant of the past and present of the religion they yet professed. They pretended to master and to exhaust the patrology and history of the Church. Whenever submission was required, they only admitted attenuated theories suiting their own frail system. The woe and misery brought on the Church by that heresy were great, but Jansenism to-day is, like the rest of the heresies, only a matter of history.

¹ Darras, vol. iv., p. 279.

THE QUEBEC ACT AND THE CHURCH IN CANADA.

AT the distinguished company assembled at Toronto last autumn in honor of Archbishop Lynch, many of the readers of this REVIEW who were present and heard the speeches will have remembered with what pardonable pride the venerable prelate from Quebec, Archbishop Taschereau, referred to the ancient boundaries of his diocese; to the time when his predecessors had jurisdiction not only over the province of his host, but westward to the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi. No one better than the illustrious speaker could have depicted the time when, in Canada, a long line of bishops traced the outlines of a great cross on this Continent, at once the symbol and limits of their jurisdiction, connecting the Atlantic with the Rocky Mountains, intersected by a belt of territory extending from Hudson's Bay to the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. This was the diocese of Quebec not only under the old French régime, but for many years after the cession of Canada to England in 1763—up, in fact, to the formation of the United States some years later. The early American Church, not owing allegiance to the French or Canadian bishops, comprised what was comparatively a small strip of Atlantic seaboard, with France to the north and west and Spain to the south. Probably the moderation of the speaker had been somewhat suggested by the cosmopolitan character of the assembly, fearing lest some representative of the Mexican Church might have arisen and asserted his claim, if not to the larger portion of the Continent, at least forestalling Quebec in priority by a good century and a quarter. Conceding this, there yet remained a respectable antiquity to Bishop Laval and his successors, and a jurisdiction of territory that now covers nearly a dozen ecclesiastical provinces.

But beyond this there are some unique things about the Church in Canada. We had a complete Church establishment prior to the cession, and we have had since the cession an attempted establishment, so to speak, under British law. Our bishops in French times were the choice of the king, and the diocese, convents and colleges were established by royal patent. In early English rule, since the cession, the King of England has been consulted in the choice of bishops, and the Downing Street authorities have time and again signified their disapproval or acceptance of nominees to the episcopal see of Quebec before they were preconized at Rome. In truth, we have had the representative

of the Crown trying, by every means, to force the Church under the law, so that not only the bishop but every curé should seem to be appointed by the king's most excellent majesty. In former days, in England, a Catholic was thought to be good enough to be head of the Protestant Church; and as it was a poor rule that worked only one way, the flexibility of the constitution was thought to be sufficient to enable a Protestant king in return to become the head of the Catholic Church, at least good enough for the Church in a colony. We have had Protestants, legal luminaries amongst us at one time, arguing that Roman Catholics in Quebec or Lower Canada had no rights whatever, as compared with the Church of England, and at another arguing that the Catholic Church is the only Church there established by law. We have seen the one see of Quebec occupied by two titular Bishops—a Catholic and an Anglican—and the latter forced to give way. Learned judges and attorney-generals have wasted their time drafting *commissions* for Catholic bishops to be licensed as Chief Ecclesiastical Superintendents of the Church of Rome, with irremovable curés and state-erected parishes; and afterwards we have seen these officials sit, "cheek by jowl," with the self-same superintendents in the legislative councils of the province, not as superintendents but as recognized bishops of this favored Church. And to this day, in this same province, the parish, so erected by the Bishop, is equally as well known as is the township or county or ward under its municipal law, and the curé and church wardens are recognized in the public law of the land. The law apports the tithes and its officers collect them. On the other hand, there is also on record within this country the refusal by Protestant rulers to grant Wesleyan Methodists any sort of legal recognition for their ministers, unless under a security of two hundred pounds sterling and the appearance of seven respectable members testifying before justices of the quarter sessions as to the genuineness of the minister in question, and the additional indignity of a violent protest against even this concession by a Protestant chief justice.¹

We have had the Church of England established by law in one province and generally the attempted disregard everywhere of all who did not belong to that church. We have examples of a Catholic being in the position of O'Connell as to taking his seat in

¹ In order to show what a beautiful example this judicial dignity bequeathed to his posterity, it is related that when the accounts of the Jesuits' estates were examined by the House of Assembly in Lower Canada it was found that one of the Church of England parsons, residing in Quebec, was in the habit of annually drawing a large income from the school funds on pretense of being "Chaplain to the Jesuits." "The Jesuits," says Wm. Lyon Mackenzie, who is authority for this story, "had been all dead many years before, and, besides, they were Roman Catholics. The parson's name was Sewell, a son of Jonathan, the Chief Justice."

the Commons. We have the sad story of the Acadians and the persecutions of religious, and by one of those curious retributions by which Providence makes a fool of people, we have a small province, into which no Catholic was allowed to emigrate, now numbering more Catholics than Protestants.

In our chief Protestant province we have had a committee of the legislature report that the Church of England is not the church by law established in Canada, and that no prayers from its chaplain would be tolerated. We have had governments make a choice of religions, and find them approving of four—the Catholic, the Anglican, the Presbyterian, and the Methodist—and following the example in Ireland of giving the most where it was least needed. We have had, however, within the last sixty years, a Catholic bishop and his clergy supported largely out of the public chest. In this same province we can turn up the estimates in blue books and find pounds upon pounds paid out of the public taxes for the building and repairing of Catholic churches. We have separate schools, and we have had large sums paid annually in this same Protestant province for the support of Catholic colleges. We have had tithes, as they still have them in Quebec. Here, too, may be found the name of a legislative councillor who was an Honorable and Right Reverend gentleman—the first Roman Catholic Bishop of Upper Canada—in receipt of a considerable pension from the state and of complimentary notices for his loyalty from his Prince Regent. We have had riots and mobs attacking processions, and we have in return a Protestant city turn out to honor its Archbishop, and the vice-regal, provincial, and civic dignitaries vying with one another to honor this same rather outspoken churchman. There is, in fine, in Canada, an immense territory, with every assistance of nature, for a great nation, with the only serious drawback of a lack of anything like a proportionate population. There is need of fifty millions of people, but, in the meantime, things go on very well with a tenth of that number, one-half of whom are Catholics, holding their own fairly well. The Catholics believe that the form of government is one of the best in the world, and that the Church is as free and prosperous as the Church militant can expect to be.

When we speak of Canada some explanations must be made. Nowadays, every one must keep up his knowledge of geography, as the political changes are so numerous that what was true of boundaries and divisions yesterday may not be so to-day. Until the Dominion of Canada was created in 1867, the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada comprised what, for one hundred years, was included in the old Canadas, or in the older Province of Quebec. To-day Canada means, leaving out Newfoundland, all

British territory lying north of the United States. This includes everything on the map, except Alaska and Greenland, and is, indeed, as large as or larger than the States of the American Union. There are now seven provinces and several territories bound together by a central government in much the same way, politically, as are the American States. Two out of these seven provinces form the old Canadas, and these are the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, the latter returning to its old name in the Act of 1774. There are three provinces around the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and these retain their former names: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. The first two of these were anciently known as Acadia, but they formed no part of Canada as ceded by France, belonging to the English for many years before Quebec fell. On the other hand, Prince Edward Island, called by the French St. John, and Cape Breton, were part of New France, and came to England under the Treaty of 1763. Newfoundland has never been fraternized, politically or ecclesiastically, with British Canada, and is no part of the Dominion. The other two provinces of Canada are British Columbia, on the Pacific coast, formerly owned by the Hudson Bay Company, and Manitoba, a new creation of the Dominion Government, carved out of the great Northwest, lying between Ontario and the Saskatchewan Valley, which runs westward to the Rocky Mountains. This latter valley and the great Lone Land to the north of it and Manitoba, extending east to Hudson Bay, is the Northwest Territory, and was formerly the seat of the posts and forts of the Hudson Bay Company and other great fur companies. The remainder of the map eastward to the Atlantic forms the Northeast Territory.

These provinces and territories have, of course, their own separate histories. They have their own local laws and, in general, the care of their own domestic concerns. Formerly they were separate colonies of Great Britain, now there is only one colony—rather one dependency—as no one now, except some newly-arrived Englishman, would talk of Canadians being colonists.

The new Dominion of Canada dates back only a few years, beginning in 1867 with four provinces and adding others since that date until the present dimensions have been attained. It is plain, therefore, that considerable limitation must be made in speaking of historical matters in Canada, as there are fully half a dozen or more places to be considered, each with a separate history of its own. However, the two Canadas, once the old Province of Quebec, and forming the bulk of what was New France, are very prominently before the mind of the reader of political and ecclesiastical history. They were divorced by the Act of 1791, to be united again in 1840, and seem to be marked out as political partners, strange enough

though the partnership be. The present constitution is the fifth or sixth change under British rule within its first century.

During all these mutations in constitutions the Church has a history that, though naturally branching out in more recent times with the increase of its children and by force of political changes, nevertheless preserved for a long time one headquarters in one ecclesiastical province, having to deal entirely with the Crown of England as represented by the governors of Canada. As has been said, all of the other fragmentary possessions of Great Britain in America were separate colonies. But the Governor-General of Canada was, in an undefined way, their superior, was Captain-General of all the forces, and took precedence of other British governors. Living in Quebec with the Bishop, he seemed to represent the Crown, as did the latter the Church, for all the British provinces. The battle of the Church was fought between these two under British rule as it was fought there under the French rule. It was not until the last years of the reign of George the Third that the Bishop of Quebec got his immense diocese subdivided, but the rights of his Church were contested and decided long before this, though by the same heroic bishop. In 1819 Bishop Plessis, having obtained sanction in England and in Rome, established vicar-generals in Upper Canada, in New Brunswick, and in the Northwest. From that time a particular history in these places is necessary. It is to this period, within which Bishop Plessis (he was Archbishop, but prudently declined to style himself such) and his predecessors, as bishops of Quebec, held the Church in their own hands, that attention must be mainly directed at first. He and Bishop Laval stand at the end and beginning of the history of that Diocese.

Upper Canada was the resort of United Empire loyalists, and many others, to whom the rule in Lower Canada or Quebec was displeasing, and it will therefore come in for considerable notice, and is entitled to it, as now and always a part of old Canada.

In 1796 Newfoundland had been erected by the Holy Father into a Vicariate Apostolic, and the same condition of things obtained in Nova Scotia since the year 1817. The other portions of Canada were under the supervision of the Bishop of Quebec. Louisiana had passed out of French control to Spain soon after the middle of the last century, and, in 1793, had its bishop, who was suffragan of San Domingo; so that nothing remained to England south or west of the Great Lakes, though the mission in Detroit was still practically under the care of Bishop McDonell, auxiliary of the Bishop of Quebec and later the first Bishop of Kingston. As will be seen later, there is a certain analogy between the political and ecclesiastical divisions in Canada. What we call

the Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, now form one ecclesiastical province, and besides the popular name, the Constitution of Canada considers these as one division for purposes of representation in the Senate. Quebec and Ontario are also ecclesiastical provinces, and are separate political provinces, and the remainder of Canada goes to make up the fourth ecclesiastical province. It has a Senate representation with reference to its population, so that four divisions obtain in each, though as to the Northwest the analogy is not so complete as in the other three. There are still vicariates apostolic in Canada. Newfoundland stands aloof from the political combination of 1867, and is yet a colony of the empire. She also forms no part of any ecclesiastical province of Canada, being directly subject to the Holy See. The western portion of the island was made an Apostolic Prefecture in 1871, and is called St. George. The French islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence form another Apostolic Prefecture.

Bearing this in mind, the reader will be better able to appreciate our past history and avoid some confusion in these matters that many Canadians have difficulty in avoiding. Many shufflings of constitutions have taken place since Canada passed under British rule. The Church alone, for two centuries and three-quarters, has pursued its unchanging way. "One great fact," says Parkman, "stands out conspicuous in Canadian history—the Church of Rome. More even than the royal power she shaped the character and the destinies of the colony. She was its nurse and almost its mother; and, wayward and headstrong as it was, it never broke the ties of faith that held it to her. It was these ties which, in the absence of political franchises, formed under the old régime the only vital coherence in the population. The royal government was transient; the Church was permanent. The English conquest shattered the whole apparatus of civil administration at a blow, but it left her untouched. Governors, intendants, councils, and commandants, all were gone, the principal seignors fled the colony, and a people who had never learned to control themselves or help themselves were suddenly left to their own devices. Confusion, if not anarchy, would have followed but for the parish priests, who, in a character of double paternity, half spiritual and half temporal, became more than ever the guardians of order throughout Canada."

Attention has been drawn to the extent of the Diocese of Quebec. That portion of it which now lies within the United States need not detain us. For twenty years after the cession the English owned north and south of the Great Lakes, and Quebec claimed jurisdiction, in the valley of the Mississippi, as far south as New Orleans. After the Treaty of Versailles, in 1783, only six years

elapsed until the Catholics of the United States had a bishop of their own, and since that time the history of the Church in the United States would include that of the portion of Canada extending along the Mississippi. None of the territory south of Lake Erie or Ontario, or west of Lake Huron, though included in the boundaries of Quebec under the Quebec Act of 1774, need be taken into consideration, though for many years after it passed into the hands of the United States authorities the ecclesiastical limits were not the same as the political boundaries.¹

So far as the Church in Canada is concerned, the extent of the Diocese of Quebec at the time of the Treaty of Paris, or in 1774, would not be a safe guide in estimating how far the guarantees of the treaty extend. It will be borne in mind that, while the French ceded Canada to the British, they stipulated for the free exercise of religion, but only as regards their own subjects. There was no compact entered into that all other Catholics under British rule in America should be secured in the same rights. The "new" Roman Catholic subjects were the subjects to be protected. Now, it is true that Acadia and Newfoundland and some of the Gulf islands changed masters very frequently, and that, in general, they were under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bishop of Quebec; but they were, excepting perhaps the Island of St. John (now Prince Edward Island), and Cape Breton, under the Crown of England before the date of the Treaty of Paris. These inhabitants were, therefore, not new subjects, nor has it been urged by any writer that any claim for the guarantees of the free exercise of religion was ever made outside of the territory actually known as Canada or New France in 1763. The terms of capitulation at Montreal, indeed, refer to the "Diocese" and to the "priests and people" in the "towns" and "country places" and "distant posts" and to the "missionaries," but under the usual construction put upon like documents the terms of capitulation would be binding only and until the definitive treaty was executed. They were binding, certainly, for three years, but then came the treaty in which "His Britannic Majesty on his side agrees to grant to the inhabitants of Canada the liberty of the Catholic religion. He will, in consequence, give the most exact and effectual orders that his new Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion according to the rites of the Roman Church as far as the laws of Great Britain permit."

The writer, while stating his opinion that the treaty is now to be looked at rather than the terms of capitulation at Quebec and Montreal, is not unaware of the fact that almost every writer who

¹ The boundaries of Quebec were purposely set out in full in the Article on the Treaty of Paris in the April number of the REVIEW.

has dealt with this matter has read treaty and capitulations as forming one international bargain. It is difficult to reconcile this with the history of the treaty, and with the general principles applicable to the construction of agreements culminating in one considered and definite document. Of course, the capitulations are good enough evidence of the desire of the parties, and where they do not offend against the meaning of the treaty, but help to explain it, they ought to be admitted. But it is manifest that entirely new stipulations may have been finally settled by the treaty which were never entertained by the generals who drew up the capitulations. Indeed, these capitulations anticipate other terms.

Nearly every treaty between France and England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries adjusting European matters affected colonists in America, the Anglo-Americans and the Canadians, as the French inhabitants were called. In 1697 the Treaty of Ryswick was signed, and by it the French asserted the Kennebec to be the boundary between them and Massachusetts.¹ The entire eastern coast, Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, St. John (now Prince Edward Island), Newfoundland, Labrador, and Hudson's Bay remained to the French.

By the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, Nova Scotia, then called Acadia, according to its ancient limits, with the whole of Newfoundland, was given up to England. The French retained some reservation as to the fisheries in Newfoundland, and the English secured the fur trade of Hudson Bay.

By the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, in 1749, Cape Breton, with the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, was restored to France. Three years prior to this, Cape Breton had been taken by the English colonists. By a consideration of these treaties it will be seen at once who were and were not already British subjects in what is yet British territory before the Seven Years' War ending with the Treaty of Paris. The inhabitants of Acadia, afterwards two provinces of Canada, were, in 1763, not inhabitants of Canada, and consequently were not "new" subjects, as Acadia passed over to England in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht. In a court of law it would not be arguable on the documents and facts to say that the guarantees of the stipulation were coterminous with the boundaries of the diocese, or that New Brunswick or Nova Scotia come within the scope of its benefits. On the other hand, the people of St.

¹ Mr. Garneau says that soon after 1763 a slice of territory was detached from Canada and took the name of New Brunswick with an administration apart. Now Nova Scotia had a legislature of its own since 1758, and it then, and since 1731, included New Brunswick, but its western boundary was not easily defined. Acadia or New Brunswick, when it passed into the hands of the English in 1713, had for its western boundary the Kennebec River. Great Britain, since that time, lost the territory between the Kennebec and the present boundary, the St. Croix River.

John and Cape Breton may fairly be regarded as citizens of a part of New France, as "new" subjects of the Crown of Great Britain after the cession, though St. John was under British rule before the treaty and in 1758. However, it was part of the Seven Years' War; Quebec was in the same position, was under British rule since 1759, and Montreal since 1760.

There is no doubt at all but that the other provinces and territories in Canada, except probably British Columbia and some of the Hudson Bay territory, come within the treaty or the act. A reference to the words of the treaty will explain this. The territory ceded to England after the fall of Quebec and the capitulation is referred to in the treaty as follows :

"Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne renonce à toutes prétentions qu'elle a jusqu'ici formées ou pourrait former sur la Nouvelle Ecosse ou Acadie, dans toutes ses parties, et en garantit le tout et toutes ses dépendances au Roi de la Grande Bretagne.

"De plus, Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne cède et garantit à la dite Majesté Britannique, en plein droit, le Canada avec toutes ses dépendances, ainsi que l'Ile Cap Breton, et toutes les autres îles et côtes dans le golfe et le fleuve St. Laurent, et en général tout ce qui dépend des dits pays, terres, îles et côtes, avec la souveraineté, propriété, possession et tous droits acquis par traité ou autrement, que le Roi très-chrétien et la couronne de France ont eus jusqu'à présent sur les dits pays, îles, terres, places, côtes, et leurs habitants, de sorte que le Roi Très-Chrétien cède et transporte le tout au dit Roi et Couronne de la Grande Bretagne, et cela de la manière et forme les plus agréables, sans restriction et sans pouvoir d'écarter de la dite garantie, sous aucun prétexte, ou de pouvoir troubler la Grande-Bretagne dans les possessions sus-mentionnées."

The clauses to be construed with this are as follows, in the language in which they were written :

"Sa Majesté Britannique, de son côté, consent d'accorder la liberté de la religion Catholique aux habitants du Canada. Elle donnera en conséquence les ordres les plus efficaces pour que ses nouveaux sujets Catholiques Romains puissent professer le culte de leur religion selon les rites de l'Eglise de Rome, autant que les lois d'Angleterre le permettent.

"Sa Majesté Britannique consent de plus que les habitants Français ou autres, qui avaient été sujets du Roi Très-Chrétien en Canada, puissent se retirer en toute sûreté et liberté, ou ils jugeront à propos ; qu'ils vendent leurs biens, pourvu que ce soit à des sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique ; et qu'ils emportent leurs effets avec eux, sans être restreints dans leur émigration, sous aucun prétexte quelconque, à l'exception de celui des dettes ou de poursuite criminelles ; le terme limité pour cette émigration sera fixé à

l'espace de dix-huit mois, à compter du jour de l'échange de la ratification du présent traité."

Under this treaty there is, therefore, included the province of Ontario and a part of the Northeast territory, along with the present Province of Quebec. These come within the operation of the Quebec Act as well.

What the western boundaries of New France may have been in 1763 is not now easy to determine. It was lately the subject of an appeal to the Privy Council between the Province of Ontario and the Dominion of Canada as to the western limits of this province. These were found to be more extensive than many supposed. But their extreme western limit does not reach into the province of Manitoba, and it would require a consideration of the Red River settlement and the wars of the traders to be able to offer any speculation as to whether treaty or act reached westward on the Saskatchewan. The country was explored by Verendrye, under French rule, in the early part of the eighteenth century, and large settlements made. The Hudson Bay charter goes back to the time of Charles II., but the French and English were alternately masters of the fur trade, and the settlements were largely made up of the traders and the half-breeds.

As regards the Hudson Bay settlement, there were very few Catholics, the inhabitants being nearly all from the Orkneys of Scotland or from Switzerland. In the Red River settlement and at Sault St. Marie there were flourishing French posts with missionaries and a prosperous body of settlers, all Catholics.

In a former article in this REVIEW it was pointed out how the Crown of England interpreted the treaty, and how, by means of the Quebec Act, the boundaries of Canada were defined and the benefit of a liberal interpretation of the religious guarantees extended to all Catholics within the large area of the new province of Quebec. Beyond this area the act does not go, but the treaty does, and to a considerable extent of territory. Under the Quebec Act there was Labrador, from St. John River to Hudson Bay, Anticosti, and the Magdalen Islands; under the treaty, the isles of St. John (now Prince Edward Island) and Cape Breton. The Canadas and parts of the territories are both in the treaty and in the act.

It will thus be seen that for a portion of British America the Treaty of Paris applied; for another portion the Quebec Act applied, and for the remainder there was no guarantee as far as the Church is concerned. Indeed, in Nova Scotia one of the early Acts of the Legislative Council was to establish there by law the Church of England.

Before discussing the question of the extent of the treaty as compared with the Quebec Act, or the benefits accorded by either,

assuming that the former extends to the French territory now owned by Great Britain, by virtue of the law of nations, and that the latter (the act) is binding within whatever territory the Crown of England chose to extend it, it may be asked what difference would it make to claim under the treaty or under the act? There can be no great difference; the act is fuller, more liberal than the bare words in the treaty, and is not limited to the old French territory, may be within larger or smaller bounds, and may, like any other imperial statute, extend its provisions anywhere within the empire.

The treaty is limited to the old French territory, and cannot be extended beyond the ancient French possessions, nor does it include them all; on the other hand, it cannot be abridged as to that territory. There is no doubt also but that as long as the British Empire continues to exist and keep up its standing as a nation, it will be bound to keep faith with France as to the terms of the Treaty. The guarantees for these terms would extend to all Roman Catholics who, at any time subsequently, were British subjects in the ceded territory.¹ A treaty does not become effete, though it is otherwise with an Act of Parliament; but until the Quebec Act is repealed a mere non-user would not render it lifeless. As has been shown in a former article, this act has been expressly recognized for over a hundred years in Canada, and in every great political change has been referred to as the basis of all our constitutions. The effect of subsequent imperial and provincial legislation will be considered further on.

The treaty, it will be remembered, has one apparently inconsistent feature in it—the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion is guaranteed to the new subjects, “so far as the laws of Great Britain permit.” The Act of 1774 puts an interpretation upon these words, but the Act itself is not easy to construe. The ablest jurists in England and Canada gave it as their opinion at the time that these words, “so far as the laws of Great Britain permit,” mean so far as the laws of Great Britain permit the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion in the colonies and outlying divisions of the Crown. Parliament adopted this construction. The statute books were then ransacked to discover what, if any, laws in force against the Catholics extended to the colonies. After a search,

¹ L' Abbé Ferland narrates that, when Monseigneur Plessis, Bishop of Quebec, was on a visit to Rome in 1819, an interview with Louis XVIII. was arranged for him at Paris. “The audience was private; the King spoke to Monseigneur Plessis with kindness, and put many questions relating to the state of religion in Canada, requested to be remembered in his prayers, and charged him to say to his diocesans that their former sovereign had not forgotten them, and that, if the conditions stipulated for in their favor by the Treaty of Peace were not observed by England, France would not neglect to claim them.”

the most careful, as may be imagined, only one statute could be found. This was the Act of Supremacy of Queen Elizabeth, the first act in the first year of her reign. In the Quebec Act, as has been seen, they, accordingly, introduced the supremacy of the king, but greatly modified the oath, so that there was nothing very objectionable about it. Where the statute applies territorially, then this construction must obtain; and without going into argument on the question, it may be assumed that, where the treaty extends beyond the boundaries of the old Quebec province, the same construction would be put upon it as upon the statute. To invoke the treaty would be to invoke the construction put upon it in the highest court of the realm. It was quite competent to the British Parliament to have made the Quebec limits coterminous with the ceded territory, and if they fell short of part of it this would not affect the *ratio decidendi*, the purview and scope of the treaty generally.

If this be so, then the one construction suffices for treaty and statute, and reduces the question to this simply: How does the supremacy of the king of a Protestant country affect the free exercise of religion to his Roman Catholic subjects? The Act of Supremacy was but a re-enactment by Elizabeth of a statute passed in the twenty-fifth year of Henry VIII., entitled: "*An Act for the submission of the clergie to the King's Majestic.*" The preamble of this act is painfully significant of the times: "Whereas, the King's humble and obedient servants, the clergy of this realm of England, etc.," and then it goes on to recite the desire of the King in matters ecclesiastical. The submission of the clergy is accounted for at this particular juncture by a Protestant writer, Short, in his "History of the Church of England." The clergy were then under a *præmunire* in regard to Wolsey. "In order to buy this off, the Convocation consented to a considerable subsidy, and in the bill which granted it the king's supremacy was asserted. It was, however, with much difficulty that this clause was passed, and so little with the goodwill of the lower house that, after the acknowledgment, a proviso was inserted *quantum per Christum licet.*" This act made the King Primate of the Church of England, and by it the sovereign is regarded as being over all persons and over all causes, ecclesiastical as well as civil, supreme in the Church.

The author referred to very candidly admits the reason of the assumption of this supreme ecclesiastical power; it was to procure a divorce for the King from Queen Catharine. "The existence of the Church of England," he adds, "as a distinct body and her final separation from Rome may be dated from the period of the divorce." To obtain this and yet remain a Catholic—a Defender of the Faith—it is by various authors contended, was the sole aim of the King,

and it is certainly clear that whatever his motives may have been, the doctrine of the royal supremacy was not pushed to as great a degree as in the reign of Elizabeth. In the interval between the reigns of these two sovereigns the first statute of Philip and Mary repealed this act and established the Church in its former relations to Rome. Elizabeth, on her accession, passed an act reviving the supremacy of the Crown, and re-enacting nearly everything that her sister had repealed. Two short sections of the first act in the year 1558 will give all that is necessary. Section XVI. is as follows: "And to the intent that all usurped and foreign power and authority, spiritual and temporal, may, forever, be clearly extinguished, and never to be used or obeyed within these realms or any other of Your Majestie's dominions or countries. May it please Your Highness that it may be further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That no foreign prince, person, prelate, state, or potentate, spiritual or temporal, shall use, enjoy, or exercise any manner of power, jurisdiction, superiority, authority, pre-eminence, or privilege, spiritual or ecclesiastical, within this realm or any other of Her Majestie's dominions or countries, but the same shall be abolished thereout forever, any statute, ordinance, custom, constitution, or any other matter or cause whatever, to the contrary notwithstanding."

Section XVII.: "And that it may also please Your Highness that it may be established and enacted by the authority aforesaid, That such jurisdiction, privileges, superiority, and pre-eminence, spiritual and ecclesiastical, or by any spiritual or ecclesiastical power or authority, hath heretofore been, or may lawfully be, exercised or used for the visitation of the ecclesiastical state and persons, and for reformation, order, and correction of the same; and of all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts, and enormities shall, forever, by authority of this present Parliament, be united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this realm."

Coke and Hale put constructions on this statute which, at all events, suited the royal pretensions. Coke says that, "By the ancient laws of this realm the kingdom of England is an absolute empire and monarchy, consisting of one head, which is the King, and of a body consisting of several members, which the law divideth into two parts. The clergy and the laity, both of them next and immediately under God, subject and obedient to the head, . . . such an authority as the Pope heretofore exercised, is now annexed to the Crown by the above-mentioned statute." And elsewhere it is laid down judicially that "all that power which the Pope ever exercised within this realm on spirituals is now vested in the King."

These opinions were certainly opposed to Magna Charta, the first chapter of which stipulates that the Church shall be free and have her whole rights and liberties inviolable. As to the statute being declaratory of the common law, that went for nothing, as the whole doctrine was novel, and without custom or precedent justifying it. The title of "Supreme Head of the Church and Clergy of England" appears for the first time in the Petition of Convocation to Henry VIII. to relieve them from the penalties to which they were exposed.

If it were necessary to pursue this subject, there would be little difficulty in estimating how the members of the Church of England regarded the change from the Papal to the royal supremacy. It was well enough to inveigh against the supremacy of the Pope, but when the royal supremacy was found to be more intolerable, then it was time for a noted public man and writer to say that "pretensions of this sort, from whatever side they have come, have never found any permanent favor with the English people." This is very briefly the history of the passing of the Act of Supremacy—an act by which, in England, the King is supreme ordinary and who might, without any Act of Parliament, make ordinances for the government of the clergy, and if there be a controversy between spiritual persons concerning jurisdiction, he is arbitrator, and it is a right of his Crown to declare their bounds. The King in England, therefore, became head of the church, no matter what the church was and no matter what religion the King professed. He was King and Pope; the church became a department of the state, quite subordinate to the Crown and to its judicial and executive officers. It exists with the Crown, and ceases when the Crown ceases. The Crown was the head of Episcopacy in England, and might have been head of Presbyterianism in Scotland that tolerates no Episcopacy. A Catholic Stuart was the head of this Protestant Church. With such precedents, what obstacle was there to the omnipotence of the Parliament of Great Britain to assume headship over the Church of Rome in Canada? Under such a multiplication of recognized churches the Crown was likely to become an ecclesiastical hydra. If there was no great reason why that should be propagated in Canada which was regarded as damnable and idolatrous at home, then it was but a step further to have the viceroy in India proclaimed the head of the native church, as Lord Dalhousie thought he could be in Canada. Had the Act of Supremacy been held to be in full force in Canada, there is little doubt but that no Catholic could have assumed any office, or any clergyman become recognized before the law; but the statute itself was virtually repealed, especially as to the oath, and a new and simple one introduced. The words of the Quebec Act are, "may

have, hold, and enjoy the free exercise of the religion of the Church of Rome, subject to the King's supremacy declared in the act, etc."

Now, as to the meaning put upon the statute by Lord Coke and referred to above, it is to this effect, that to the King of England there is now annexed such an authority as the Pope heretofore exercised. Suppose such power were annexed, it could vest only by some supposed transfer of it from the Pope himself; or that the King inherently was possessed of it. The latter was the only view possible. The statute affirming this inherent authority could not make it a fact or make it believed by Catholics, and the only course open to the Crown was by active coercive measures in the more modern form of persecution. The Crown then, in Canada, said in effect, we will assume control over the Church and be its head whether it wants another head or not. The Church in Scotland would have been satisfied with the Crown, and why should Rome be more particular?

It was evident that this was the only way out of the difficulty—to force the head on the body; but after sixty years of endeavor the Crown was utterly defeated in Canada, the Church rejecting the royal headship. The difficulty was settled by time, the Act of 1 Eliz., chap. i., was ignored, and the Catholic Church rendered independent of the Crown—neither its creature nor its slave. The details of this struggle form the most exciting part of the history of the Church in Canada, and will aid in discussing the present legal *status* of the Church.

The reader has had his attention directed sufficiently to those matters which lie at the foundation of the Church in Canada under British rule—the Articles of Capitulation, the Treaty of Paris, etc., and the Quebec Act. The Diocese of Quebec and its subdivisions have been adverted to and the extent within which the safeguards of the treaty extended. The acknowledged interpretation to be put upon the treaty as to the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion has also been noticed, and the inconsistencies on the face of the guarantees endeavored to be explained. Wherever it was possible, reference was had only to authorized copies of state papers and Acts of Parliament and other official documents, so that the reader can draw his own conclusions. There still remains the question of the exact legal status of the Catholic Church in Canada, whether it occupies a position different from that of the other religious denominations. This was the question raised by the Privy Council in the Guibord case; but not decided there. It is not an easy question to approach, much less to attempt arriving at a definite opinion, but the writer will submit his evidences and authorities as to his own views, and the reader can form another opinion if he chooses to do so. This will be considered in the next article.

HUME'S THEORY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT THE BASIS OF HIS SKEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

HUME'S acuteness as a reasoner is generally admitted, and his influence upon philosophical ideas still continues. His professed followers, however, are few, perhaps because men see too plainly that his skeptical conclusions are false; yet he contributed more than any other author to produce the systems of dubious thinking which have sprung up since his time, and which have terminated in the well-known skepticism and agnosticism of our own day. The influence he had and still has is owing not a little to the rare literary merit of his productions. A master of the language in its simplicity and beauty, and by nature a keen-witted Scotchman, he proposes his principles of doubt with fascinating subtlety, reasons from them in general consistently, and finally reaches conclusions that contradict universal experience, that are certainly false, and which Hume himself virtually admits to be erroneous when he confesses that the triumph of his doctrines is academical only, and therefore vanishes when put to the test of common experience and the practice of every-day life. For Hume is a skeptic, and, in his own words, "arguments are skeptical when they admit of no answer and produce no conviction; their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion which is the result of skepticism." As an argument by its definition consists of the truth supported by evident and demonstrative reasons, it is clear that an argument which is skeptical, according to the sentence just quoted, does not exist as a means of reaching rational and certain conclusions.

A survey of Hume's main principles will make manifest that the characteristic mark of his philosophy is doubt, though the doubt is not of so universal a kind as was Pyrrho's of old, for he admits at least one species of knowledge to be demonstratively certain, though he limits that species of knowledge, thus: "The only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and . . . all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion; . . . these may safely be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and of demonstration." This is the preliminary principle upon which his doctrines are based, but it supposes what is false, viz., that mathematical science alone is demonstrative, and that every other species of knowledge is only probable or doubtful.

Waiving for a moment the question how Hume could hope to demonstrate his assertion, since its demonstration could not pertain to mathematics, it is clear that if admitted it would prove all philosophy worthless, as philosophy has no real place in the circle of man's knowledge if its principles be not the most immutable and the most certain; yet philosophy is not specially concerned about mathematical quantity and numbers, although it is true that the sciences, respecting these objects, depend for their ultimate truth and certainty upon the superior truths of philosophy; there would be neither quantity nor numbers if there were not real natures and beings of which they are properties and of which they are predicated.

Metaphysics, or philosophy, comprises the absolutely first and most universal principles of human reason, together with all the necessary conclusions derived from them by demonstration. The first principles of every other science are only relatively first, because they presuppose other principles that are prior, and they regard only some particular being, or aspect of being, to which they are completely limited. Philosophy considers being comprehensively or under its aspect of most universal reality; it includes the intrinsic and most general properties of all things, its principles are the most evident and the most necessary, and they presuppose no other principles that are prior or to which they are subordinate. By consequence, the metaphysical is superior to all other truth in demonstrative perfection. Its supremacy in the order of purely human knowledge becomes apparent when we compare it with any other species of demonstrative knowledge. The science of geometry cannot take the first step in demonstration without presupposing many principles; *v.g.*, it assumes that the evident truth necessarily produces certainty, else its attempt to demonstrate would be vain; it assumes the objective reality of bodies and of quantity; it assumes that its own objects can truly affirm themselves to the mind, that the mind can read their essences, define them, and know that those objects which have the same definition are of the same essence. In short, the science of geometry assumes the whole body of metaphysical truths as the basis upon which it is ultimately grounded.

That this is only the usual teaching of the Christian schools, the following sentences clearly show.

“Nisi enim essent duo trianguli ejusdem speciei, frustra demonstraret geometræ aliquos triangulos esse similes; et similiter in aliis figuris.” (St. Thom. in Arist. Met. Lib. 1, Lect. 10.) “If there were no two triangles of the same species, in vain would the geometrician prove certain triangles to be similar; and so for other figures.”

And in Lib. 11, Lect. 4, he says: "Prima principia demonstrationis accipiuntur a mathematica et ab aliis particularibus scientiis particulariter tantum; ergo eorum consideratio secundum quod sunt communia pertinet ad hanc scientiam [*i.e.*, metaphysicam] quæ considerat de ente in quantum est ens. . . . Mathematica assumunt hujusmodi principia ad propriam considerationem. . . . Non est aliqua mathematica scientia quæ consideret ea quæ sunt quantitatis communia in quantum est quantitas." "The first principles of demonstration are taken and employed by the mathematical and other sciences particularly only; hence the consideration of them as common or general (principles) pertains to this science (metaphysics), which considers being precisely as being. Such principles are assumed by mathematics for its own consideration. . . . No mathematical science considers what is common to quantity precisely as quantity."

Quantity as an object of mathematics is particular and limited, as an object of metaphysics it is universal and absolute; its metaphysical consideration is prior to its mathematical. To a particular science a particular method is proper; but to the universal science belongs a universal consideration of objects. The distinguished schoolman, Duns Scotus, following Aristotle, uses similar language: "Quæcumque communia a scientiis particularibus solum particulariter sumuntur, pertinent ad considerationem hujus scientiæ [*i.e.*, metaphysicæ] communiter et generaliter accepta." "All the common conceptions and principles of knowledge that special sciences employ according to a restricted application, pertain to this science [metaphysics], when they are employed according to their common and universal application." Metaphysical principles not being presupposed, magnitudes and dimensions could not be discovered, nor any of the relations of quantity and numbers ascertained, and reflexly tested by a final and absolute standard of truth. It is an axiom that no science proves its own first principles; to do so it should prove them by other principles which are prior, and then the supposed first principles would not be really first. The first principles of any science are either self-evidently true, in which case they do not admit of proof, or else they are assumed from a superior science, and in this case they are not proved in the science of which they are first principles. Philosophy presupposes no other science whose principles or conclusions it takes for granted; its own being simply first and those of every other science subordinate to them. It was on account of this real supremacy that the schoolmen, with Aristotle, considered philosophy the Queen of the Sciences.

Hume is not an advocate of universal skepticism; but when his doctrines are consistently reasoned out, they tend in that direction.

When he asserts that none but mathematical science is demonstrative, the proof of his assertion, as just intimated, does not pertain to mathematics, but to metaphysics, an order of knowledge superior to mathematics and competent to declare the absolute requirements of demonstrative evidence. The assertion supposes two orders of knowledge, the non-mathematical and the mathematical. As to the first order, a principle is laid down despite the asserted impossibility of proving it, because the criterion of any demonstrative certainty, not mathematical, is rejected; and because demonstration, as distinguished from the particular science which employs it specially, and as containing the simply first principles of all proof, is proper to metaphysics, not to mathematics. On the other hand, why should mathematics itself be considered demonstrative, if the metaphysical and absolute tests of demonstration be arbitrarily set aside? The principles of mathematics have only a dependent necessity, for their objective certainty depends upon extra-mathematical and more absolute truths; and these being cast aside, by what inerrable process will you prove the demonstrative character of mathematical principles? And why may not mathematical certainty be denied, or at least questioned? It is upon evidence outside of mathematics, and clearer and more convincing, that we build securely the demonstrative certainty of mathematics. To deny or doubt the truth, then, of whatever is not mathematical science, would be to set at naught those principles which are primary and intrinsic in respect to all intellectual knowledge, and in reality to efface the certainty afforded by the sciences that regard quantity and number. The ultimate canon of all reasoning, "The Principle of Contradiction," it is almost needless to add, is not a principle of mathematics, and would be no principle at all if Hume's system, judged rigorously by his definitions, were true. When the conclusions of this philosopher are logically and completely drawn forth from his skeptical premises, it will be noticed that they seem to embody a skepticism which does not stop at the boundary of mathematical truth. And even for his reservation in favor of mathematical knowledge Hume is opposed by the more advanced skeptics of to-day, and notably by Professor Huxley, who attempts to show that whatever be the differences between mathematical and other truths, they do not justify Hume's statement. In proposing a system of philosophy, it is irrational to begin with what is doubtful; it is equally irrational to require proof of everything, though evidence is necessary for every assent of the intellect. Proof is justly required of any proposition or doctrine which is not self-evident, or which is not certified by adequate authority; then, until the proof be produced doubt may properly be entertained. To suppose that the self-evident first principles of philosophy can

be proved, or that they need proof, would be as absurd as to imagine that the sun at midday requires some other luminary to make it visible.

Hume next develops his complete skepticism concerning the relation of cause and effect; this is brought out in the following sentences, which have been selected as most perfectly embodying his essential doctrines: "All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *Relations of Ideas* and *Matters of Fact*. Propositions of this kind (*Relations of Ideas*) are discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. *Matters of Fact* are not ascertained in the same manner.

"All reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause* and *Effect*. . . . The knowledge of this relation is not in any instance attained by reasonings *a priori*, but arises entirely from experience when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.

"All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not of reasoning.

"All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. . . . This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances.

". . . Belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the *manner* of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind.

". . . The sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and this *manner* of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses."¹

These sentences contain the cardinal principles of Hume's speculative system; they contain also ideas prolific of modern skeptical philosophy, which advances beyond the limits set by Hume, and reduces all our intellectual knowledge to the kind which he intended only for cause and effect and matters of fact. To apprehend the unfitness of these principles for explaining the origin and real character of our knowledge, a few elementary distinctions are necessary.

Since our ideas are caused and measured by objects, all rational knowledge may, under this view, be divided into two kinds, viz.,

¹ Inquiry conc. Hum. Und., Sec. 4.

the knowledge of objects that are immutable and necessary, and the knowledge of objects which are mutable and contingent.

Judgments of the mind which regard objects of the first kind are called, especially since the days of Kant, analytical or *a priori* judgments; those which regard the latter kind of objects are termed "experimental" judgments. That "an effect requires a cause," that "the whole is greater than any of its parts," are instances of analytical judgments, all of which possess the characteristics of necessity and universality; that an effect requires a cause is necessarily true of every effect whatsoever, and the opposite of this truth is simply inconceivable, because it contradicts an evident definition based upon the objective and intrinsic nature of things. This judgment should also be distinguished from the positive truth, "This is an effect," which requires an inductive process to make it certain. All positive or experimental judgments, such as "bodies gravitate," "the sun will rise to-morrow," etc., are learned by observation and experience, and their certainty is proportioned to, and based upon, this species of evidence; they have that necessity which is proper to the physical laws of nature, but the mind perceives no evidence of an *a priori* necessity and universality, according to which the opposites of these truths are intrinsically impossible and inconceivable. It is conceivable that the law of gravitation might be suspended; but if it could be demonstrated that gravitation is of the intrinsic essence of bodies, or is a property necessarily resulting from their intrinsic essence, then to conceive a body which would not gravitate would be an impossibility and a contradiction in terms. Since the objects of analytical judgments possess necessity and universality, they are more adequately of the intelligible order, and hence more proportioned and congenial to our intellects. Mutable and contingent objects are less completely subject to the intellect than are those of the necessary and immutable order; though there is a species of necessity and at least a vague universality in all rational knowledge, since the intellect knows only by way of ideas that express a common essence of their objects whether such objects are of the necessary or contingent, abstract or concrete order.

Plato found it so difficult to account for rational knowledge of mutable objects that he invented his celebrated "*per se* intelligibles," by participating which material things acquired both real existence and an intelligibility. His error consisted in supposing an object's existence in reality to be identical with its ideal existence in the intellect, since that essence solely by which the intellect knows any object is in a true sense in that object. An aspect of the same difficulty seems to have induced Kant to propose his incongruous theory of "synthetical judgments *a priori*," according

to which he explained the presence and union in our knowledge of the necessary element with the experimental. Necessary and positive truth being thus distinguished, Hume's skepticism concerning the latter becomes clear. Allowing demonstrative evidence only to mathematics, he professes to doubt whether we can know with certainty the cause of any real effect whatsoever. Our idea of natural causes, he argues, is not obtained by *a priori* reasoning according to which we would first know objects as causes and from this knowledge predict their effects before experience. This reasoning is true, for in the experimental sphere we first learn certain phenomena or facts, and of these we inquire the causes. But in the speculative and necessary order in which we abstract from concrete causes and effects, our reasoning concerning these objects is of an *a priori* character. The analytical principle, every effect must have a cause, is learned in early childhood after a very limited experience, which suffices to produce in the infant mind the idea of a cause, together with its necessary and immutable relation to the effect. A child may be unable to enunciate in the exact terms of metaphysics the proposition; every effect requires a cause, but its accustomed actions and language show that the judgment in its universality and necessity resides habitually in its mind from a very tender age, and is directive of its action in all those particulars which depend upon this principle. When we turn from the speculative to the positive order, Hume's principle is undeniable, for then we do not consider a cause under an *a priori* aspect, but whatever we know of it is learned *a posteriori*. Facts observed lead us to the knowledge of their causes, since there is an actual connection between any effect and its cause. The falling of the apple led Newton to know its proximate cause—gravitation; he did not know *a priori* the law of gravitation and from this law as a principle predict the falling of the apple as an effect. The human mind naturally inquires after causes, and from any real effect observed it can infer truly the existence of a cause; if the effect be such as adequately reproduces the perfection of the cause, and also if it be fully understood, then the nature of the cause may also be inferred, but from any effect whatsoever the mere existence of a cause may and must be concluded. It will be noticed that phenomena which are effects in the real order operate as causes in the order of our knowledge, since they determine the mind to know their real causes. When Hume professes to doubt whether we can know with certainty the cause of any real effect, he employs substantially the following argument: A cause is not learned by *a priori* reasoning, neither can it be learned by experience, and hence we have no certain knowledge of a cause at all; experience cannot furnish us with the idea of a cause, since it reveals only an

unvarying sequence of certain facts and events, *e. g.*, that wax placed before the fire melts. Granted that we know as a fact that wax melts when placed before the fire, we do not know with certainty that the fire causes the melting of the wax, cause and effect as really such being unknowable. But though these philosophers profess to be certain of only so much respecting the conjunction of these two objects, mankind at large are certain of more, and they judge unhesitatingly that the fire is not merely adjacent to the wax, but *causes* it to melt. It must be allowed to Hume that we know natural causes only by way of an inference from their effects, and that the evidence, on account of which we infer the existence of any natural cause, depends upon observation and experience. Mankind know the fire as cause only by an inference from the melting of the wax, but all the requisites for the perfect certainty of experimental judgments are present in this instance, and the inference is evidently and inerrably drawn. The universal judgments of mankind are always true when they are the immediate inferences from matters of fact, and from primitive and self-evident truths. That the tree produces its fruit, that the animal is nourished by food—these and all similar instances of immediate conclusions from facts of universal experience are known by all men, inferentially indeed, but with complete certainty; so that in no system of philosophy can we rationally doubt such evident and familiar judgments. To reduce our knowledge of natural causes and effects to merely the knowledge of a customary conjunction between two objects does not distinguish it from the knowledge of a mere animal respecting the same objects. Animals can learn experimentally that one object always follows another, and can manifest by their action that they possess such knowledge; and if they do not know the customary conjunction as such, they at least know it by way of a concrete relation. Proofs of this will occur to every reader. Many proverbs are founded on the observation. The spider weaves and spreads its net with as much apparent skill as the fowler; and are we permitted to doubt that in its own sentient way it sees in the entrapped fly the effect of its gossamery cause? But when the human mind affirms by a judgment based upon a sufficient induction that one object is the cause of another, its act of knowing is of a higher order and it presents the cause precisely as such, or in its true and necessary relation to its effect. The power to know causes, as such and in their necessary relation to effects, is a distinctive mark of man's real superiority over mere animals. It would seem, then, that Hume does not clearly distinguish between the manner in which the mind knows causes and that in which causes are the objects of merely sensible cognition, for he allows certainty only to what is known as matter of fact and upon the testimony of the senses; whereas the mind does not know causes

as matter of fact, but as conclusions from effects reported by the mind's ministers, the senses. It is an obvious and necessary inference or conclusion which reveals in the preceding example that the wax is not merely adjacent to the fire, but is really influenced by it. The evidence upon which the inference is based is complete, though inductive; and, like all inferences that are only physically true, it does not assert of the objects inferred any *a priori* and absolute necessity, but only such necessity as the physical laws of nature have, which is relative and is ultimately dependent upon the will of the author who conceived and produced these objects in accordance with such laws. When inferences pass by the limits of first and immediate deductions from matters of fact, or when they require some intricate reasoning to reach them, then they have not the same universal acceptance; they are then the subject matter of special sciences, and are known only by the learned.

The general tone of consistency and clearness with which Hume reasons from his skeptical principles shows the strength and subtlety of his intellect, and it is to be regretted that a mind so well fitted by nature and by culture for metaphysical pursuits should have adopted and advocated unsound and skeptical principles.

A primary object intended by Kant in his writings was the refutation of Hume's skepticism; in this attempt he not only was unsuccessful, but in addition he developed a theory of human knowledge which is, perhaps, more comprehensively unsound than that of any other celebrated philosopher. Towards the end of his elaborate system he is forced to admit that Hume's demand for the connection between cause and effect which enables us with certainty to conclude the one from the other has not yet been satisfied. Hume himself was influenced not a little by Locke; indeed, his theory seems to be in part a further application of Locke's principles. Locke holds that we know nothing of real essences nor of substance. He was, perhaps, led to this position by attending too exclusively to the declarations of the senses, substance not being thus declared but known only by an inference from its qualities. Qualities, we conclude, must have some subject in which they exist, and by which they are supported in existence, and this subject is substance. If inference cannot make us certain of the existence of substance, then Hume is not far wrong in declaring that it cannot disclose the existence of any real cause; for our knowledge in both cases is gained in the same way. The answer to both Locke and Hume, who here agree in principle, is that inference can disclose with certainty the existence as well of substance as of natural causes. It can, moreover, disclose the intrinsic nature as well as the existence of these objects, since causes and effects are proportional. Hume's succeeding chapter upon "The Idea of Necessary Connection" follows consequently from his skepticism

concerning cause and effect, and the reply to his doubts upon this point is somewhat touched upon in what has been already said. As it is only by the necessary link between a given cause and its effect that we are enabled to know them as cause and effect, Hume, denying that we can know with certainty any causes at all, attempts to prove that we have no idea of a necessary connection between the one and the other. His argument is contained in these sentences: "The power or energy by which this [motion of our limbs] is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable. . . . It must be allowed that when we know a power we know that very circumstance in the cause by which it is enabled to produce the effect, for these are supposed to be synonymous. We must, therefore, know both the cause and effect and the relation between them."

An observation is here pertinent upon Hume's statement before given: "Arguments are skeptical when they admit of no answer and produce no conviction; their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion which is the result of skepticism." We have here a proof how constantly and inseparably the link between cause and effect is fixed in the mind, whence it cannot be dislodged.

A cause may be viewed under two phases: First, merely to know whether it exists; and, secondly, to discover its exact and intrinsic nature, together with the power by which it produces its effect. In other words, we may know of a cause, "*an est*," or we may know of it, "*quid est*," that it is a cause, or how it is a cause. When it is said to be a matter of common experience that the command of our wills is the cause of motion in our limbs, it is not meant that mankind at large understand the exact and intrinsic nature of the will's causality over our bodily members, but that they perceive as a fact the motion of our limbs, and infer with truth the existence of its cause. In addition to this knowledge immediately inferred from facts common to all men and embodied in their familiar judgments, each person is directly conscious that his will has empire over his limbs, and that his limbs obey the command of his will; hence the direct consciousness of each person is a witness to the same truth that his will moves his limbs, although he knows not how. It is noways necessary for the multitude to know profoundly and psychologically the mode by which this process is accomplished in order to know that it is really accomplished. Mankind at large are incapable of following, or else have not the time and opportunity to follow, a long chain of reasoning; they stop with what is obvious and unmistakable. It is the province of psychology to give the philosophical explanation of the union and interaction of soul and body, but it is in the

range of common experience to conclude, as it is also the office of direct consciousness to attest, that our wills cause the motion of our limbs. Hume's conclusion, then, is erroneous when he asserts that, because mankind do not understand how the motion of our limbs is caused, therefore they do not know that it is caused at all. Men often know the cause of a fact or event so imperfectly that they can only name the cause "something," but it is a want of logic to deduce from this that then they do not even know there is a cause. Complete certainty as to the existence of a cause is not incompatible with considerable ignorance of the cause's nature; to use the very obvious example of Boethius, we know there is a certain number of stars, but what that number is we do not know; we know also that the number is either odd or even. By what name soever we call that something in us which enables us to raise the hand, to walk, to sit, etc., whether we name it power, cause, or principle, its existence is none the less certain, even should our ignorance of its intrinsic nature and essential properties be equally evident. But in point of fact the science of Psychology enables us to know with demonstrative certainty the real essence of the human will, although we are not thereby enabled to perceive that essence intuitively. It is false to assert with Hume, Mill and others that the inmost nature or essence of things is unknowable and inconceivable. Definition manifests the essence of a thing, and while it is true that positive and mutable objects cannot be subjected to definition as readily as objects of the necessary order, still there are things positively and experimentally known whose essence we can apprehend and define with perfect certainty. The definition of man as a rational animal is a conclusion based upon induction, but it nevertheless expresses the inmost and immutable essence of man, that without which this being would be an impossibility. But in the domain of necessary truth the essences of things are perceived without a like difficulty, and their definitions are more readily expressed. A triangle is an object the intrinsic essence of which we perfectly comprehend and easily express by definition. The essence of a thing, or, as the schoolmen with Aristotle word it, the "*quidditas rei*," is really the proper term and object of intellectual operation; the quiddity, or conceived essence in its more rudimentary states, may be objectively vague and transcendental, but it is capable of being reflexly perfected and brought to express an object's intrinsic nature.¹

¹ Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐ ὁ λόγος ὁρισμός· καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὁ σοφία λέγεται ἐκάστοτε. Arist. Met. Lib. 4, No. 2, ed. Bek.

"Quod quid erat esse cujus ratio definitio est, et hoc uniuscujusque essentia dicitur."

Scholastic phrases rendering Aristotle's ideas can always be relied on for accuracy in reproducing his thoughts, though not always for elegance. The schoolmen sought exact truth, even to the loss of elegance.

When Locke asserted that we know nothing of substance, which, in fact, we do not know intuitively but by inference, he, perhaps, did not foresee the erroneous consequences which logically result from his position. Hume, accepting this reasoning which invalidates our knowledge of substance, generalized the principle that none but *a priori* reasoning is demonstratively certain, and, therefore, that all inferences concerning matters of fact are doubtful and illusory: so that a species of reasoning which Locke intended only for actual substance and actual essence, Hume developed into a universal principle applicable to all reasoning that is grounded upon experience. Hume thus becomes the influential teacher of a skepticism which covers the whole field of knowledge gained inferentially from matters of fact. From this philosophy of restricted doubt to the more general skepticism of certain modern philosophers the transition is effected without much difficulty. The theory of the so-called "relativity of knowledge" seems to be a reproduction of Hume's skepticism, with modern skeptical additions. In this theory all of our knowledge is explained to be of a mutable character by the supposition of a superior order of truth which might essentially change, nay, even contradict, our *a priori* and most necessary truths. The theory is illustrated by the current example derived from the science of perspective. In this science objects are ranged in a picture, so that their situations in reality are exactly reproduced for the eye. It is an axiom in perspective that parallel lines meet, that two straight lines inclose a space, etc. Failing to note that an object, by its nature common to more than one sense, cannot be known perfectly by one sense alone, a philosopher might argue: If, instead of having five senses, man were endowed only with the sense of sight, then his knowledge of geometrical axioms would be such only as is declared by the science of perspective, which is under certain respects contradictory of real geometrical truths. In like manner, were that so, it might be possible that all our knowledge, which we now imagine to be objectively necessary and immutable, would be but "relative to the knowing mind" and subject to contradiction by a superior enlightenment, supposed to supplement our present limited conceptions and to contradict our primary axioms. Since all knowledge admitting this theory would be essentially relative, even this supposed additional and superior knowledge would be merely relative also, and the final consequence would be either that absolute certainty of anything is impossible, or that it could be reached only by passing through an infinite series of superior orders of knowledge, a process impossible to us, and possible, if at all, only to beings immeasurably superior intellectually to us. The really ultimate

conclusion then would seem to be that absolute certainty of anything is impossible.¹

Knowledge is the product of the object known and the faculty knowing, but of neither exclusively; hence, when it is said by Mill that all knowledge is relative to the knowing mind, a distinction is necessary; that the received influence from objects known exists in and is cognizable by the intellect, in a manner proportioned and natural to the intellect, is true; just as the mountain seen is received by the eye and perceived in a manner proportioned and natural to the eye itself. "*Omne receptum per modum recipientis recipitur.*" In this sense it is true that all knowledge is relative to the knowing mind. But when the proposition is extended in meaning beyond this limit and made to imply that all knowledge is a merely subjective and mutable affection totally incapable of conjoining the intellect with the real intrinsic and immutable natures of things, then it is evidently false. For knowledge can and does truly express to the intellect the existence, nature and properties of objects. It can and does disclose that in an object which is necessary and immutable, *i.e.*, its essence.

In the usual acceptance of the terms, "all knowledge is relative to the knowing mind," it is intended briefly to embody a comprehensive skeptical opinion which includes the theoretical uncertainty and mutability of axiomatic truths, together with Hume's speculative doubts concerning positive truths. The influence of Hume is clearly discernible in determining upon the subject of cause and effect the position of John Stuart Mill, an author who, one might suppose, would not be swayed by the authority of any philosopher whatever. "And how, or by what evidence," says this luminous writer, "does experience testify to it (the causation hypothesis)? Not by disclosing any *nexus* between the cause and effect, any sufficient reason in the cause itself why the effect should follow it.

¹ J. S. Mill, in his usual clear and direct language, thus states the theory: "But all this additional knowledge [conceivable in some future state of existence, or possessed by intelligences superior to us] would be like that which we now possess, merely phenomenal. We should not any more than at present know things as they are in themselves, but merely an increased number of relations between them and us. And in the only meaning which we are able to attach to the term, all knowledge, by however exalted an intelligence, can only be relative to the knowing mind." An Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos., Chap. 2.

Again, in Chap. 3, he quotes with approval the following sentence from Sir William Hamilton: "Had we as many senses as the inhabitants of Sirius in the 'Micromegas' of Voltaire; were there, as there may well be, a thousand modes of real existence as definitely distinguished from one another as are those which manifest themselves to our present senses, and had we for each of these thousand modes a separate organ competent to make it known to us—still would our whole knowledge be, as it is at present, only of the relative." Mill thinks that "nothing can be truer or more clearly stated than this," an exposition of a doctrine which eliminates from rational knowledge all objective necessity and immutability.

No philosopher now makes this supposition, and Sir W. Hamilton positively disclaims it. What experience makes known is the fact of an invariable sequence between every event and some special combination of antecedent conditions, in such sort that wherever and whenever that union of antecedents exists the event does not fail to occur." (Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton's Phil., Chap. xxvi.) That experience does not "disclose any *nexus*" between cause and effect may be admitted when it is understood by these terms that it is not the office of experience as such to disclose any *nexus*, but to furnish that complete evidence which enables the intellect to perceive a real *nexus* between an effect and its cause, so that the one may, with certainty, be inferred from the other. Experience is rather limited to a declaration of facts, but reason is not so limited; reason can proceed from facts to their causes, perceiving by direct and certain inference that actual and intelligible relation which indissolubly connects causes and effects. Experience reveals an unvarying sequence of certain objects or events, but the reason of man transcending mere experience discovers the real consequence and the necessary relation of effects to their causes. It is worthy of note that the word "invariable" does not seem to express Mill's true meaning, because in that term is implied a real necessity to occur which Mill directly intends to exclude. Although it is inference alone which discloses the causes of natural events, such as, *e.g.*, that the tree really produces its fruit, that the food which is eaten really nourishes us, yet such inference is a medium of certainty to the mind just as truly as the eye is a medium of certainty that the fruit really hangs from the tree. There is as much reason to doubt the truth of the eye's testimony as there is to doubt the truth of a cause's existence duly revealed by inference, the only difference being as to the manner in which the intellect becomes certain; immediately in the case of the eye's objects, mediately in the case of the objects inferred. And if there is a difference in the intensity with which the intellect assents to each of the truths, it is a difference between two certainties, not a difference which leaves objects duly inferred only probable or doubtful, as Hume and his followers contend. There is a certainty in both cases, and we can as readily make the irrational supposition that some optical illusion always frustrates normal vision, as we can imagine that just inference is untrustworthy in that sphere precisely in which it is the proper and only medium of certainty. When inference reveals the existence of any cause without disclosing its intrinsic nature, as often happens, it would be as irrational then to reject its testimony entirely as to argue that the eye does not truly see because it does not discourse upon the medium through which it sees. Inference or reasoning is not, however, in itself, so perfect a manner of

knowing truth as is that of intuitive vision, the self-evidently true being more perfectly manifest than what is mediately evident. Evidence is the absolute criterion of certainty, and demonstrated conclusions concerning experimental matter afford that evidence which necessitates the firm assent of our understandings. The immediate and evident deductions from facts of experience can no more be denied than the facts of experience themselves.

Certainty is that condition of the mind in which there is an assent to the truth on account of a motive or principle which excludes all doubt and all fear of the opposite's being true; by consequence, it does not consist of any "feeling to the mind," be the feeling dull or lively. When the understanding acquiesces in the truth, it is possible that a certain feeling of satisfaction may result, but the feeling itself should be carefully distinguished from intellectual certainty. The species and degree of certainty we have of any object is proportioned to the evidence which such object affords, and evidence may be denominated that intelligible light which proceeds from an object and is shed upon the understanding so as to make the object visible. Certainty is proportioned to the species and degree of this light, and they are measured by the perfection of the object whence they proceed. What is made manifest by the light of metaphysical truth is received and possessed by the mind with the most perfect species of certainty. The intellect perceives in objects thus manifested a solidity and necessity of existence that it finds nowhere else. For example, when one judgment affirms precisely that which another denies, it is self-evident that both judgments cannot be true at the same time. This is a metaphysical truth which is known in such a manner that our intellect is rendered absolutely and infallibly certain upon understanding the terms; that this principle could admit of an exception, or be contradicted by any additional knowledge, is simply impossible and inconceivable. By this highest species of certainty objects are always known in a simply unchangeable character; but those of which we are only physically certain are not known in the like way; that bodies gravitate is, indeed, certain, but the mind does not yield the same kind of assent in this case that it does to metaphysical truths, for it is not simply impossible for gravitation to be suspended. When the mind possesses metaphysical certainty of a truth, the opposite of that truth is simply inconceivable.

The popular tendency to confuse inferred with merely conjectural knowledge, as well as the diverse intensity of assent proper respectively to physical and metaphysical certainty, was skilfully employed by Hume to prove our rational knowledge of physical objects merely doubtful, while allowing mathematical truths to be

demonstratively evident. John Stuart Mill not only grants Hume's principle respecting objects of which we are physically certain, but, as will be seen presently, applies the principle also to mathematical and necessary truths. Concerning the obvious relation between our wills and the motion of our limbs, Mill has the following observation: "I conceive that no more in this than in any other case of causation have we evidence of anything more than what experience informs us of, and it informs us of nothing except immediate, invariable and unconditional sequence."¹ In every known instance of real cause and effect we have evidence of something more than what mere experience informs us of; we have evidence of the relation between an effect and its cause, evidence of the actual influence of a cause upon its effect, and assumed also in support of the proof is the metaphysical axiom, every change has an adequate cause. The relation and the actual influence are neither of them intuitively evident, but they are both concluded with adequate and demonstrative certainty. Mutation is impossible without something which produces it, and when we observe any mutation in an object, we know with metaphysical certainty that such mutation has and must have a cause.

That our wills are the cause of motion in our limbs may be known in two ways: by consciousness, and by inference. By consciousness we directly perceive that our will moves our limbs, just as we directly perceive that we think, exist, etc. By inference the same truth may be known, but in an abstract way: we may reason from the evident fact of motion in our limbs to a cause of that motion; as we may also learn the nature of our own intellect in the same manner that we learn the nature of any other object; "*intellectus intelligit seipsum sicut et alia.*" But this mode of reasoning employed to know merely the existence of an internal faculty is inferior to the intuitive and perfect knowledge which consciousness affords, although the sphere of consciousness on the other hand is limited and not discursive into the nature and properties of the faculty. Our wills, when discursively known as cause of the motion of our limbs, are a direct conclusion from facts universally attested; this conclusion is based upon the absolute need of a sufficient cause for the motion.

Mill professes to perceive no sufficient reason for distinguishing between that of which we are metaphysically certain and that of which we are only positively and relatively certain. His theory of "inseparable association" aims to reduce the metaphysical characteristics, necessity and universality, to merely physical properties of knowledge which denote no more than a uniform and constant

¹ An Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton, Chap. 16.

experience; he thus excludes from human knowledge any character by which it is objectively immutable and *a priori*. He is effectually and felicitously answered by Mr. Mansel, whatever theory the author of "The Limits of Religious Thought" may hold respecting "the relativity of knowledge." When Mr. Mansel asserts, and truly, that the experience upon which physical certainty is based is as uniform and habitual as that which we observe in connection with necessary truths, and when he, therefore, inquires why the results in the one case are to be regarded as "contingent and transgressible," while those obtained in the other must be regarded as "necessary and universal," Mill answers that the character of the experience with which the various truths are connected accounts for it all; that "nature, as known in our experience, is uniform in its laws, but extremely varied in its combinations;" that conflicting experience, as well as any other opposing circumstances whatsoever, prevents the formation of immutable certainty, and will always be found to exist in those cases in which only physical certainty is produced; that cases of so-called metaphysical certainty connote only a better known, a more invariable and universal experience than is obtainable in cases of physical certainty. In this answer it is falsely assumed that all certainty and truth are proportionate to and produced by experience alone; it is falsely assumed also that the experience pre-required for knowing mathematical axioms in their necessity and universality obtains as generally, and is as manifest, as that upon which our knowledge of physical truths is based. For perfection in mathematics is limited to the few.

Judged of in the light of mere experience and observation, physical truths are more manifest and better known than mathematical axioms; and, were necessity and universality mere properties of experience, physical truths would be in that case more necessary than mathematical axioms. Such axioms, moreover, refer to objects which do not even exist *in rerum natura*, much less are they matters of common experience. A circle, according to its mathematical definition, is an object which nobody has ever seen; so, also, a line and a point. Truths may be self-evident, but not in respect to all men; they may be so "*sapientibus tantum*." Physical truths, on the other hand, are not as abstract as are mathematical truths, and they connote objects which really exist and which belong more directly to the sphere of common life, sensible objects in general being more manifest to us than the supersensible. Mill's theory of "inseparable association" is totally insufficient to the purpose for which it is proposed, and mere experience, however constant and uniform, cannot account for the absolute and immutable characters of objects known with metaphysical certainty; such

characters are really intrinsic to these objects, and are fundamentally contained in the declarations of experience; but it is eminently and essentially the office of the human intellect, as intuitive and discursive, to discover the absolute and immutable determinations of an object, and to elaborate from them propositions of necessary and unchangeable truth.

To conclude, the leading principles of this article may be re-stated briefly, as follows: Quantity and numbers are not, as Hume contends, the only objects of science and demonstration; they are, it is true, real and necessary properties of beings, and as such are just matters of rational investigation; but they are not the sole nor the most intrinsic properties of beings; they are only one branch of the Porphyrian Tree, which has other branches more robust and springing more immediately from its trunk.

Our knowledge of cause and effect is something more than the mere knowledge of a customary conjunction or of an invariable sequence between two objects or events; it is, in addition, the knowledge of the real and necessary relation between these objects, according to which an effect really depends for existence upon its cause. To deny that the relation exists is absurdly to suppose that an effect is self-sufficient for its own existence, or that a real production can take place without anything to produce it.

Inseparable association, proposed as a theory to account for the necessity and universality intrinsic to certain ideas and judgments, is logically destructive of metaphysical certainty; although these characteristics of ideas and judgments have an origin in sensible experience and an objective reality in common with all intellectual knowledge, nevertheless they are the result of intuition and *a priori* reasoning, which produces metaphysical certainty, such as transcends all experience and is based upon the immutable nature of things.

Reasoning, whether employed to determine positive truth from the data of experience, or to discover necessary truth based upon the inmost essence and properties of any object, is equally a medium of truth and certainty, but the certainty in each case is of a totally different species, being physical in the former instance, and in the latter metaphysical.

Finally, in Hume's theory the cause of every real effect is unknowable. It follows from this that the existence of a first cause cannot be proved, and when Hume, at times, distinctly asserts its existence, he does so at the expense of his theory and logic. Reason can demonstrate the existence of God only by a conclusion based upon the principle, every effect requires an adequate cause. Modern agnosticism, also, which accepts Hume's false theory of causation, cannot advance from his position of uncer-

tainty respecting the Supreme Being. Opposed to this agnostic, skeptical, and erroneous philosophising are the plain truths of reason, asserted over two thousand years ago by the Sage of Stagira, that the visible universe is an effect requiring an absolutely first cause, that the first cause is God, an intellectual essence of eternal and infinite perfection.

AMERICAN CATHOLICS AND THE PROPOSED UNIVERSITY.

“The thinge a work of praise,
Her present shapp hereafter still to see :
To keep length, bredth, and curving of the waise.
Number, height, and forme of buildings as they be ;
Eatch man to knowe his owne by just degree ;
With all thinges else that maie adorn the same,
And leave her praise unto eternal fame.”

*From an old map of Oxford (1578), preserved
in the Bodleian Library.*

AN official announcement of the proposed Catholic University appeared a short time ago, in the form of an “appeal” under the name of the Board, “constituted by the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore.” Though the document does not allow us to form any definite idea of the immediate prospects of the university itself as an active organization, enough is contained therein to arouse the intelligent interest of Catholics on the subject of its success. For who that loves our holy religion, and the beauty of that divine spirit, whose temples we were dedicated in baptism, will not rejoice at the prospect of having supplied to us a workshop whence may be brought forth fit adornments of mind and heart to grace the treasure of holy faith hidden within? Does not the fact bear with it the promise that the stifling and dark atmosphere of atheism and agnosticism around us will be cleared; that a true philosophy, a real science not resting on conjecture or hypothesis, but on a first cause and facts, will diffuse more widely a loyal spirit of faith; that a severe but sober and impartial criticism will give testimony to the truth wherever it may be found, so that wisdom may indeed supplant mere knowledge, and with her be brought to us all things good? And from the gradual intercourse with men of lofty aims, of high acquisitions, of a science that humbles be-

cause it is so far-sighted and true, can there come aught else but that thoughtful moderation, that regard for the rights of others, that charming urbanity of manners, sure company of true culture, bringing out more clearly the sweet notes of a simple charity, conquering clarion-like the brazen-voiced philanthropic cant that issues from society's great stage? Yes, surely, all this and much more that is lustrous and beneficent would be guaranteed by the establishment in our midst of a university worthy of its name.

If we realize this fact; if we are assured that the work is possible, and rejoicing in its promised accomplishment open our hands in generous material support of so grand a work—then let no man speak foul of our hearts. But though our men of wealth, keenly appreciating the needs of our time and the beneficent influence of education on our population, freely offer their treasures; though the poor add their mite to swell the blessing to the needful sum, and all this be placed into the hands of able men, intellectual architects and practical withal, who would wisely dispose of these means—is our task done and may we, basking in their wisdom and our munificence, stand idly by to watch the results? Able leaders are indispensable to a great work; the material means to carry out their plans are equally necessary—but this question of the erection of a university implies another need. Not our money alone will be wanted; our labor, too. Why and how, is our object to show.

It has been said, and a long experience has on the whole proved, that since first

A University was reared,
Ere yet the music of Messiah's name
Had thrilled the world,

its strength has been the result of growth, of slow and simultaneous development. But we also know that centralization is frequently the fruit of some necessity. It supposes either foregone activity towards a definite end or else a struggle which by reason of some centripetal and incontrollable force quickly gathers the scattered powers around it into one energetic mass. Thus large cities have sprung into existence from one cause or the other of the two. We have in our own day and country built up great centres of industry and society in an incredibly short time. True, they bear somewhat the mark of their birth. They have neither the inherent strength nor the lasting air of Cæsar's Rome or the Minervan Acropolis. Still who will doubt that, if need be, we could raise old Rome precisely as it was in its best days in a much shorter space of time than it actually took its builders?

And what we say of great cities may be aptly said of universities.¹ Our own generation, undertaking such a work, is singularly

¹ Cardinal Newman makes an elaborate comparison of the two in his "Idea of a University."

avored with resources so abounding, so altogether new that in great measure they supply the long and systematic labor of a past age. We in our day are witnesses to the truth of Roger Bacon's prophecy in his "*Opus Majus*," 500 years ago, about the "chariots that will move with incredible rapidity without the aid of animals," and how "a little matter about the bigness of a man's thumb, making a horrible noise, producing a terrible corruscation, would destroy a city or an army in several ways." Yet in spite of all his wisdom the "*Doctor mirabilis*" had to make his journey from Paris to St. Ebbe's by the slow process of travel on foot, or by stage and sluggish sail, and the students who in his later days left Oxford to hear the new oracles of the Sorbonne, might still have listened to the old monk discoursing on astronomy and theology from Folly Bridge, had they but had our appliances of sound and thought transmitting wires. Thus time has shortened, and space contracted and labor quickened a thousandfold. But there is one element in this undertaking which no mechanism can supply. We said that centralization, if not the result of slow accretion, comes of a certain immediate necessity; we might say, of advantages paramount to such a necessity. There must be not only a need but a demand.

The inference is plain. The founding of a university, to be done safely, and at the same time so as to satisfy our eager search for telling results, cannot possibly rest exclusively on the zeal and devotion of the few, no matter how accurate their judgment, how large their experience, how prudent their enthusiasm, or how magnificent their material resources. For this is not indeed merely a question of farsighted legislation, or of complicated construction. It is a question essentially of coöperation, of connection of parts intellectual, moral, social, a question of proportion of basis and superstructure. And the Catholic educators of our community, whether they think well or ill, or not at all, of the project, should have to bear a share in the loss, if it happened to be a failure, as they should be participants of its success. Nor must we be understood to speak of a university here as a necessarily large or pretentious institution, at once fully equipped to dispense general knowledge or exerting that influence which is associated with the names of the ancient universities. We simply mean an institution which, aiming at that end, commands respect by reason of a well-sunk basis, of legitimate prospects of future success arising from the definite advantages which it offers, and from its ability to make these advantages understood and felt.

The strange comments which have been made from time to time in the general press and elsewhere with apparent good will towards the project, whilst they are not taken as authoritative statements,

prove sufficiently that even in the circles of the better educated there is no clear understanding as to the precise aim and nature of such an institution. Beyond this, it must have struck anyone who has given the subject sufficient thought and has noted how other issues come to pass, that there has been a very limited amount of intelligent discussion given to this subject which touches so nearly our highest interests.¹ We are a large community. The youth who may expect at our hands a higher intellectual training count by thousands; the number of educators, clerical and lay, is legion. The mere possibility of improvement all-sided and high, such as the name of a university implies, should send a thrill of anxiety into the hearts of all such as, whilst not directly charged with the responsibility of carrying out, are yet to participate in the honorable task of sustaining an institution so far-reaching in its operation. Yet such anxiety is hardly apparent.

"I saw a smith stand with his hammer—thus,
The whilst his iron did upon his anvil cool,
With open mouth swallowing a tailor's news."

And all this is the more striking when we recall the intense agitation—we can hardly call it anything else—which was exhibited precisely in this country some thirty years ago, on occasion of the founding of the Irish University. Not only were enormous sums raised for its support, exhibiting a generosity and appreciation which, considering the circumstances, has hardly been paralleled in any similar work since then,² but the press and public men gave the project most spirited and intelligent support. They repeatedly set forth its aim and advantages. They created a keen anxiety in its behalf, by laying bare the difficulties besetting such a work, and thus enlisted the earnest solicitude and active sympathy of all classes of Catholics. Nay, as soon as the lists of the infant university were opened, Americans of the best society and highest literary accomplishments were among the first to have their names inscribed upon its books side by side with some of the most able European savants.³ And so distinctly was this interest understood

¹ We cannot, of course, be understood to refer in any sense to the action of the prelates gathered in the late Council, whose deliberations must be considered as altogether private.

² We have not at hand a report of the total amount contributed in this country, but some estimate may be formed from the fact that New York and Albany alone subscribed above \$25,000 within a very short time.

³ Associated with the illustrious names of Cardinal Wiseman, the rector of Louvain University and others, we find upon that list the learned Dr. Kenrick, archbishop of St. Louis, the Hon. Enoch L. Lowe, LL.D. (ex-governor of Maryland), the Hon. S. R. Mallory (senator), Prof. S. S. Haldeman, Prof. George Allen, of the University of Pennsylvania, Rev. Sestini, S. J., of Georgetown College, Dr. John Bellinger, Esq. (Charleston); John Keating, Esq. (formerly Colonel in the French service), of Philadelphia, etc.

to be of the highest order, that Cardinal (then Dr.) Newman was anxious to have America represented among the faculty of the new university in the person of Dr. Brownson, then understood to be "about the first metaphysician and philosophical historian of the day in this country."¹

It will hardly be denied that discussion on this subject is, under present circumstances, equally desirable if not absolutely necessary, in order to secure to the undertaking that amount and kind of popular sympathy which arises, as we have said, from a clear understanding of its usefulness and from a realization of the actual difficulties that attend its accomplishment. And this becomes very much more apparent when we note, as we have already said, how the most absurd statements made under the sound of great names, or such as we must respect, and that in reputable journals, not only gain credit but become the basis of further conjectures absolutely detrimental alike to the project as to the persons who have its furtherance in hand. At the same time, it is highly important that, as the machinery of this work has been actually set in motion, we may thoroughly understand what be our weakness and what our strength; that they who are to feed its fire permanently be conversant with the labor which is expected of them, and that they be trained in good time to keep in line lest there be any confusion, any interruption in the work, and subsequent lack of power to carry on the labor begun.

We can hardly suppose, however, that in a matter of such vital consequence to our well-being, social as well as intellectual, there can be any positive apathy; and though there is a certain want of demonstrativeness rather uncommon in a community which is so easily roused into excitement on any question of public interest, whether in politics or trade, or education, or what not among the thousand questions which touch the common weal, it may be safely assumed that public opinion is in favor of a step so decidedly in advance. Indeed, it is hard to see why, at present, it should not be. But we must not attach too much importance to this condition of the popular atmosphere. Public opinion, even if strongly expressed, is a fickle thing, and no thinking man will be easily found to make himself responsible for it. Cardinal Newman, speaking of its value in this very matter of the founding of a university, says: "Public opinion is too often nothing else than what the whole world opines and no one in particular. Your neighbor assures you that every one is of one way of thinking; that there is but one opinion on the subject, and while he claims not to be answerable for it, he does not hesitate to propound and spread it. In such

¹ See a controversy on the subject between the *Dublin Evening Mail* and the *Dublin Tablet*, April, 1854.

cases, every one is appealing to every one else, and the constituent members of a community, one by one, think it their duty to defer and succumb to the voice of that community as a whole."¹

So if Catholics were hereafter to meet with any unexpected difficulties which to remove would rest with their readiness to make a personal sacrifice, and for which they were not prepared, public opinion might take another, though perhaps more unreasonable, turn. And this brings us to what we suppose is the real cause of that apparent lack of enthusiasm and energy which we are, at other times, so ready to expend, often by forerunning real needs, when there is a question of loss or gain, sympathy or resentment, or any good or ill affecting ourselves.

May it not arise from a want, on our part, of realizing the task which is, in truth, before the men who, seeing a great need, have generously set themselves to inaugurate and labor for its removal? May it not be that we underestimate the difficulties and dangers that beset the accomplishment successfully of this work? We have been so little thwarted of late, have been in many ways so successful materially, that it would be no surprise did we trust half blindly to our strength, and, without giving thought to a matter which must necessarily remain under the direction of a few, leave to them the task of its accomplishment. It is out of the question to presume that those who have generously undertaken the burden of carrying this scheme of the university into effect, having considered it in all its bearings, should not be aware, to the fullest extent, of all the harassing obstacles that beset it. But when we are assured that these difficulties can be overcome, it is necessarily expected that the Catholic community of these States give their all-sided support. And the zeal which prompts this support is not a thing which can be elicited at a very short notice, the more so as it is to arise out of convictions opposing, as we shall see, settled and rather comfortable prejudices. In commenting, therefore, on the subject, we simply desire to awaken that wider interest, that sense of responsibility among the educated of the clergy and laity, which we deem essential, now that we are committed to the work, to guarantee its ultimate success and prevent compromises, great and small, of our common cause and name.

In answer to some general objections urged against the practicability of at present establishing a university in this country, reference has been made to the later foundations of Louvain and Dublin. In the case of Louvain we hardly think the comparison is fair. The Dublin foundation, however, bears, in many respects, a close analogy to our own, and it may profit us to run over the phases

¹ Universities, Introductory, page 3.

of that work with reference to our own condition. As for the difficulties peculiar to our country and people, they naturally claim the first and greater share of our attention. They need to be realized in order to be removed. These obstacles, as they are stated, point to the remedies which will likely undo them. And even in this respect the case of the Irish University will help us to illustrate the reality of the former and the nature of the latter.

The main sources whence obstacles to the ready establishing of an American university will arise are two. The first is a predominance in us as a nation of the material or utilitarian principle. This carries with it a certain depreciation of all that is purely intellectual or ideal, unless it aid us at the same time to the accumulation of wealth. The second obstacle is found, and—*pace tua dicam*—in a certain incompleteness of our present educational system, both in extent and depth. And the fact that this incompleteness has been, in a manner, systematized in our non-Catholic institutions of learning, and has thus become adequate to the general demand, has forced us to aim at and adopt a standard of measurement in this direction which is vitally detrimental to the spirit that must support and emanate from a Catholic university.

As to the utilitarian tendency, it is quite pronounced in our leading American universities, of which it may be said: “Grand dans son genre, mais le genre est petit.” We ask, what is the market value of the liberal education our children shall receive, and the theory which many years ago was vainly advocated in England by Locke and the Edinburgh reviewers, has, as it were, naturally grown up with our busy generation in these States. How far our Catholic youth, trained largely in the public schools and forced into competition for existence in all walks of daily life and profession, are imbued with such sentiments, will be readily testified to by the superiors of our Catholic colleges, who have, no doubt, often been obliged to go against their better convictions and yield a point in pedagogic science because they could not hope successfully to oppose the spirit of their time, unless it were done in a body by the united efforts of all, and, at the same time, on some prearranged plan.

Before we can realize the hindrances arising from this two-fold source, we must, of course, have a very clear understanding of what a university is; what are the essential elements of its existence; whether there is any, and, if so, what is the special work which must be the object separately of a university in this country.

“A university is a universal school in which are taught all branches of learning, or theology, medicine, law, and the sciences and arts.”¹ This is its object and its profession. Its aim is of a

¹ Webster.

wider range: "A place where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified and perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed by the collision of mind with mind and knowledge with knowledge."¹ In its essential elements and character, "a university consists and has ever consisted in demand and supply, in wants which it alone can satisfy, and which it does satisfy, in the communication of knowledge, and the relation and bond which exist between the teacher and the taught. Its constituting, animating principle is the moral attraction of one class of persons to another, which is prior in its nature, nay, commonly in its history, to any other tie whatever; so that, where this is wanting, a university is alive only in name, and has lost its true essence, whatever be the advantages, whether of position or affluence, etc."²

It will be noticed in this threefold definition that it implies three things, to wit: The capacity of attracting, together with the capability of being attracted. Further, the power of discernment (together with the liberty of using that power consistently), as to the particular kind of knowledge, complete in itself and defined in its relations to other knowledge, which is to be gained. This is commonly called academic freedom. And, lastly, as to its ultimate aim, the definition implies that a university, of its very nature, is entitled, nay, cannot but take position of authority, to correct and keep in proper balance the spirit of the age. In the case of a Catholic university for the United States this latter point involves application to circumstances altogether untried and very different from those found where the old honored universities hold sway. We do not live, as does Canada, or India, or Australia, largely on the time-honored traditions of our founders. The child has turned to make itself a man upon a new mode of self-training without pattern or tutelage. We are in our youth, in a state of metamorphosis, beautiful of itself and promising a beautiful maturity, but still with all the uncertainty of youth. European society, on the other hand, is settled; it has its infallible signs and landmarks; it undergoes at times convulsions, but no changes. It is old in years, but still of the early habits. It may alter its temper, its attitude, its garment; but it does not alter its character. Its best days are past. It does not look forward, as we do, but back upon its halcyon days. It speaks forever of the good old times of sober wisdom and propriety, and is scandalized at the bold sallies of this wanton youth, with his stars and stripes, shaking its hoary head and its finger ominously, for it is so new a thing to the old world, this substitution of quick attempt and elastic recovery for the safe lessons of patient experience.

¹ Newman, *Universities*, Chap. ii.

² *Ibid.*, Chap. v.

And surely it were wrong to say that the new way has not proved an immense advantage over the old, and that, though our science be but the fruit of yesterday, it serves us quite as well as does on the whole the accumulated lore of years. Still, a university remains a university, that is, not merely a corporation dispensing knowledge of varied and excellent kind, but a high tribunal presiding over the spirit of its times; judging and fashioning thought and feeling; regulating public opinion; settling intellectual strifes; far above partiality or weakness or dependency of any kind.

We have said that our predominant tendency is towards the material, the practically useful, together with a proportionate undervaluing of the ideal, the purely intellectual for its own sake. Hence virtuosos have ever found it impossible to live amongst us, unless for a season, and with accompanying sound of trumpet which frequently pleased better than their own excellence. This is demonstrated not only by the actual results of our efforts in the domain of education, by the character of our domestic literature and by the spirit of our press, but it has universally been the first and last impression upon foreign observers, who have attempted, under varying and more or less favorable circumstances, to make a diagnosis of our national character. Herbert Spencer came to us in friendly mood, and civilly told us that we needed a revised ideal of life; that not only the arts of peace but even "those of war had been supplanted by business as the purpose of existence"; that "even those who are not directly spurred on by this intensified struggle for wealth and honor, are indirectly spurred on by it." But he considers this a necessary result of our conditions, which it is hardly possible to correct, for, "where rapid material growth is going on and affords unlimited scope for the energies of all, little can be done by insisting that life has higher uses than work and accumulation."¹ Mr. Mathew Arnold, the acknowledged apostle of culture, warns us of the danger to which we are tending, viz., "hardness and materialism, exaggeration and boastfulness,"—"a false smartness, a want of soul and delicacy."² Few Americans will be inclined to accept the conclusions these and other observers of the same character draw from such premises. Nevertheless, we can hardly deny the premises themselves. They are facts so far, and will strike any one who does not choose to walk blindfold. Listen to the conversation of men in our railway-coaches, our hotels, and public places of resort. Stocks and bonds, rents and interest, property and investment, shares and percentage, profit and loss,—such are the sounds that repeat themselves *ad nauseam* from morn till night. The province of *belles-lettres*, such as it is, has been

¹ "The Americans," *Contemporary Review*, January, 1883.

² "Numbers," *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1884.

consigned, more or less, to woman. Hence, she has gained a peculiar intellectual ascendancy. In the drawing-room, it is the lady who pronounces on the subject of art and letters. Our man is a different but in no way a superior being. He has almost less influence, unless it be in his own circle. If he goes to college or university, it is to prepare for a profession which he will not consider either a devotion or a distinction, but simply a means of gaining wealth. Of course, there are exceptions to this in a community so large as ours, yet they are still but the exceptions.

Is the university, then, a training-school for the professions, or a place where men receive what is commonly called a practical education? No more than an art gallery is a painter's studio or a sculptor's workshop. The one may be the other, but in their objects they are vastly different. To have studied with the best of masters could not dispense the most gifted pupil from going to Florence or the Vatican, Madrid or the Louvre. True, we may substitute a new aim for the old, we may paint china and buckets, and put it in a hall, and call it art gallery or school of design; but euphonious names will not give us the substance of things. Yet this is what we have largely done with our university education. We have opened professional schools and lecture-halls for specialists in science, and with a suitable admixture of what else may have been in demand here or there, they passed for universities. Certainly, these are thorough enough in their way. They are what we have wanted. But what we wanted was not a university, in the old and true sense of the word. If there has been any rise in the higher sphere of education, it lies in the abnormal increase of "schools of science." "These," says Professor Gilman, speaking of the growth of such schools during late years, "showed the desire for an advanced education founded upon some other basis than the literature of Greece and Rome; they showed the popular craving for what was vaguely termed, for want of a better word, a practical education."¹ The popular desire for this sort of advanced education, discarding the old basis of the Greek and Roman classics, has, of course, affected the curriculum of studies in our best American universities. But do they, in consequence, turn out really educated men, men conspicuous for breadth and depth and originality of thought? Do they not, rather, multiply the race of pettifoggers and schemers at law, quacks in medicine, talkers of cant or of sensation with the title of Reverend? Or, even granted that, out of so vast a number of youth frequenting these schools, we receive a fair average of excellent physicians and able lawyers, is the object of a university reached in this way? Let a student

¹ "Report of the Commissioner of Education," 1878, cviii.

spend, as is the case in our universities, one year of faithful labor in the laboratories of chemistry, pharmacy, osteology, histology, and in the dissecting-room; another or two in attending clinical lectures in general medicine and surgery, a course of biology, physical diagnosis and gynæcology—and he will be able to handle a scalpel and make a good diagnosis and relieve many an individual and prolong some lives. A good work, in sooth, but such work as is done by fresh air and pure water and good breadstuffs. Has he the mental aptitude, the sweep of judgment with correctness and precision, and the various acquirements, such as they are obtained by the study of the classics, of intellectual philosophy, etc., which will make him, according to his value, a member of society, exerting a much wider influence and a deeper one than that of a patent medicine or a text-book on health? This is the influence of a university through its members, whom it gives, preparatory to and together with the professional training, the “old-style liberal education.” Nor can this sort of education be supplied by the newspapers or general reading, as is commonly supposed. Reason, prone to err, wants a corrective, found in the teaching of principles, and not of facts or views. But facts and views are the only things which the press can teach, and education means quite a different thing from this storing-up in the memory.¹ It has been customary of late to refer to the German universities as models. Surveying the matriculation lists of these, we find invariably a large, sometimes the largest, contingent of students inscribed for attendance upon lectures in metaphysics and ethics. Students of medicine, of jurisprudence, of philology, frequently take a full course of philosophy at one university, and then pursue their specialty at another or several others in succession. It is no odd thing for any one to have spent ten years at the different universities, after having passed the examination of abiturients which, with its eight years of Latin and six of Greek, preparatory to it, qualifies the applicant to choose his academic course. At an American university,² no such preparation is required, nor need philosophy always be chosen as the “principal branch” among those requisite for obtaining the doctorate in philosophy. Quite in harmony with this tendency is the effort that has lately been made to replace the

¹ Cardinal Newman has an admirable chapter on “Knowledge and Professional Skill,” which clearly sets forth the difference between both. (*The Idea of a University*.)

² It is impossible to make any satisfactory comparison, founded on statistics of attendance, as to the two systems. We have attempted it, in order to show, what becomes at once evident, how very much practically our university education differs from that obtained at the European universities. But the promiscuous and undefined manner in which titles and terms, such as university, college, literary, classical, scientific, modern, etc., are used in this connection, defeats any sustained attempt at fair analysis.

study of the ancient classics in our colleges by what are deemed more practical branches. What the German university authorities, who have made the test of utility, think of this tendency has been quoted often enough. Professor Haeckel, of Jena, believes it a great advantage to have the practical academic studies entirely separated and excluded from the university, and transferred to special high schools, in order that the university may remain in reality a *universitas litterarum*.¹ Dr. Zarncke, although he represents the modern languages and literature at the Leipzig university, writes to our Professor Adler: "I am fully convinced that the educated world would bitterly repent it some day, if it should ever cease for a time to consider the study of classical antiquity the main source of all higher intellectual culture."²

Now what is to the point here is this: That, as we wish to establish a real *universitas litterarum*, we shall encounter the prejudice of the popular educational party, whose standard, being more easily attainable by the student, will naturally carry with it a great deal of good-will. For this we must be prepared. Nor can we, what might be desirable, yield much to gain a footing at the start. Leo XIII. has taken pains to show how a sound philosophy—the only hope of the intellectual regeneration in our day—cannot easily be built, as we have nothing equivalent, unless upon the well-tried basis of the ancient systems of Greek and Roman thought, with which our lay world has naturally but little sympathy. It is plain, then, that unless we can make it an issue of conscience and convince parents that they are injuring themselves in following the current of their time, they that aim—as the majority do—at the emoluments of a profession for their sons, will prefer or leave to these the choice of a less laborious and shorter method by seeking our non-Catholic American universities. To produce this effect of inducing that class of parents who desire their sons to embrace a learned profession, to make a sacrifice in behalf of their souls, is a task that will not accomplish itself without serious and sustained labor. It will require the combined work of the clergy, the educated laity, and the press; we say the educated laity, for it is mainly the moneyed middle and half-educated class who aim at social distinction at the expense of religion. This danger needs hardly any proof. England and Ireland have, in reality, better facilities for furnishing Catholic students with a professional curriculum than we shall likely have for some time to come; yet for more than thirty-five years the hierarchy of those countries have incessantly had to appeal against those Catholics who, in spite of the advantages of a home university course and a university board conferring

¹ "Report of the Commissioner of Education," 1878, xcix.

² *Ibid.*, ci.

degrees, would send their sons to Oxford, or Cambridge, or Queen's College, simply because it satisfied a certain hankering after social respectability. And with us the difficulty in this direction will inevitably grow the more we advocate a certain liberalism in the sphere of education. On the mere assumption of intellectual superiority, we should find it difficult to cope with Harvard or Yale or some other recognized institutions of the same character. For, whatever may be the true merit of the education these furnish, their degrees have a certain standing in the public estimation, and thus open more easily the coveted passages to social and professional advantages, and it is well known that:

“Il méglione il nemico del bene.”

In the matter of prestige we have nothing or very little to help us. The requirements of society and official life do not, in any sense, favor our project, as would be the case in Europe. In England, for example, a gentleman's son, unless he propose to enter the army or navy, must have passed through a certain amount of conventional education at a university before society opens to him its doors. In other countries, as in Germany, it is an absolute requisite for entering certain grades of the civil service. We, in this country, need nothing of the kind. A polished manner, a certain amount of *au courant* in topics of the day, practical good sense and power of adaptation, are qualities which will make their way through our social conditions to the highest offices of state. As for the European youth, bred for literary or other kind of leisure, we are rather inclined to look upon him with a sort of mild contempt, as lacking freshness, robust versatility, and practical good sense. He is utterly out of place in our land, and our opinion of the typical Oxford student is, with the *London Times*: “He is a cockney in the country; a landlubber at sea; in town, a greenhorn; in business, a simpleton; in pleasure, a milksop;” which malappreciation certainly commends our good sense. Still we must remember that this character is not a necessary result of a university system, and that we might be no less practical and intellectually strong for the additional boon of a good university education. As it is, we supply such training by frequent contact with the world, and a world which, acknowledging no caste, is accessible to every one; the omni-gathering character of our press does the rest, with its obtrusive multitude of sheets covering every field of thought and action. This suffices for the common purpose. Our mutual interests allow us at present no room for nice distinctions. We have business and contracts, which are an affair of chattels, not of persons. And so long as we are such, a *universitas litterarum*

will have to battle and to educate its own members almost from the cradle up.

Nor can it be said with certainty that a higher seminary on the university plan would meet with none of these obstacles, at least for a considerable time. The practical views of our world of merchants, mechanics, professionals, and politicians have communicated themselves very naturally to the ecclesiastical sphere of education. It could hardly be otherwise. We must study the people, follow them in their individuality, and, in some sense, sustain their interests, in order to labor efficiently among them for their good. So we cannot blame ourselves for being such, but such as we are we must be content to be judged. To take an example: For a number of years facilities have been offered to ecclesiastical students in this country to avail themselves of a higher education at certain of our Catholic universities on the continent of Europe. Some of the most promising seminarians, after sufficient trial, are periodically selected and sent there with scarcely any expense to themselves, with the added attraction of foreign travel, or, what is nearly equivalent, the advantages of a peculiarly varied intellectual life, such as is found, for example, in Rome, where students meet from every part of the globe, with the common aim of gathering wisdom and stimulating their zeal for learning, whilst imbibing, at the same time, that correctness of religious feeling, that delicacy and penetration in matters of faith, which is naturally gained in the atmosphere of such centres. Nevertheless—and we may say it without giving umbrage—probably the greater number of those who, under the most favorable circumstances, and with no lack of ability, have been led into this sphere of higher education and intellectual distinction, prefer, on their return home, to devote themselves to the labor of the mission rather than seek positions as teachers and professors, which would naturally be open to them. Thus it happens that few of those among the clergy who lack neither talent nor opportunity, devote themselves to higher spheres of intellectual activity. This want of appreciation has the further disadvantage of habitually stifling any aspiration in the same direction among our younger students. They see no particular advantage derived from laboring in this field; and just as artists tell us that they find no encouragement in America unless they turn artisans, so our gifted young men set aside what they naturally consider an unprofitable employment.

This conviction of the weakness and want of appreciation of a distinctively Catholic intellectual life in our midst will strengthen when we take a glance at our literature and press. Catholic newspapers, like Catholic colleges, are struggling for support. Perhaps, when compared with sectarian influences, we seem to have the

advantage. There are more Catholic readers of Catholic papers than there are, for instance, Episcopalian readers for Episcopalian papers. But statistics in this case are no standard by which to estimate religious life and activity. A Protestant may, without violence to his religious principles, endorse almost any doctrinal opinion of almost any sectarian journal. A Catholic cannot endorse any doctrinal opinion distinctly Protestant without thereby denying his own. But even with this distinguishing feature, Catholic opinion is hardly felt as exercising any adequate influence. In Europe Catholics are very much ahead of us in the matter of literary activity. The journalists on the continent fighting the war with infidelity and anarchy could teach us to wield that mighty weapon of the press so as to elicit respect and sometimes wholesome fear from those who wantonly and falsely attack our rights and truth. But there is a well-understood agreement on all sides that they must be supported. In England we see the same advance. Forty years ago Fred. Lucas set a current afloat, not turbulent but steady, which has worked in the interests of Catholic rights in that country perhaps as much as the united efforts of the hierarchy found it possible to do in the same direction. And so it has come to pass that Catholic intelligence commands this day in England a respect fully equal to that of its adversaries. Lilly, Wilfred Ward, following the paternal traces of the robust metaphysician, Harper, the Jesuit, St. George Mivart, Father Coleridge, S. J., Dr. Barry, and others, to say nothing of Cardinals Newman and Manning, chiefs of a larger tribe, are names which figure habitually in the best non-Catholic periodicals. They command attention from every quarter as—and this it is important to note—Catholic writers, Catholic leaders of thought. And yet they have to contend with prejudices far more unreasonable and possessing much more power of being enforced than could ever gain command amongst us. With us, whilst the press is a most efficient power in all other interests, Catholic thought does not impress one as being any marked feature in it; as like in most of our ephemeral literature we miss anything like a high or serious tone. Brilliancy and raciness and appeals to common prejudices largely supply the place of thoughtful editorials showing a philosophically trained mind. And all this is evidence that we care little, on the whole, for intellectual culture, unless it be ready-made. We like the facts and the pomp of it well enough when it comes in patent form, but to evolve, and shape, and make a sacrifice of ease or wealth for it, is not our general habit.

It has been said that, as to Catholics in America, there is no special need for a literary activity such as is forced upon Catholics abroad by the aggressive hostility of their adversaries, for Pro-

testants in America are daily becoming more tolerant in proportion as they become acquainted with the real life and belief of Catholics. If this were true, all the more reason to work in behalf of the Kingdom of Heaven. Because the harvest is great, shall we put our hands into our lap and say: "There is no blight upon the crop; behold, we have plenty and can afford to lose a part of the reaping!" The Catholic Church is a living body, instituted not only to guard but to spread the true faith. Her Founder was ever consumed with zeal for the glory of that Church. And the legacy He has left us is: "Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always."¹ Worldliness is far more dangerous to the Faith than heresy; it grows as quickly, and it grows within as without the fold, becoming the root of countless heresies.

But it is an error, both in fact and in principle, to suppose that the Catholic Church will ever cease to be an object of general aggression, whether from Protestantism or infidelity. Our Lord did not tell His disciples, who were messengers and lovers of peace, that the world would not mind them, but that it would hate them. They did not need to attack it. They were going among wolves, and that told them enough. If at any time the contrary appears to be the case, it is the greater sign of danger. It frequently implies that Catholics are on the point of settling down to a liberal sort of religionizing which is what lukewarmness is to the individual, a more hopeless state of the soul than any other. Whether the watchword outside of us be "no popery" or "liberalism" or "anarchy," or whatever else you will, it is quite the same to us in the end; the method only differs. Skepticism and infidelity only want to be systematized to find their sole and most serious enemy in the Catholic Church. And as a matter of fact, if we but take the trouble to attend to it, there is constantly alive against us a fearful and morbid activity. The various sects in this country publish in the gross about 400 papers² representing over two million subscribers. Run your eye over any one of them at random, and you will rarely fail to notice, more prominently than all its gospel cant, misrepresentations of the Catholic doctrine or imputations against Catholic morality which have their origin probably in the hatred of individual writers, but certainly also in a consciousness that such statements will find credit if not applause among the Protestant public. Even the unsectarian religious papers, of which we have nearly a hundred, teem, the best of them, with humiliating bits of gossip or false interpretations of facts, all laid to the charge of a religion as pure and consistent as its Divine Founder. The secular

¹ Gal. iv., 18.

² This does not include Sunday-school papers or tractarian publications issued periodically.

press, whilst it now and then gives a bone to Catholics, as befits it, since it feeds on their patronage, on the whole treats us with lofty condescension or mere toleration. Things are said of us in denunciation of our principles which would not be breathed against men of any other denomination on the score of their religious belief. And all this with a bland assurance in respectable and high-toned journals that makes one blush to think it could not have been written were there not some hope that it would be believed. If we realize the strength of our holy religion, what a boon it is to society, and what it might do through us as loyal members of either, then we must confess that we are sadly below the level that befits us in Catholic *esprit de corps*. Even as we glance in passing at one of our most energetic Catholic weeklies, we meet at the head of the editorial column the question put to the educators of our youth who have just left college: "Have they (the youth leaving college) been taught to take an interest in Catholic affairs? A course of instruction on Catholic public spirit would not be a bad one for schools, colleges, pupils and teachers." True, the place where this spirit is to be infused is the school and the college. And this brings us to a second source of difficulties to be overcome in the erection successfully of a Catholic university. We mean the uneven character, the indefinite scope, and the incompleteness on the whole of what must become in one way or another the feeders of the university. As to the seminaries, a movement aiming at greater thoroughness and uniformity has, as is well-known, been already inaugurated by the late Council, and in spite of the materialistic atmosphere that surrounds us, some noticeable headway will undoubtedly soon be made, to allow the University to continue and perfect the work. We cannot, without increasing beyond proper limits the bulk of this article, enter into the details of this question of our colleges as feeders of a university. The matter has, moreover, been amply and ably illustrated in these pages heretofore, by writers at once in position to judge and to influence. We may be permitted briefly to quote their testimony in corroboration of what we have stated. The first of these writers, though speaking anonymously, is readily recognized as the author of various papers on the subject of education, a man devoted practically and wholly to the task of college and school-reform. He sees a main difficulty of our system in a combination of the college with the preparatory schools, which of itself tends to lower the grade of the former. Yet few of our colleges, he considers, are at once prepared to alter this state of things. For the rest he looks upon the condition of our colleges as hopeful;¹ "too hopeful," comments the Rev. F.

¹ "What is the Outlook for our Colleges?" *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, 1882, page 385.

Thébaud in an article written soon after, in which he supplements the paper of Brother Azarias by his own observations in the same field. The system of our colleges, he says, "is altogether faulty, and must be changed if there is to be any hope of a rise in the intellectual scale. The change must begin from the very studies which are preparatory to college."¹ A reform had been attempted, but failed. But, happily, he finds the cause of this failure, and offers a scheme by which it may be permanently remedied and by which at the same time a link would be supplied between our colleges such as they are and a complete university.² Dr. Gilmary Shea, who, though not in practice a schoolman, has had, we believe, more than ordinary opportunities of estimating the true merits of the educational question in this country, writes in the July number of the following year, complaining of the want of preparatory facilities: "But colleges and universities cannot thrive unless the preparatory schools exist in greater number." Similar complaints as to the insufficiency of the preparatory course for a university system upon the European principle are made by non-Catholic educators. A remedy is proposed, not in remodeling our system according to the German university plan, but by establishing more post-graduate courses, and thus, by carrying on the college system to a greater height, to give it a new development, whence will eventually issue an "American University."³ If academic freedom is to be the prerogative and not an impediment and a disgrace to a university, then a rigid and sufficiently protracted college discipline, mental as well as moral, is absolutely essential. There is a tendency to introduce the elective system of studies in our principal colleges, which, if it obtain, must needs add to the difficulties in the way of a thorough university education.⁴

Nor can we wholly trust to the anticipation that excellent and even renowned professors will draw students around their chairs without any further effort on our part. Such professors—unless they be religious—cannot be expected to lose their time acting as tutors to unprepared collegians. Even if we were to assume that they would for a time lower their standard for the sake of profiting their hearers, much of the stimulus to original investigation, which should characterize a university professor, would inevitably be lost. It is to be supposed that these professors be not only prepared to give, but actually offer proof of their ability to keep apace in their respective departments and cope with the theologians, philosophers,

¹ "Superior Instruction in our Colleges." By Rev. Aug. J. Thébaud, S. J., *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, 1882, page 681.

² *Ibid.*, p. 696.

³ See "The American College" in the *Independent* of May 21, 1885.

⁴ See an admirable paper on the subject by Prof. West in *North American Review*, May, 1885.

scientists, and literati of their sister institutions. Their names must be before the public as among us are those of McCosh, Eliot, and other representative men in their sphere. To do this, to be able to command the public ear, they need from us more than ordinary co-operation. Our professors, whatever their individual ability, are necessarily without the thousand resources brought together in the old universities by generations of toilers in the field of knowledge and by the munificence of royal patrons. In this way European students have an immense advantage over us. Even to take merely a stroll through a place like Oxford adds to our education; the men we meet, the traditions which speak to us from cornice and gate, invite inquiry and speculation, and all sorts of knowledge, old and new, being accessible, we silently compare, and our minds grow unconsciously. The professor is drawn on at once by the love for his work and by the honor and prestige that attach to it. His salary may be low enough in our estimation, but it is proportioned to his needs, and amply compensated for by other advantages. He has not to provide special libraries for his purpose; the periodical literature in his field of labor is at his hand in the museums; experiments, travel, and such like, involve much less expense than is the case with us. A certain fitness of things would demand that the professors at our university should be paid on an equality with those of other institutions of the same order in this country. Some of our colleges without endowments pay as high as Oxford divinity chairs, that is, between \$7000 and \$8000 per annum. Johns Hopkins's regular professors receive, we understand, \$5000. The majority of institutions rate, of course, much lower, but their influence is accordingly. This implies that we should be under considerable expense on the score of a respectable faculty, a necessity which has been set forth in the document referred to at the beginning of this paper.

In all we have said so far, it must, of course, be borne in mind that our university would have to be an "American university" withal, that is, possess certain modifications necessitated by and adapted to our national circumstances. Its object is to be useful to Americans, but still useful as a university. There is enough, then, to make us thoughtful, and whilst we may have cause for confidence in so grand an interest, we must surely increase our energy. If it should happen that the university, no matter how well equipped, should still attract but a limited number of students in its beginning and for some years to come, those who have pondered the subject will be in no wise surprised. It is possible that in times when we attach so much importance to numbers, this turn of things might act as a discouragement to parents who think of a great university only in connection with crowded halls of

students. This would be equivalent to abandoning a work in its most needy crisis. We must be prepared for drawbacks. If it turn out that these were groundless fears, so much the better.

For such reasons we may briefly refer, as said above, to the foundation of the Irish University. Not that the difficulties in particular which beset that undertaking were the same as would be in our own. We have hardly any downright opposition as had Ireland. Still an incubus is often as hindering, and requires as much labor to remove, as the aggressive attitude of an enemy who must be silenced. At all events, it will draw our attention to one aspect of the case, useful to us in forming an estimate of things to be tried for the first time. For there is one important feature which makes both cases alike. Among the modern foundations there is none that offers the analogous circumstance of an entirely new foundation except this one of the Dublin University. Louvain, Laval, the *École des Hautes Études*, even Salzburg just on the point of rising, are all either developments or revivals of older institutions. The old haunts of wisdom had, in most instances, retained their venerable air; the honored traditions of better ages clung always about the places, and fired the student to unconscious ambition, and from the very ruins of tower and wall spoke the desire to be what they once had been :

“Like the vase in which roses have once been distilled;
You may break, you may shatter the vase if you will,
But the scent of the roses will hang round it still.”

But the Irish University stands thus far alone. It was, as its founder says, “an anomaly in the history of universities. These had been the slow and steady growth of centuries out of a settled and uniform system of education, and, while expanding into their peculiar and perfect form, had, at the same time, been by anticipation educating subjects for its service, and had been creating and carrying along with them the national sympathies. But here was a great institution to take its place among us, without antecedent or precedent whether to recommend or explain it. It receives neither illustration nor augury from the history of the past, and requires to be brought into existence as well as into shape.”¹ Such is also our case. For the rest, the Irish University had to encounter, besides the difficulties of raising sufficient funds, of finding able superiors and professors, and of obtaining a charter of incorporation, the opposition of public opinion. Even the bishops, to whom the thought of its realization was most dear, had serious

¹ Newman, *Historical Sketches, Universities*, chap. i.

misgivings as to its practicability.¹ A negative opposition manifested itself in the reform movement going on at about this time at Oxford and Cambridge, by which students were drawn thither, inasmuch as it was proposed to modify the restrictions attaching to college-fellowship and endowments, and tending to the general increased efficiency and extent of study. These were indeed difficulties with hardly any of which we have, even in a modified degree, to contend. But, not being in their nature insurmountable, they tended to stimulate the zeal and activity of all concerned in the success of the new university. On the other hand, the then condition of the Louvain University, which, though begun with a certain prestige, had encountered many difficulties in its revival similar to those which beset the Irish foundation, was very encouraging to the laborers in behalf of the latter.² There was also a sufficiently promising outlook that there would be no lack of hearers. Students were prepared and might be drawn from the best colleges in England, such as St. Edmund's, Stonyhurst, Ushaw, and others. Ireland itself had, at that time, some twenty respectable institutions, on a sound basis of classical instruction, and under the supervision of the diocesan authorities.³ This advantage, however, was little understood and appreciated by those who were not directly engaged in the interests of the university, and in point of fact proved really less available than had been anticipated.

What was most necessary was funds; and to have them, public opinion was to be gained over. In this Cardinal Newman found his main labor.⁴ And well did the "Old Lion of Oriel" do it for the four years that preceded the actual opening of the university, and ere any work had been done in it beyond his own appointment as rector of the proposed institution. England soon handed in her mite of over a million dollars. We have already alluded to what America did. France, with the *Univers* as its interpreter, supported the university scheme in Ireland (as it supported its rector during the Achilli trial at the same time) by contributions to its funds and to its staff of professors. What Ireland herself did we may readily surmise, when it is remembered that men such

¹ The then Bishop of Cloyne, Dr. Murphy, addressing a circular, dated Fermoy, September 20, 1854, to his clergy, says: "About three years since, when the project of founding the Catholic University was submitted by the Holy Father to the consideration of the Irish prelates, there were few indeed, even amongst the most strenuous advocates of the measure, who did not entertain serious doubts of its ultimate success."

² After sixteen years of its new existence, Louvain had some forty professors, active in the four faculties of law, medicine, letters and science.

³ The Directory for Ireland, 1854, gives the number of regular colleges at twenty-eight.

⁴ Vide "The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated," 1852.

as Dixon of Armagh, Cullen of Dublin, Dr. Vaughan, McHale of Tuam, occupied the Episcopal chairs that supported the movement. And thus the enthusiasm increased from day to day until the poorest laborer began to realize that the university was a work which to sustain was a singular prerogative for every man that bore the name of Catholic. The best powers of Catholic intelligence were engaged in the press to appeal to the sympathies of the educated classes. The *Rambler* acted as a sort of university-magazine so long as there was no other. The *Tablet*, then published in Dublin, then as now of a high tone and able to command respect, constantly defended the interests and cheered the prospects of the new university. And all through its crisis when actually at work, this journal supported and popularized it in a consistent manner, frequently publishing in detail the excellent lectures delivered to a small body of students in the university hall by distinguished professors. Thus it kept the public informed and interested in the momentous enterprise, and warded off in a dignified way sneers and discouragement, when the refusal of a charter showed the displeasure from high places in government.¹ There were other periodicals, such as the *Catholic School*, *Duffy's Magazine*, the *Lamp*, etc., which took at least an indirect part in the promotion of this cherished project.

On Whitsunday, 1854, Dr. Newman knelt before the Apostolic Delegate in the Dublin Cathedral, to make his profession of faith as Rector of the Irish University. Four years had passed since he had accepted that office. That same week appeared, for the first time, the *Catholic University Gazette*, the official organ of the new institution. It was published every week² for about a year, when it became a monthly magazine.³ In it appeared successively the well-known articles on the "Rise and Progress of Universities," which have since been collected and published in book form among the Historical Sketches. They bore the title *prima facie* "Idea of a University." The *Gazette* had the further object of familiarizing the students in the various colleges with what the university expected from its applicants. It gave specimens by which to direct the studies of candidates for competition, and generally such information as is expected from a journal of that kind.

And what was the outcome of all this activity so prudently begun, so consistently carried out, benefited rather than injured by unreasonable opposition, and by the existence of difficulties properly viewed and courageously handled? Let us extract the sub-

¹ Shortly after this time, Mr. Lucas handed over these to him sacred interests, involved in the principles of that paper, to Mr. Swift, saying: If you got £10,000 for it, from the corruptionists, my wife would not touch a penny of the money.

² J. Duffy, Dublin.

³ March, 1855.

stance of an account of its work and progress at the end of the first term after its formal inauguration.¹

"The examinations for entrance were held, and above twenty passed successfully, and immediately afterwards commenced the university course.² On Sunday following the examinations, Dr. Newman invited the University faculty, consisting of the Dean of Residence, the professors and lecturers, to a *soirée* in the Refectory by way of introducing the students to their academical career. There were fifteen students in all that evening. Dr. Newman made a beautiful address on the subject of the career they were about to enter on. He ended the same by alluding to their number, with which he was in no way disappointed, but rather "well pleased, though some might have expected more."

We see here many difficulties actually overcome by strenuous efforts. The university was at last a reality. If in subsequent days it had to change its outward form, owing to the hard policy of the government, which refused it a charter, it has neither lost its original aim nor ceased to grow in real efficiency. We need not anticipate any such difficulty stunting the growth of an American Catholic university. We enjoy full freedom of legitimate action, and our government would rather favor than narrowly oppose through political motives any real advance toward higher education. So far our university would not be prevented from being in truth a

——— Sacri domus hospita veri,
Quam neque civiles potuerunt vertere motus,
Bellorumque faces, nec conjurata revellant
Secula.

Neither charter nor public favor would likely be wanting to us in this work. Yet these are helps necessary to its well-being rather than its being. What we mainly want is, it appears, a supply of properly qualified students, eager for knowledge for its own sake, clustering around their new Alma Mater, and *sicut novellæ olivarum in circuitu mensæ, sicut sagittæ in manu potentis*, becoming at once her support and her pride. So long as a university is looked upon as a machine expected to turn out professional men merely, it must be a failure and a misnomer. If the Irish University, with its corps of excellent professors,³ with its uniformly

¹ Taken from a report in the *Catholic University Gazette*, of that date.

² Among the first students enrolled upon the examination list is found that of Daniel O'Connell, who, in consideration of his illustrious grandfather, was presented with an exhibition allowing him free residence.

³ The *Catholic University Gazette*, October 19th, 1854, gives the list of professors and lecturers appointed up to that date. They represent masters of Oxford, Cambridge, and the Dublin Universities. Among the regular lecturers we have M. Pierre le Page Renouf, taken from the Chair of French Literature at Oxford (Pembroke College), Signor Marani, lecturer on Italian and Spanish Literature, from the University

graded colleges, with all its public-spirited activity, had so slender a beginning in this respect, as we have seen, we shall have to temper our grandiloquent expectations, lest disappointment paralyze that needful enthusiasm whence comes energy for the beginning of every arduous work.

An organized system of press work, the general and uniformly-directed co-operation of the clergy, lectures on the subject among our better educated classes, are means in our hands which might facilitate the work of creating a clear understanding and an active sympathy in behalf of the project. If we cannot have a university magazine at once, might not certain organs already in existence be officially set apart to bespeak plans and modes of action by which Catholic public spirit would be raised, the matter elucidated, discussed, and encouraged? This, even if it were necessary to pay, and pay adequately for such means, would probably prove a better investment of a university fund in the beginning than most others.

Next to this, an understanding with some of our reputable colleges and educational leaders seems a necessity of the situation. These also should have to make a sacrifice for the common good.

But we mean rather to suggest than to propose. More will unquestionably be done when the Holy See has made public its approval of the scheme, and then a blessing of peculiar weight would be added to our resources. Meanwhile, as this work is determined on, we must gather up and use our energies in every direction.

Certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
'Noctes atque dies niti præstante labore
Ad summas emergere opes, verumque potiri.

And this all the more deliberately because we have no direct opposition from interested persons or parties to urge us on and sharpen our sensibilities, or rouse our resentment into swift resolve and action for the gain of a noble end. The difficulties in the way of a higher seminary, though not quite the same as those of the remaining university faculties, are still sufficiently great to make us anxious. Less time would be required to remove them, because our clerics are generally under the control of a ten or twelve years' uniform discipline. In either case it is a task of building up from the foundation, of creating a somewhat different atmosphere from that which surrounds us on all sides. If there is need of a regeneration of society, those that are to do the work of regenerating must themselves be filled with the spirit of the Baptist. All must set to work on the task as if its fulfillment depended on each, or else bear the reproach of an unfinished tower.

of Modena, besides such familiar names as the poet D. F. McCarthy, Professor Robertson, Healy Thompson, Dr. Dunne (Irish College, Rome).

MARYLAND AND THE CONTROVERSIES AS TO HER
EARLY HISTORY.

THE first view taken of the establishment and early history of the Province of Maryland was that its Patent had been solicited by a nobleman, liberal and tolerant in his views beyond the statesmen of his day, who left in the charter which he solicited the impress of his noble mind; that the Province was colonized by his Catholic son with gentlemen mainly of his own faith, who brought over settlers without regard to their religious opinions, making Maryland a home to all, opening its doors of refuge to men who fled from the persecution alike of those who upheld the Church of England and those who, while fugitives from that very persecution, were re-enacting it with fearful severity. Maryland not only established religious equality and an entire separation of church and state, but had officials, we were assured, bound by an oath prescribed by the Lord Proprietary, to vex no man on account of his religion. It crowned its career of religious equality by an act of its legislature, passed in 1649, while the dominant element was still Catholic.

The picture was a fair and goodly one. It was one of which Americans had reason to be proud. If it reflected credit on Catholics, it was not one drawn by men of that faith for their self-glorification; for, sooth to say, they have, as a body, shown little interest in their own part in American history. Writers drew the picture while the Georges were still honored as sovereigns in this land; other writers drew it after a republic was established. And nowhere does the picture appear in more glowing colors, or with nobler forms, than in the pages of Bancroft's "History of the United States," when the results of deep historic research were portrayed with a pen guided by the honest impulses of a generous nature. But, at last, some began to reckon with their Protestantism, and ask whether it was worth the while, necessary, politic or wise to give such credit to Catholics. As the Church, which, a century and a half ago, was but a handful of persecuted, oppressed people, developed as a religion with all its attributes, its definite creed and government and worship, there were some who felt that every claim in its behalf must be ignored, undermined, distorted and defeated. Protestantism, as Professor Fairbairn admits, is not a religion, but merely a phase of thought. It has no creed, no priesthood, no worship. It was in its origin, and must ever remain, a mere denial of something held by Catholics.

This negative quality of the mind led some to assail the early views of Maryland history, not with any noble aim of presenting the characters of the founders of Maryland in a nobler or more heroic light, but to lower them to the level of the most truculent and intolerant of their contemporaries. This school may be said to have originated with Bozman, author of a history of Maryland, been maintained by S. F. Streeter, and some other writers of the Maryland Historical Society, and more recently with intense and unscrupulous bitterness by Rev. Edward D. Neill. Their efforts have not been altogether unavailing; men of culture abroad, like Gladstone, have accepted these polemics as historic decisions, and at home we can trace the bias in the pages of the latest edition of Bancroft.

In defence of the earlier view, upholding it as correct, no Catholic has yet appeared, except McSherry, in his "History of Maryland," Colonel Bernard U. Campbell in his criticism of Honorable Brantz Mayer, and Richard H. Clarke in a reply to Gladstone; the Catholic interest in the early history of the province, evinced for some years in annual celebrations of the Maryland Pilgrims, having long since died away, leaving no monument but the printed addresses, in which even we look in vain for a manly and vigorous handling of the questions at issue.

The ablest upholders of the original view of Maryland history have been the honest, impartial investigators of early records, G. L. L. Davis, William Meade Addison, General T. Bradley Johnson, and, to some extent, J. Thomas Scharf, the latest historian of the State that still bears the blazon of the vanished house of Baltimore.

The first question raised was in regard to the charter for Maryland, issued by King Charles I. at the instance of the first Lord Baltimore, but, in consequence of Sir George Calvert's death, really made to his son Cecilius, the second Baron. The charter, vast as were the powers it conferred on the Lord Proprietary, guaranteed to the settlers and their descendants the rights of native-born subjects in England and Ireland, gave them freedom of trade, and assemblies in which in person or by representatives they should take part in enacting the laws of the province. Maryland was open to all British subjects who chose to settle there; notwithstanding the statute against fugitives and others of the kind, no man "except such to whom it shall be expressly forbidden" being debarred from embarking for it. The dissenter and the Catholic were thus secure in sailing for this favored colony.

Though a Catholic, the Lord Proprietary had the right of presenting to the churches of the established religion erected in the province, and the charter ended with this clause: "Provided always

that no interpretation thereof be made whereby God's holy and true Christian religion or the allegiance due to us, our heirs and successors, may, in any wise, suffer by change, prejudice, or diminution."

"Representative government was indissolubly connected with the fundamental charter; and it was especially provided that the authority of the absolute Proprietary should not extend to the life, freehold, or estate of any emigrant. . . . Christianity, as professed by the Church of England, was protected; but beyond this silence left room for equality in religious rights not less than in civil freedom to be assured. . . . Calvert, in his charter, expressly renounced any claim" (to the fisheries). The king, "by an express stipulation, covenanted that neither he, nor his heirs, nor his successors, should ever, at any time thereafter, set any imposition, custom or tax whatsoever upon the inhabitants of the province. Thus was conferred on Maryland an exemption from English taxation forever." (Bancroft's "United States," 1861, i., pp. 242-3.)

Now, to whom is the credit due for the wise, tolerant and statesmanlike features that mark this charter, and prevented its being "as worthless as those of the London Company, of Warwick, of Gorges, or of Mason"?

It was from the outset asserted that the charter was drawn up by Lord Baltimore, who, as Assistant Secretary of State, and subsequently Secretary, and connected with the Virginia Company, and holder already of one patent, that of Avalon in Newfoundland, was perfectly familiar with all the details of charters granted for America.

Chalmers says: "He laid the foundation of his province upon the broad basis of security to property and freedom of religion." ("Annals," i., pp. 207-8.)

Bancroft says: "Calvert deserves to be ranked among the most wise and benevolent lawgivers of all ages. He was the first, in the history of the Christian world, to seek for religious security and peace, by the practice of justice, and not by the exercise of power." ("History of the United States," 1861, p. 244.)

The first to raise any other theory was the Honorable John P. Kennedy, who, in his discourse on Calvert, assumed the merit to the king: "There is more freedom of conscience, more real toleration a hundred-fold, in this charter of a Protestant prince to a Catholic nobleman than in that act so often called to our remembrance." This idea was taken up by Rev. Ethan Allen in a polemical tract entitled, "Maryland Toleration, or Sketches of the Early History of Maryland," to the year 1650 (Baltimore, 1855). Its virulence may be judged by the fact that on a single page it six times applies to Catholics the filthy and degrading nicknames, Ro-

lish, Romanist. The writer denied that the credit was due to Lord Baltimore. "What gave it its authority was the king's signature and seal. . . . The authority, then, which gave Protestants protection in the colony was the king's own authority, and he a Protestant." (p. 16.)¹

This idea was soon taken up, and it was argued that, as a charter was the act of the king, the credit for any wise or liberal features in that of Maryland must be given to Charles I., because "whether this (or that) feature of the charter was the original conception of Lord Baltimore," says Allen, "is not material and cannot now be shown."

That the principles guiding Charles in England showed no such broad and liberal views as those contained in the charter, was to be overlooked, on the fallacious plea that because as he signed it, it must be regarded as, in its conception and detail, the work of the king. But on comparing this charter with that granted by King James I. to Lord Baltimore for Avalon, we find the same ruling ideas. These ideas are not found in other charters. The Avalon and Maryland charters stand alone in giving the people a share in the passage of the laws by which they were to be governed. These charters alone are free from a compulsory state church or the exclusion of particular faiths. If the credit of this political wisdom is to be given to a king, it must be given not to Charles I., but to his father, who gave the charter for Avalon, of which that for Maryland is in the main a copy!

As there is nothing in the character or policy of James or

¹ How utterly illogical or perversé this writer was, may be seen by a single example. The fourth section of the charter reads: "Also, we do grant and likewise confirm unto the said Baron of Baltimore, his heirs and assigns; . . . furthermore, the patronages and advowsons of all churches, which (with the increasing worship and religion of Christ), within the said region, islands, islets and limits aforesaid, hereafter shall happen to be built; together with license and faculty of erecting and founding churches, chapels and places of worship in convenient and suitable places within the premises, and of causing the same to be dedicated and consecrated according to the ecclesiastical laws of our kingdom of England." This is perfectly clear and explicit. The king gave Lord Baltimore license and faculty to found churches of the Established Church, and nominate pastors, the latter right being enjoyed by great Catholic landholders in England till the reign of William and Mary, and which it is even now proposed to restore to them. Now, see how Rev. Mr. Allen perverts this: "This, it will be perceived, confined the erecting and founding of churches and chapels, and all places of worship, to his license and faculty. None, consequently, could be built but such as he should permit and authorize. It placed thus the erecting of Protestant churches, and Roman Catholic ones too, at his will and pleasure; so that, if he saw fit, he could forbid and prevent any of either name being built." The charter simply gave Lord Baltimore permission to build and found. It has not a syllable about his permitting or preventing the colonists from doing so. A schoolboy would be ashamed of such an argument. If a schoolmaster gave one boy permission to go off for a day's fishing, could that boy argue that henceforward none of his fellow-scholars could go fishing without his leave? Yet, such is Allen's argument, and grave writers follow him!

Charles to explain how or why such remarkable ideas of liberality in regard to civil government, and religious equality, manifested themselves in no other act or deed, except on the occasion of the granting of the two charters to Sir George Calvert, we must believe that they were like latent heat in a lump of ice, something theoretically existing there, but against which our senses bear testimony; and that contact with Sir George Calvert was necessary to create the current by which these latent virtues became apparent. So that even under Allen's theory Calvert becomes the potent element by which popular assemblies and religious freedom could get into an American charter.

Against such fallacies men of sense will always coincide with the view of the judicious historian Chalmers. "Nothing can afford more decisive proof than these material omissions (that of subjecting the provincial laws to king or parliament, etc.), that Sir George Calvert was the chief penman of the grant. For the rights of the Proprietary were carefully attended to, but the prerogatives of the crown, the rights of the nation, were in a great measure overlooked or forgotten."

So much for the authorship of the charter, and the merit of the principles it embodies.

2. The next question that has been raised is, whether it really deserves any praise as having contributed to increase the welfare of mankind.

Anderson, in his "Colonial Church," condemned it because the supremacy of the Church of England was not established by it; Brownson censured it as aristocratic and containing very little of any democratic element, and as inferior to the early New England plans of government, in that it did not recognize the Church as independent of the state; George William Brown, addressing the Maryland Historical Society, maintained that "the people of Maryland are not mainly indebted to it for the freedom which they have always enjoyed." Others, to maintain that the charter really had no element favoring religious liberty, but simply guaranteed the maintenance and protection of the established church, resorted to a most comical expedient, and maintained that the Latin words of the charter, "*Sacrosancta Dei et vera Christiana religio*," which had from the time of the charter been rendered "God's holy and true Christian religion" should be translated "holy *service* of God and true Christian religion," as Streeter maintained; or "God's holy rights and the true Christian religion," as Hon. Brantz Mayer translated. "The holy service of God and the true Christian religion could honestly and fairly mean," says Rev. Ethan Allen, "only that which was then established by law in England," that gentle-

man not recognizing any common Christianity or Christian religion, nor even admitting a common Protestant religion within the term.

Let us compare the charter with others. That of Avalon alone resembles it. The patent of Queen Elizabeth to Raleigh, in 1584, secured to those born in the colonies he might establish the rights of British subjects; but the power of making laws was reserved absolutely to Raleigh, and no provision made for the voice of the settlers in an Assembly: no liberty of trade was given, and no law was to conflict with the doctrines of the established church (Hakluyt, iii., p. 243).

The patents of the London and Plymouth Virginia Companies had no guarantee of the rights of colonists; and the royal charter for Massachusetts Bay gave the right of electing the governor and assistants and of making laws, not to the settlers, but to the freemen of the company. None of these gave any freedom of trade, nor did that of Virginia.

In the matter of religion the Virginia charter of 1606 required the doctrines of the Established Church to be preached to the settlers and the Indians; that of 1609 virtually excluded Catholics by authorizing the administration of the oath of supremacy to be tendered to all who wished to sail to that colony; and the New England charter granted to Sir Ferdinand Gorges in 1621 formally excluded Roman Catholics. The charter therefore granted to Lord Baltimore was in several points more liberal and enlightened, better calculated for the welfare of the colonists than any of the patents issued in that century. The latest historian of Maryland, who had all the views on the subject before him, gives his conclusion frankly and clearly: "And we cannot be far wrong in ascribing the peculiar independence of Marylanders, their unflinching maintenance of their rights, their stubborn resistance to wrong, their Spartan courage and endurance, and their ardent patriotism, to the extraordinary liberties of the charter, and the singularly excellent administration of a government under which they felt themselves to be truly freemen." ("History of Maryland," i., p. 62.)

But it has been advanced that the charter did not really secure religious freedom, because penal laws against Catholics were subsequently passed by both Puritan and Episcopalian. The answer to this view is simple. These laws were not passed under the charter, but when the charter and the government it established were suspended. The charter vested the lawmaking power in the Proprietary with the consent of the freemen. Clayborne and Bennet in the name of the Commonwealth deposed Lord Baltimore's governor, and appointed a board of ten commissioners to administer the government. They called an Assembly excluding all who had borne arms for the king, and all who "do profess the Roman Catholic re-

ligion." The Assembly thus called met in October, and in "An Act concerning Religion" declared "that none who profess and exercise the popish (commonly called the Roman Catholic) religion can be protected in this province;" and though it declares that "such as profess faith in God by Jesus Christ" "shall not be restrained from, but protected in, the profession of the faith and exercise of their religion," it concludes thus: "Provided such liberty be not extended to Popery or Prelacy."

The act was in direct contravention of the charter and passed by a government not authorized by the charter.

In 1691 Lord Baltimore was called upon to surrender his charter, and on his refusal his authority was set aside and a Governor sent over by William and Mary. From the Assembly called by Copley Catholic freemen were excluded, and were not even permitted to vote for members. The act, therefore, establishing the Church of England, and those subsequently enacted against Catholics, were not passed under the charter. Though the Crown pretended to continue the charter in force, it was virtually made a nullity. The descendants of Sir George Calvert recovered their authority only by renouncing the Catholic faith and accepting what had been done.

Both Puritan and Anglican recognized the charter as an impediment to intolerance, for they both deprived the Proprietary of his chartered rights, and without warrant of law deprived Catholics of rights as freemen in order to pass laws disfranchising them.

To give Sir George Calvert credit for the liberal provisions of the Maryland charter is galling to some, simply because Calvert was a Catholic. Since the Maryland charter is in the main a copy of that for Avalon, they discovered here matter for a new argument. The charter for Avalon was granted to Lord Baltimore when a member of the Church of England, and before he became a Catholic. Hence, they maintain, his statesman-like forecast, his care for the liberties, commercial rights, and religious equality of his colonists, was that of a Protestant—not of a Catholic.

The charter for Avalon, which Scharf gives in full ("History of Maryland," i., pp. 34-40), was issued April 7, 1623.

"The construction to be put upon its provisions, especially in regard to religion," says Streeter, "must depend upon the faith of Lord Baltimore at that period. If he was then a Protestant, as is generally asserted, the charter would be drawn in terms manifesting full confidence in the grantee as a member of the Established Church." This is not fairly stated. A Protestant does not become a Catholic by an instantaneous process. Periods of doubt, study, prayer, precede the final step. Even when conviction came, and

instructions had been received preparatory to being admitted into the Catholic Church, a man in position would undergo a terrible mental trial that would often last for a long time. The step deprived him of official position, of a place at court, of social relations, subjected him to loss of property, heavy fines and a perpetual risk of loss of liberty under some of the ingeniously devised penal laws. A man in Sir George Calvert's position would naturally provide in advance before taking the step. He was already interested in American colonization, as a member of the Virginia Company and as a purchaser of Vaughn's grant in Newfoundland. To place his estate there in the safest possible position would be a step dictated by prudence, and he would frame its provisions, so far as he could, to meet his necessities as a Catholic, and what he solicited would be to meet the requirements of a Catholic.

When he signed as Secretary the order for the arrest of the Jesuit Father, John Sweet, November 29, 1621, we can regard him as still a Protestant by conviction. But when, on the 4th of March, 1622, we find him writing to endeavor to procure the release of two imprisoned Jesuits, for whom a foreign ambassador had interposed kindly offices, we can recognize a feeling friendly to Catholics. The interesting letter which he penned to Secretary Conway on the 26th of October, 1623, describing the terrible accident at Blackfriars, where a Catholic congregation with the priests were plunged down to death by the giving way of the floors, is written in such a strain that we can scarcely withhold our conviction that he must have been a Catholic at the time. His conversion has been ascribed to Count Gondemar and Sir Thomas Arundel of Wardour. Neill impeaches this on the ground that Gondemar was not then in England, but, after all, a good deal is effected in this world by correspondence.

Sir George Calvert certainly avowed himself a Catholic and resigned his offices before he was made Baron of Baltimore in Ireland, the patent for which issued February 16, 1624. This year, 1624, is that assigned by Wood (*"Athenæ. Oxon."* i., p. 565; Fuller and Archbishop Abbott) as the date of his conversion to the Catholic faith; but the transaction covered months, and he may have been received into the Catholic Church in 1623. At all events everything tends to show that in that year he was in conviction a Catholic, and was preparing for a step which was, in a worldly point of view, to make such a change for himself and his family.¹

¹ Neill's *"Founders of Maryland"* asserts that he announced his conversion in 1625, but he gives no authority, and the date is not reconcilable with facts. Fuller, a contemporary, gives the year 1624. Wood says that when he was created Lord Baltimore (February 16, 1624) he was "then a Roman Catholic, or, at least, very much addicted to their religion." And Archbishop Abbott says: "since Charles's return from Spain (in 1623) Mr. Secretary Calvert apparently did turn Papist, which he now professeth."

3. The character of Lord Baltimore himself is the next point at issue. The earlier estimates were highly favorable. Bancroft wrote: "Before the patent could be finally adjusted and pass the great seal, Sir George Calvert died, leaving a name against which the breath of calumny has hardly whispered a reproach. The petulance of his adversaries could only taunt him with being 'an Hispaniolized Papist.' A man of such moderation that all parties were taken with him; sincere in his character." ("History of the United States," i., pp. 241-2.)

John P. Kennedy, in a discourse before the Maryland Historical Society in 1845, made the first serious attack on Calvert's character by representing him as a religious hypocrite. He treated the statement of Fuller, Abbott, and others, that Calvert became a convert to the Catholic faith, as false. He arrayed arguments to "prove that Sir George Calvert was, if not actually nursed in the faith of Rome, no convert to that faith in his period of manhood; that if he ever was a Protestant there is no record of it within our knowledge. ("Discourse," p. 34.) "He thought it the part of prudence and wisdom to keep his religion as much as possible confined to the privacy of his own chamber." (p. 35.) Yet he speaks of his "deference to Calvert's high character, integrity, and honor." (p. 38.) His ideas of integrity and honor were strange. Could a Catholic of honor and integrity take the oath of supremacy to which Sir Thomas More preferred the block? Could he be instrumental in sending Catholic priests to prison and the gallows for saying Mass? Could he, as a Catholic, have accepted the Longford grant in 1621, charged with conditions for the utmost severity against Catholics and schemes for their perversion? That he accepted the grant as a Protestant in 1621, as in that year he was active against a Jesuit in England, tends to show that he was then sincerely a Protestant. When he became a Catholic he surrendered his grant and obtained a re-grant in fee simple, thus obtaining exemption from conditions which, as a Catholic, he could not conscientiously perform. The whole theory of Kennedy was at the time so thoroughly confuted by Bernard U. Campbell that few have since questioned the reality of Calvert's conversion, or asked us to admire him as a successful hypocrite.

Another mode of lowering Lord Baltimore in the general esteem of mankind is to impeach his moral character. From an expression in a letter of Stuyvesant, the Dutch Governor of New Netherlands, certainly no very high authority on a question of English family history, Hildreth assumed that Leonard Calvert, the first Governor of Maryland, the actual founder of the colony, who guided its destiny so ably, was the fruit of some disgraceful amour of Lord Baltimore. Even the cautious Davis in his "Day Star"

accepted and repeated the charge. And yet in Hertingfordbury church a tablet to the memory of Lady Baltimore, first wife of Sir George, enumerates all her children, and second among them names Leonard. Even Neill ("Founders of Maryland," p. 41) admits that the charge is erroneous. Determined to sully Lord Baltimore's character, the charge was afterwards made that Philip Calvert, whom Cecil, the second Lord, styles "our very loving brother" (Bozman, ii., p. 699), was really illegitimate. But of this there is no proof. After the death of his first wife in 1622 Sir George married again, and the accounts of his residence in Newfoundland mention his wife and her children.

Scharf, whose very comprehensive "History of Maryland" has done so much to settle the annals of his State, gives (vol. i., p. 47) Leonard his due position, and adds: "Philip Calvert, who in 1656 was made Secretary of the Province of Maryland, afterwards Chancellor, and then Governor, was son of the second wife." This attempt to fix a stigma on the fair fame of Sir George Calvert fails.

4. Another mooted point in Maryland history is the position to be assigned to William Clayborne. Earlier historians represented him as the "evil genius of Maryland," the source of endless troubles. Streeter, Neill, and others, of late years, attempt to exalt him into a hero. Clayborne was one of those who refused to permit Lord Baltimore to remain in Virginia in 1629, unless he took the oath of supremacy. He was then an earnest upholder of the Church of England, and the king as head thereof. When Lord Baltimore obtained a grant south of the James, in 1631, he was active in opposing it, and the patent was revoked. In 1627, '28, and '29, he had obtained of the Governor of Virginia permission to trade to the Chesapeake, and, to confirm his privilege, in 1631 obtained of King Charles I. a license "to trade in all those seas, coasts, harbors, lands or territories, in or near about those parts of America for which there is not already a patent granted to others for sole trade." Governor Harvey subsequently gave him a license to trade to the Dutch. The only authority he had was to trade; no power was given to settle; no proprietary power given by the king or by the Colony of Virginia. He founded a settlement or trading post on Kent Island, and another on Palmer Island. When Lord Baltimore's colony arrived, he refused to recognize the authority of the Maryland charter, or the government established under it. But he surely had no valid title to the land, and the claim of a purchase from the Indians was one never recognized; and even a lawful title to the land did not authorize him to resist a government created by royal charter. If the charter divided the territory of Virginia unconstitutionally, Virginia might, and did, raise the question,

but it was not competent for every citizen of Virginia to resort to violent acts against the Maryland government. He was finally driven out, and his little establishment brought under subjection. He returned to Virginia, and when the Commonwealth was established, the old adherent of the King and Church of England was sent out by Cromwell to reduce Virginia to Puritan rule, and assuming powers over Maryland also, overthrew the Proprietary government, defeated the Governor, Stone, and is responsible for the ensuing butchery in cold blood of the prisoners taken.

Writers who have attempted to belittle Lord Baltimore have endeavored to elevate this man. The fullest and fairest collection of material for forming a correct judgment of Clayborne, and assigning him his proper place in history, will be found in Scharf's recent "History," and it shows how utterly subversive of all sound ideas of government are the arguments by which his career has been justified.

5. The next point to be considered is the object which Lord Baltimore had in view in obtaining the Avalon, Southern, and Maryland charters. The older historians, all, without any equivocation, regarded and represented it as an attempt to found a colony to which Catholics might withdraw from the fierce persecution in England. But to let Maryland be presented to the minds of men as a colony for Catholics, in its inception, was galling to some minds, and they endeavored to evade. Hence Kennedy, in his "Discourse," says: "I find no reason whatever to suppose, as I have already intimated, that in the planting of either Avalon or Maryland, Lord Baltimore was moved by a special desire to provide an asylum for persecuted Catholics, as many have alleged. The charter of Maryland does not indicate such a purpose, nor do the proceedings under it." (p. 41.) "There is no evidence that his ardor in these undertakings was stimulated by any motive having reference to particular religious opinions. We are, on the contrary, bound to presume that his purpose was, in part, the advancement of his own reputation, the increase of the wealth of his family, and as the Maryland charter expresses it, 'a laudable and pious zeal for extending the Christian religion, and also the territories of our empire.'" (p. 25.)

This idea was at once caught up by a certain class of writers like Doyle, who, in his "English Colonies in America," everywhere seeks to belittle Calvert, and the assertion was boldly made that Lord Baltimore had no idea of founding a refuge for the persecuted Catholics of England. It is almost an insult to common sense thus to pervert the silence of the Avalon and Maryland charters, or to say, as Allen puts it, "the words Protestant or Roman Catholic, or their synonyms, are not found in the charter." A charter granting

a refuge to Roman Catholics, in explicit terms, would have arrayed all the fanaticism of England against the king. The only thing was to word the grant so as to permit Catholics to proceed to the colony and live there in quiet. The penal laws were still enforced with unsparing rigor; priests were hanged, drawn, indecently mutilated, and quartered, for no crime but saying Mass as the English chaplains did on the field of Agincourt; laymen were punished by heavy fines and imprisonment for not attending the Anglican service, for harboring priests, for having a Catholic Bible; and we are gravely told that a document obtained from the king could not have been intended to benefit Catholics, because it does not say expressly: "And he is hereby authorized to convey to said land any of our Roman Catholic subjects, and freely to have the service of the Roman Catholic Church there." Calvert would have been a fool to ask such a clause, or Charles to allow it.

The period of Lord Baltimore's conversion shows a change in his plans. His grant from an individual in Newfoundland he merges in a proprietary government under a royal charter; other charters of that day, and from his interest in American colonization, and the office he held, he must have been familiar with them, pointedly excluded Catholic settlers; a law requiring the tendering of the oaths of supremacy and allegiance to Catholics seeking to pass to America, prevented them setting out. If Calvert had no wish to open his colony to Catholic emigration, why did he secure for Avalon, and afterwards for Maryland, the omission of the usual clause, and a proviso by which any one not specially forbidden could sail for those colonies? These points were not accidental, and if we are to presume at all, we are bound to presume that a trained statesman secured their omission with a motive, and the only motive for removing a restriction on Catholic emigration was the motive of making it possible.

The idea of a Catholic colony in America was nothing new. The voyage of Sir Humphrey Gilbert was part of a scheme of Catholic colonization, one of the projectors being the father of one of the earliest settlers in Maryland under Lord Baltimore's patent. The voyage of Weymouth to the coast of Maine was part of another project of Catholic settlement, projected by Thomas Lord Arundell of Wardour, who is said to have had so much influence in effecting Sir George's conversion, the two families being soon connected by intermarriage. Lady Anne Arundell's name is borne by a Maryland county to this day.

There were Catholics ready to emigrate; there were English Catholics on the continent of Europe who would readily join a colony where they could practice their religion, and live sur-

rounded by those who spoke the language and followed the customs of old England.

That Lord Baltimore secured three priests in succession for Avalon, while affording his Protestant colonists means of practicing their religion, shows that he took out Catholics as settlers. He had scarcely secured his Maryland charter when fanatical efforts were made to thwart his sending out settlers, all showing a belief that many, if not all, would be Catholics. Streeter, who cannot be suspected of favoring this view, says: "Opposition was not wanting, also, from parties in England hostile to the plan of the new colony. False and exaggerated representations were made through the Attorney-General before the Star Chamber relative to the designs of Lord Baltimore; that he intended to carry nuns into Spain, and soldiers to serve the king; that his ships had left Gravesend without due authority from the custom-house; and that his people had abused the king's officers, and refused to take the oath of allegiance. But Calvert succeeded in showing the falsity of all the charges brought against him, and at the end of about eighteen months from the time the Charter passed the great seal all obstacles were overcome, and his ships, which had been detained in consequence of these false reports, were allowed to depart." (*"Maryland Two Hundred Years Ago,"* p. 14.) The Jesuit Fathers, and evidently some others, did not join the vessels till after they reached the Isle of Wight (*"Relatio Itineris,"* p. 9). Here is abundant evidence that a Catholic object was suspected, and means taken to defeat it.

That Lord Baltimore designed Maryland as a refuge for Catholics was asserted by Beverly in his *"History of Virginia:"* "Calvert, a Roman Catholic, thought for the more quiet exercise of his religion to retire with his family into this New World." (*"History of Virginia,"* p. 46.) Wynne, in his *"History of America,"* says: "His lordship was a Catholic, and had formed his design of making this settlement in order to enjoy a liberty of conscience." Douglass, in his *"Summary,"* and *"The Modern Universal History,"* expresses the same view; and the Maryland Catholics, in their petition in 1751, asserted it as an undisputed fact.

We have thus considered the main points in controversy, so far as Lord Baltimore is concerned. The latest historian of Maryland justly remarks: "Calumny has not shrunk from attacking his (Baltimore's) honored name. Detraction has been busy; and, as the facts could not be denied, Calvert's motives have been assailed; but empty assertion, conjecture, surmises, however ingeniously malevolent, have happily exercised very little influence over the minds of intelligent and candid men." (*"History of Maryland,"* i., p. 52.) It must still, therefore, be recognized as historic truth that

Sir George Calvert was a man of integrity, ability, and unimpeached morality; that he was not a hypocrite, always a Catholic and concealing his faith, but a Protestant who from conviction became a Catholic; that he planned a refuge in America for those who, like himself, were the victims of penal laws, and obtained a charter for Maryland, which gave them an opportunity to settle there in comparative freedom; that this charter contained guarantees for the liberty and prosperity of the colonists unusual in charters, and that these beneficent features are due to the noble mind of Calvert.

6. Passing to the history of the Province, we encounter the great question in regard to the oath taken by the officers. According to Chalmers ("Political Annals," pp. 210, 235), the oath taken by the Governor and Council, between the years 1637 and 1657, was: "I will not, by myself or any other, directly or indirectly, trouble, molest or discountenance any person professing to believe in Jesus Christ, for or in respect of religion. I will make no difference of persons in conferring offices, favors, or rewards, for or in respect of religion; but merely as they shall be found faithful and well-deserving, and endued with moral virtues and abilities; my aim shall be public unity; and if any person or officer shall molest any person professing to believe in Jesus Christ, on account of his religion, I will protect the person molested and punish the offender."

We have this oath, as modified in 1648, and as it continued to 1657; but the question has been raised, whether the oath in the exact form given by Chalmers was in use from 1637 to 1648; whether, in fact, in the whole of that early period of eleven years this oath was taken. Streeter disregarded Chalmers, and maintained that the oath from 1639 to 1643 contained no allusion to religious matters. Yet, as Scharf reasonably argues, "Chalmers was too accurate a writer to use dates so loosely; and, as he was not only an experienced lawyer, but the custodian of the Maryland provincial papers, and had free access afterwards to all documents relating to the colony in the British State Paper Office, he could not have been in doubt as to the precise date, or ignorant of the exact language." ("History of Maryland," i., p. 171.) In fact, if Chalmers did not copy it, he must have invented it—a grave charge, indeed. Streeter does not give the form of the oath which he found, nor tell us where it can be seen. Scharf, who is the official custodian of the State archives, sustains Chalmers, and evidently has not in his keeping the form to which Mr. Streeter alludes. The volumes of the "Maryland Archives" ought to show the oath mentioned by Streeter, but it has not been our good fortune to secure a set, or even a reply to our application for one; and, in the examination we were able to give these volumes, in one of our public

libraries, we did not find the oath referred to by Mr. Streeter, or any proof that any such oath was administered during the period he specifies.

Leaving this question, which can easily be decided by a reference to the archives, let us come to the Act of Toleration of 1649, and the oath prescribed at that time. Those who denied that Maryland was in its origin a Catholic colony; that Lord Baltimore had any religious motive in planting it; that religious freedom was intended or implied in the charter or early provincial rule, now come forward to maintain that the Legislature of 1649 was not a Catholic body, or that Catholics were in a majority in the Assembly. This strange set of writers seem to quake and tremble, from morn to dewy eve, for fear their fellow citizens should give Catholics credit for doing any praiseworthy act, from the first discovery and settlement of our coast to the present time.

In 1648 Lord Baltimore, evidently convinced that he must prepare for trouble in Maryland, affecting his own rights and those of the Catholic settlers, deemed it wiser to place a Protestant in the Governor's chair, and selected William Stone, a resident of Northampton County, Virginia. For the new Governor, and the officers under him, he drew up a new oath, in which the Maryland officials swore, in express terms, not to molest any Roman Catholic for or in respect of his or her religion.¹ In 1648 he also sent over a body of sixteen laws, which the Maryland Assembly were asked to pass and make perpetual. These laws are said by Johnson to have been proposed to Lord Baltimore, and he endeavors to show that they emanated from Father More, the superior of the Jesuits in Maryland. His arguments seem insufficient. There is nothing to show that the members of that Order had regained his goodwill and confidence to that extent that he would accept projects of laws from them to be imposed on the people of his province. In fact, it is known that at this time he was complaining at home of the Jesuits, and asking the *Congregation de Propaganda Fide* to send over other priests. It would seem much more probable that the contents of these laws were suggested by persons in Maryland versed in the actual condition of affairs. Be that as it may, they were sent by Lord Baltimore, as his act, to Governor Stone and the Assembly, to be made laws, under the charter which vested the making of laws in him, by and with the consent of the freemen. They were to be perpetual, and in token of their essential importance, as a kind of fundamental constitution of the province, they were engrossed on three sheets of parchment. In a session

¹ The oath is given in full by Scharf, i., p. 172-3.

held between April 2d and April 21st, 1649, the Legislature passed seven of the acts thus sent over, one of them being the Act concerning Religion. When the Assembly met again, in April, 1650, "they read and considered the sixteen laws sent over by his lordship to be assented to and enacted without alteration;" and then proceeded to pass the rest of the sixteen. These laws were confirmed by the Proprietary in one instrument, 20th April, 1650. The Act concerning Religion was thus passed by the Proprietary, Governor and Assembly, in 1649, and reconsidered in the Assembly in 1650 and confirmed by the Proprietary in that year. The "Short Account of y^e State and Condition of ye Rom. Cath. in y^e Province of Maryland," by Rev. George Hunter, notes this two-fold enactment, although in copying the figures have evidently suffered.

"In consequence of y^e said declarations and promises in y^e 1st Session of Assembly held in y^t Province in 1640 (9) a perpetual act passed entitled An Act concerning religion w^{ch} confirmed y^e said declarations and promises concerning liberty of conscience." The same act was again reënacted in 1650, and confirmed in 1656 (9).

Now it was asserted that the majority of the inhabitants in 1649 were Protestant, that the majority of the Legislature were Protestant, the Governor, Stone, a Protestant, so that Catholics could make no pretence to the credit of passing the Act, which was purely Protestant and characteristic of that high sense of respect for the religious opinions of others which from the time of the Reformation they had invariably displayed.

Leaving the general question, however, as to the existence of any such tolerant spirit in the Reformers and their followers, which certainly the seizure of every Catholic church and convent in the British Isles, the disfranchisement of Catholics, their exclusion from emigrating to the colonies, and from abiding in them, do not permit us to see very clearly, we come to the explicit question whether the Maryland Assembly of 1649 was Catholic or Protestant in the majority of its votes.

The Lord Proprietary, from whom the law emanated and who confirmed it, was undeniably a Catholic. His Lieutenant Governor, Stone, if we consider him as an individual, was a Protestant, if as representing him whose agent he was, may not unreasonably be regarded as what his principal was, a Catholic. The Council of the Province, as is established by Mr. Davis, were Governor Stone, Secretary Thomas Hatton, Messrs. Thomas Greene, John Price, John Pile, and Robert Vaughn, as appears by their commission. Nine burgesses sat in that Assembly, Cuthbert Fenwick, Philip Conner, William Bretton, Richard Browne, George Manners, Richard Banks, John Maunsell, Thomas Thornborough and Walter Peake, their names being given in the Assembly commit-

tee's report on the bill of charges for that session, a document preserved in the Land Office.¹

The councillors and burgesses on the day the Act passed sat together in one house. Including the Secretary, there were fourteen members besides the Governor. Of these Thomas Greene, afterwards well known as acting governor, John Pile, among whose descendants were a priest and a nun, Cuthbert Fenwick, ancestor of two Catholic Bishops, William Bretton, who gave land for a Catholic chapel, were undisputedly Catholics; Mannors, Maunsell, Thornborough and Peake always acted with the Roman Catholics; the first two, though present at the signing of the Protestant declaration, did not affix their names; Maunsell and Peake's land grants bore Catholic titles; Thornborough was very obnoxious to the Protestant party at a later day. From these and other incidental circumstances Mr. Davis makes these four gentlemen to have been Catholics. Messrs. Price and Vaughn were undoubtedly Protestants; Conner and Banks are inferred to be of the same faith, because in a will where the testator wished that his eldest son should reside with no Papist, he confides some of his children to Messrs. Conner and Banks. As to Browne's religion Mr. Davis could find no clue;² but assigning him to the Protestant side, it gives as the faith of the members of this famous Assembly eight Catholics and six Protestants. If Governor Stone voted as a member of the Assembly, it would not have made a tie; but there is no evidence that any Governor of Maryland acted as Lord Bellomont did when Governor of New York. When the penal law against the Jesuits and Catholic priests was brought before the council of New York, Governor Bellomont claimed to vote as councillor; this made a tie, and then by his casting vote as President of the Council it passed that body. After it had been passed through the lower house, Lord Bellomont signed it as Governor, having three times given his voice to place it on the Statute Book of the Colony of New York.

That Catholics were entitled to the credit of passing the Act of 1649 was called in doubt by John P. Kennedy, and by Bozman in his "History of Maryland": "There are strong grounds to believe that the majority of the members were Protestants, if not Protestants of the Puritanic order" (vol. ii, p. 349); by Streeter in his "Maryland Two Hundred Years Ago": "Because the laws were enacted by a Protestant Assembly" (p. 41); by Rev. Ethan Allen, quoting and endorsing Bozman ("Maryland Toleration," p. 55). But as their statement was based simply on conjecture, it was utterly demolished by the facts elicited by Davis in his patient and ex-

¹ Davis, *Day Star*, p. 129-131.

² See Mr. Davis' proofs at length in his *Day Star*, pp. 183-253.

hastive research. To this day no one has questioned the accuracy of the author of the "Day Star" in this matter.

But even this work did not prevent cavil. Rev. Mr. Neill at once endeavored to show that if Catholics voted for it, they did it as Protestants and not as Catholics. With the utmost serenity he tells us: "This Act was contrary to the teachings of the Church of Rome, since it was the recognition of Christians who rejected the Pope" ("Founders of Maryland," p. 122). For this astounding proposition he cites, as he of course could cite, no authority. The Catholics had from the first given the Protestants full liberty; from the settlement the Protestant had been free to practice his own religion. The Jesuit missionaries differed from Lord Baltimore on several points, but they nowhere assert that the Proprietary's recognition of Protestants was contrary to the doctrines of the Church; and it would certainly be very strange that Rev. Mr. Neill should be so much better versed in Catholic theology than the Jesuit Fathers who were in Maryland from 1634 to 1649. By confusing the Assembly of 1649 with that of 1650 Neill contrived to give so false an idea of the former, that Mr. Gladstone, at a moment when his mind was in a terribly illogical condition, following the guide of Allen and Neill, wrote: "Of the small legislative body which passed it, two-thirds appear to have been Protestant, the *recorded* numbers being sixteen and eight respectively."¹ Where he found the record does not appear. No record is known which shows any such state; and the unimpeached researches of Mr. Davis, and the "Bill of Charges," which is of record, give the names, and the certainty.

Mr. Scharf in his "History of Maryland," quoting the testimony of Spence in his "Early History of the Presbyterian Church," to the toleration established under the Lords Baltimore in Maryland, adds: "Would that all who have discussed the subject had done so in a like frank and honorable spirit." ("History of Maryland," i.,

¹ "Rome and the Newest Fashions in Religion," Preface. His illogical condition of mind may be seen. "The sinlessness of the Virgin Mary and the personal infallibility of the Pope are the characteristic dogmas of modern Romanism. . . . Both present a refined idolatry, by clothing a pure humble woman and a mortal sinful man with divine attributes." The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception declared Mary to have been from the first instant of her existence free from original sin. This he tells us is a divine attribute. Now, Adam and Eve, before they committed the first and original sin, must have been free from it, or it was not first and original. The devil told them that by eating a fruit they would become like gods. Gladstone would have gone further than the serpent: he would have told them that they were clothed with "divine attributes," in fact, gods; but how God could create gods, or how these created gods ever could incur sin, Mr. Gladstone does not explain; but full of this god-theory, he maintains that God cannot preserve those whom He makes judges of doctrine from error in giving their decision, without making them gods. Did He make the apostles gods when He empowered them to teach all nations?

p. 180.) He fully endorses the results attained and the documents cited by Davis.

Neill's next device to rob Catholics, and indeed Maryland, of the credit of passing this early act of religious freedom, was to maintain that it was copied from a Puritan model. "Although the House of Commons in 1645 had ordered liberty of conscience and worship in the plantations, the Independents of Somers Island and Virginia were oppressed by those in power. ("Founders of Maryland," p. 115, *n.*) The act was, as he himself admits (p. 111), one to protect a community of Independents under Rev. Patrick Copland, who had removed from Somers Island to Eleutheria. Then came the charge that Parliament had first established general toleration by an ordinance of 1647, which he styles "that golden apple." ("English Colonization," p. 280.) Following this unfaithful guide, Gladstone wrote: "The colonial act seems to have been an echo of the order of the House of Commons at home, on the 27th of October, 1645, that the inhabitants of the Summer Island, and such others as shall join themselves to them, shall, without any molestation or trouble, have and enjoy the liberty of their conscience in matters of God's worship; and of a British ordinance of 1647."

Mr. Gladstone ought to have been able to speak accurately of British acts and ordinances. The authorities were at his hand; instead of consulting them he trusted to the garbled statements of a polemic. Bradley T. Johnson in his "Foundation of Maryland" says: "No order for general liberty of conscience, either in the colonies or in England, ever was passed by the Long Parliament. No such ordinance as that referred to by Mr. Gladstone was ever passed in 1647, or at any other time." None such is in Schobell's "Collection of the Statutes and Ordinances." Rushworth is given as authority for the alleged ordinances. Reference to his "Collection" shows that an ordinance for settling the government of the Church in a "Presbyterial way" was discussed in the Commons on the 6th of October, 1647, and an amendment was adopted for "giving ease to tender consciences of such as are godly, and make a conscience of their ways." (Rushworth, iii., p. 834.) On October 13th, 1647, the Lords resolved: "That the king be desired to give his consent, and that all who do not conform shall have libertie to meet for the service and worship of God, and so that nothing be done by them to the disturbance of the kingdom."

Here is an order passed by one House only. Mr. Johnson says: "It is the only order that can be found to support Mr. Gladstone." Of course, readers concluded from the assertion of Neill and Gladstone that it also passed the House of Commons. But what was the real fact? "It was promptly repudiated the same day by the Commons," who "resolved" that liberty of conscience or worship

granted shall extend to none that shall print, preach or publish contrary to the first 15 articles of the 39, except the eighth, which mentions the three Creeds, made many years after the Apostles; that *nothing contained in this ordinance shall extend to any Popish Recusants, or taking away any penal laws against them.*

And on the 15th the same House modified its resolution of the 6th so that it should not extend to tolerate the use of Common Prayer in any place whatsoever (Rushworth, vii., pp. 840-2).

Can any judgment be too severe on the writer who could give the action of the Lords, and suppress that of the Commons? The Summers Island act and the ordinance were conceived in the same spirit, they were passed by Puritans and Independents to give liberty solely to Puritans and Independents, it was a grand grant of toleration, freedom of conscience and of worship to all mankind who thought as they did. Not such was the idea of religious equality professed and practiced by Lord Baltimore and the Maryland Catholics, so long as they could sit in the Legislature of their Province.

We have thus taken up the main points of controversy as to Maryland history raised of late years, all aiming to detract from the claims put forward by or on behalf of the Catholics. The charges have been advocated with skill, research, and it is a pity we cannot say with impartiality and fairness. But every one has been met with clear and unimpeachable documents. The old theories and views of Maryland history have been triumphantly established, and it is most creditable to the historic students of America that the defence of the view favorable to Catholics has been maintained not by Catholics, but by scholars as Protestant as those whose arguments they so ably refuted.

CHRISTIAN BURIAL AND CREMATION.

Nouvelles Études sur les Catacombes Romaines. Par De Richmond.
Paris, Poussielgue, 1870.

De Angelis. Jus Canonicum, Romæ. 1879.

Le Cimetière au Dix-Neuvième Siècle. Par Mgr. Gaume. Paris.

THE fundamental reason 'for the discipline of the Catholic Church regarding the disposition of the dead is the dogma of the Apostles' Creed: "I believe in the resurrection of the body." Her philosophy is that the body is an essential part of the man, and that a religion which even partially ignores this fact is not universal, and, therefore, not true. Although she does not hold that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses, yet she recognizes the fact that they are necessary in the order of natural cognition as well as in the order of religious belief. Through the senses men's minds are corrupted, and through them they may be improved morally and elevated spiritually. Unphilosophic Protestantism began by ignoring the important role which the body and its senses play in the work of salvation. It made war on the religious pictures and statues through which spiritual ideas are conveyed to the mind, and attacked the old sacramental symbolism which, by the action of sensible signs and ceremonies on the body, conveys invisible grace to the invisible soul. To ignore the material and sensible in divine worship, to deny the sacramental system established by Christ, is indirectly to weaken faith in the mystery of the Word made flesh. To try to establish a purely spiritual system of religion for beings who have a mixed nature, a physical body as well as an immaterial soul connected with it, and dependent on it for reflex cognition as well as for outward expression of religious worship, is to attempt to build a steeple in the air without a church to put it on. Yet this is what Protestantism has tried to do in warring on the sensible devotions of the Catholic Church and abolishing her sacraments, in diminishing the number of religious ceremonies and the impressiveness of the Christian ritual. A Catholic has only to attend a Protestant funeral to feel the chill produced by the curtailing of the Catholic ritual. The Protestant dead is put away in a dark room; the corpse is shunned; it is carried in silence to the church, where pagan symbols in flowers, wreaths, and broken columns surround the coffin, where a few dry words of Scripture are read; and thence to a graveyard,

beautifully laid out, indeed, with gravelled walks, weeping willows, and evergreen trees, for there is sentiment still even where faith has ceased to exist, but a graveyard, almost without a cross and without the figure of the kneeling widow, or father, or child,—so often seen in the Catholic cemetery,—praying at the tomb for the repose of the soul departed. There is no heart in the Protestant funeral. There is a hurry to put the offensive corpse out of sight, and then forget all about it. The old Church holds on to her dead with eternal affection. The dead body is the body of her child. It is sacred flesh. It has been the temple of a regenerated soul. She blessed it in baptism, poured the saving waters on its head, anointed it with holy oil on breast and back, put the blessed salt on its lips, and touched its nose and ears in benediction when it was only the flesh of a babe; and then, in growing youth, reconsecrated it by confirmation; and, before its dissolution in death, she again blessed and sanctified its organs, its hands and its feet, as well as its more important members. Even after death she blesses it with holy water, and incenses it before her altar, amid the solemnity of the great sacrifice of the New Law, and surrounded by mourners who rejoice even in their tears, for they believe in the communion of saints, and are united in prayer with the dead happy in heaven, as well as with those who are temporarily suffering in purgatory. The old Church, the kind old mother of regenerated humanity, follows the dead body of her child into the very grave. She will not throw it into the common ditch, or into unhallowed ground; no, it is the flesh of her son. She sanctifies and jealously guards from desecration the spot where it is to rest until the final resurrection; and day by day, until the end of the world, she thinks of her dead, and prays for them at every Mass that is celebrated; for, even amid the joys of Easter and of Christmas, the memento for the dead is never omitted from the Canon. She even holds annually a solemn feast of the dead, the day after "All Saints," in November, when the melancholy days are on the wane, the saddest of the year, and the fallen leaves and chilly blasts presage the season of nature's death. Then are the graveyards filled with the living who go thither, "not as those without hope" to read inscriptions and curiously inspect stately and gorgeously carved monuments, or gratify a vain and pagan sentiment by hanging a wreath of immortelles around some favorite's tomb, but to kneel and to pray that the souls of the beloved dead and of all "the faithful departed through the mercy of God may rest in peace." The intense belief of the Church in the resurrection of the body is seen in all this solicitude and love. They are the expression of her conviction that a body, which has been repeatedly united with the flesh and blood of Christ through the reception of the Eucha-

rist, ought to be honored even in the grave, and that it will be a sharer in the glories of His resurrection.

"The resurrection of the dead gives confidence to all Christians,"¹ wrote Tertullian in the third century. Two general councils—that of Constantinople and the fourth Lateran—have defined the resurrection of the body as an article of faith. The Christian belief on this point is inherited from the Hebrews, for Job says: "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth. And I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God."² Daniel³ and the second book of Machabees⁴ bear similar testimony.

Martha's words to our Lord showed what was the common belief of the Jews in her time: "I know that he (Lazarus) shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day."⁵ Our Lord expressly taught this doctrine in refuting the Sadducees, a sect of Hebrew materialists, who denied both the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body: "And concerning the resurrection of the dead, have you not read that which was spoken by God, saying to you: I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? He is not the God of the dead, but of the living."⁶ Although dead to men, they were alive to God, both body and soul. The central idea which runs through many of the epistles of St. Paul is that there are but two men in the world,—Adam and Christ. All our misfortunes come from the former, original sin and death, while from the latter come our restoration, our regeneration and resurrection. Christ is our spiritual head, who proved His divinity by His resurrection; we are united to Him, both to His soul and to His body, and by this union we share in the graces and privileges both of His soul and of His body. "For if the dead rise not again, neither is Christ risen again. And if Christ be not risen again, your faith is vain."⁷ Then again he writes, in a text so often quoted in the Ritual of the Church: "And we will not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning them that are asleep, that you be not sorrowful, even as others who have no hope. For, if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them who have slept through Jesus will God bring with Him."⁸ Again, in words that remind one of Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul, in "Phædo," the apostle writes: "So, also, is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. It is sown in dishonor, it

¹ Lib. de Resurrect. Carnis, n. 1.

³ Daniel xii., v. 2.

⁵ John xi., v. 24.

⁷ 1 Cor. xv., v. 16, 17.

² Job xix., v. 25, 26.

⁴ 2 Mach. vii., v. 9-14.

⁶ Matth. xxii., v. 31, 32.

⁸ 1 Thess. iv., v. 12, 13.

shall rise in glory. It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power. It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body.”¹

This dogma of revelation is intimated even by the law of nature and its analogies. Nothing is annihilated. “Our bodies die to us, but not to God,” says Tertullian in his treatise on this subject. “God is able to remake what He made. He gave life and can give it a second time.”² There is restoration of all that perishes around us; life comes out of death. The winter is followed by the spring; the living bud and blossom come again on the same branch upon which they perished; and the green grass grows again where the frost and snow killed it. The juicy stalk and ripened ear spring from the soil in which the planted seed lies rotten and dead.

This is not only the argument of Tertullian, but even of the pagan Seneca.³ And why should not the body live again, since the soul lives forever? Why should not the partner of the soul’s toils, the instrument of its mortifications, of its abstinence and fasting, as well as of its sensuality, rise again to share its bliss or its misery? The whole man, not merely a part of him, is destined for eternity; and man is not complete without his body, either in this life or in the next. St. Ambrose puts this argument as follows: “Since the association of soul and body is continual during this life, and the resurrection implies a reward for well-doing or a punishment for wickedness, it is necessary that the body should rise to receive its due. For how can the soul be called into judgment without the body, since the account to be rendered concerns the relations of the soul with the body?”⁴ The objections against this doctrine made by certain rationalists are all answered by the simple but profound philosophy expressed in the words of the *Catechism*: “Nothing is hard or impossible to God.”⁵

¹ 1 Cor. xv., v. 42, 43, 44.

² De Resur. Carnis, C. 68, *et seq.* Here is the passage from Plato which expresses a thought similar to that of St. Paul and Tertullian:

“Ὅτι ἐναντίον μὲν φησὶ τῷ ζῆν τὸ τελευτᾶν εἶναί; ἔγωγέ.” γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; ναί. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί το γιγνόμενον; τὸ τεθνηκὸς, ἔφη. “Τὶ δὲ, ἡ διὰς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνηῶτος; ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι το ζων. Εκ των τεθνεωτων ἄρα, ὡ κέβρις, τὰ ζῶντὰ τε και οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται φαίνεται, ἔφη. τερνεῶτος. Teubner’s edition, Leipsic, 1879. (Cap. 16, line 24th, *et seq.*)

³ Ep. 36, v. ii., “*Videbis nihil in hoc mundo extinguī, sed vicibus descendere ac surgere.*” This is but an echo of Plato.

⁴ Lib. de fide resurrect., n. 52, *et seq.*

⁵ As no theological question is completely discussed without the authority of St. Thomas, we quote what he says:

“The gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam. But death was brought into the world by sin, for if there had been no sin there would have been no death. (Rom. v.) Therefore by the gift of Christ man will be restored to life from death. Moreover, the members ought to be conformable to the head. But our head lives, and will live forever in soul and body, because ‘Christ, rising again from the dead, dieth now no more.’ (Rom. vi., 9.) Therefore men who are his members will live in soul and

Therefore the Church claims the corpse. It has once been a holy tabernacle of the body and blood of Jesus Christ. She orders the civil power away from the bier and the graveyard. The funeral and requiem mass are hers. Her jurisdiction over them is supreme; and although it may not be always respected, it nevertheless exists, for the dead man was a Christian and has a right to Christian burial; and Christian burial is not a subject within the province of the civil magistrate. The Church, indeed, recognizes the right of the State to make sanitary regulations and order things of a purely civil character regarding funerals and cemeteries; but she considers interference with her ritual, or with property owned and consecrated by her, as intrusion and usurpation. Hence her Canon Law—and it holds good wherever the Church is untrammelled by the State—gives the right of burying the dead to the priest alone, and descends into the most minute details regarding funerals. It dictates the place and manner in which bishops, priests, novices, and monks, as well as laymen, should be buried; tells who should bury those who die in hospitals; gives to the pastor of a parish the right even to choose the road which the funeral procession should take in going to the grave, and leaves nothing to doubt from the very death to the inhumation of the faithful.¹ Indeed, if we follow the letter of the old Canon Law, the authority of the relatives over the funeral is confined to inviting the guests to the ceremony and determining the expense of the funeral. All other matters pertain to the clergy.

Nor is this legislation recent or arbitrary. Its reason is found in the Old Testament and in the writings of the Fathers. Tobias is repeatedly praised for his care in burying the dead,² and St. Augustine³ quotes the example of the Hebrew patriarchs to urge Christians to decency in funerals and care of the dead. "We should not despise nor reject the bodies of the dead," he writes; "especially should we respect the corpses of the just and faithful, which the Spirit hath piously used as instruments and vessels in the doing of good works. For if the coat of arms and ancestral ring are dear to children in proportion to their love of their ancestors, how much more are our bodies to be respected, which are nearer and dearer to us than any garments; for these bodies are not mere ornaments, but pertain to the very nature of man. Hence the funerals and burying of the patriarchs of old were cared for with officious

body; and therefore resurrection of the flesh is necessary." (3d part Sum., quest. 75, art. I., *et seq.*)

¹ See any Canonist, *e. g.*, Craisson, *Jus Canonicum*, tom. II., p. 48, *et seq.*, or Grand-claude in *Lib. ter. Decret.* tom. II. (Paris, 1882), p. 387.

² 1 Tob., 20, 21, xiii, v. 12.

³ *De Civ. Dei* Cap. xiii., p. 27, tom. 41 of Migne's *Patrologia*.

piety. (Gen. xxv., 9;¹ xxxv., 29;² l., 2, 13, etc.³); and even while living they made provision for the burial or translation of their bodies. (Gen. xlvii., 29, 30; l., 24.) Our Lord Himself, about to rise on the third day, praises the good work of the woman who anoints His head, and says it will be told to future ages, because she poured ointment over His body;⁴ and those who took care to have His body properly buried are praised. (John xix., 38-42.) But these authorities do not mean or intimate that there is any feeling or sense in corpses, but that they live to God, and such offices of piety are acceptable to His providence as confirming faith in the resurrection of the dead."

Any one who desires to see at a glance the riches of patristic literature regarding funerals, cemeteries, and care of the dead, has only to read the Index of Migne's "Patrology," under the head of "Sepulture." Tertullian, Lactantius and Jerome, Chrysostom, Ambrose and Augustine treat of it; and tell us of the Requiem Masses, and the prayers offered for the souls of the departed; the hymns and psalms sung at funerals; the solicitude of the faithful to be buried in consecrated ground; and the avoidance of all vain pomp, or display, or extravagance in the funeral. Prudentius, the Christian poet, speaks of the custom of decorating the martyrs' tombs with flowers; St. Ambrose, in his funeral oration on the death of Valentinian, alludes to the same custom: "I shall not strew flowers on his tomb, but incense his spirit with the odor of Christ." St. Jerome⁵ also refers to the use of flowers at funerals. "Other husbands," says he, "scatter on the tombs of their wives violets, roses, lilies, and purple flowers."⁶ Baruffaldi⁷ also, treating of the rubric on the burial of children, speaks of the ancient usage of putting a crown of flowers, artificial, if natural ones could not conveniently be found, on the head, not only of dead children, but of all persons who died unmarried, no matter how old they might be, as a sign of their innocence and purity, real or supposed. This soon begot an abuse. Not satisfied with strewing flowers on the tombs of the dead, Christians began to bring them into the Church, and crown the coffin, not only of the child, whose well-known innocence deserved the tribute, but even of sinners who barely escaped damnation by a death-bed repentance. Some

¹ The burial of Abraham.

² The burial of Isaac.

³ The burial of Jacob. He was carried away from Egypt and buried in his own selected sepulchre in the land of Chanaan.

⁴ "For she in pouring this ointment upon my body, hath done it for my burial." (Matth. xxvi, v. 12.)

⁵ Ad Pammach. de obitu uxoris.

⁶ It will be noticed that these authorities speak of putting flowers on the graves, not of using them in the Church at funeral Masses.

⁷ Commentaria ad Rituale Romanum, p. 275. Venice, 1792.

of the early fathers, like Lactantius, reproved this abuse; and by degrees bishops were obliged to condemn it by diocesan laws.¹ It is indeed very bad taste to crowd the church aisle and load down the coffin with garlands and crowns, and enormous bouquets, symbols of joy, which are out of place among the dirge, the mourning altar, and the sombre vestments of the Requiem Mass.

It would be long to tell of the influence of this Christian respect for the dead, and of Catholic belief in Purgatory, upon the art-life of modern peoples. Dante's "Purgatorio" could never have been penned by a pagan or a Protestant. The requiems of Donizetti, Mozart, and Rossini, and the plaintive wail of the Gregorian dirge, as well as the words and music of the "Dies Irae," are blossoms of Catholic teaching regarding the fate of the dead and the cult that is due to them. Over the tombs of the martyrs were built some of the finest Christian churches. The crypt, often a masterpiece of art, in Romanesque and Gothic architecture, finds its reason of existence in the Christian tomb. The beautifully decorated sarcophagi of the Middle Ages; the "brasses" and enamels on the tombs of the great and illustrious buried in the walls, or under the pavement of the mediæval church, the cenotaphs of marble, of stone, or wood, with angels swinging censers, surrounding the sculptured figure of the deceased, reposing on the marble pillow; tombs like those of the dukes of Brabant, in Louvain, or of Bishop Evrard de Fouillay, in Amiens Cathedral, which he founded; or of Philippe le Hardi, and Jean *Sans Peur*, at Dijon; the tombs at St. Denis, in France, and of Edward III., at Westminster, and of the Black Prince, at Canterbury, England, as well as countless others throughout Christian Europe, attest the piety of the living, and the influence of the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh, and the communion of saints, upon the art-life of the people. The beautiful chantries, or little chapels, built in the cemetery, or near the tomb, to insure the saying of masses for the souls of the departed, is another fruit of belief in purgatory.

No one who has seen these splendid evidences of Catholic faith on the other side of the Atlantic, and who has examined the beauty of their design and execution, can fail to recognize their superiority to the broken shafts, draped shafts, the senseless columns, topped with capitals and with statues of rich and vulgar nobodies, the pagan nymphs, half nude, modeled by inartistic hands, and the other pagan symbols which characterize the modern cemetery, since the "Reformation." Nor has the hand of the botcher always spared in modern Catholic cemeteries the tomb from the desecrating travesty of the

¹ The fourth diocesan synod of New York, held in 1882; condemns the custom of decorating the coffins of adults with flowers, and urges its abolition, as contrary to the spirit of the Church.

Madonna or the Saviour. The invading spirit of revived paganism and its morganatic sister, Protestantism, has intruded, with its pagan symbolism, even into the Catholic "*Campo santo*." Pagan vanity, a vulgar love of display, show themselves too often in the modern funeral and the modern cemetery, instead of the simple faith and modest hope of the Christian believer.

"Blest are they

That earth to earth entrust; for they may know
And tend the dwelling whence the slumberer's clay
Shall rise at last, and bid the young flowers bloom,
That waft a breath of hope around the tomb,
And kneel upon the dewy turf and pray!"¹

II. The ground in which the bodies of the faithful are to repose has ever been an object of the Church's special legislation. She has given it the sweet name of cemetery,² or dormitory, because, as St. Jerome says, "the bodies sleeping in it are one day to rise."³ "Lazarus, our friend, sleepeth; but I go that I may awake him out of sleep."⁴ So said our Lord of His dead friend; and, imitating her divine Founder, the Church employs the word "sleep" to designate the death of her children. "He fell asleep in the Lord," instead of "he died," is a common form of expression in her liturgy.

In the early ages, any decent place served for the burial of Christians; and during the ages of persecution it was difficult to set apart and bless special cemeteries for them. Yet, even when the cemetery was not specially consecrated, the early Christians, as indeed even the pagans, looked upon the place of burial with religious reverence, and put it beyond the pale of human commerce.⁵ But now, and for centuries, a Catholic cemetery is that place alone set apart, and solemnly blessed by the authority of the bishop, for the burial of the pious faithful.⁶ This blessing distinguishes and separates the graves of Catholics from the graves of heretics, infidels, and others specifically excluded by ecclesiastical law from the right of Christian burial. "No Christian," says the Roman Ritual, "dying in the communion of the faithful should be buried out of the Church, or cemetery properly blessed; but, if necessity compel, and for some reason the body should be temporarily buried elsewhere, care must be taken to have it transferred to a holy place as soon as possible ('quamprimum'); and, in the

¹ Mrs. Hemans.

² From κοιμάω, to sleep. We have the word and the idea in Homer: "Εἴθ' αὖ πάρος κοιμαθ', ὅτε μιν γλαυκὸς ὕπνος ἰκάνοι." II., book I., l. 610.

³ Ferraris' Biblioth., tom. ix., p. 27, Venice, A.D. 1770.

⁴ John xi., v. 11.

⁵ Grandclaude, tom. ii., p. 387.

⁶ "Cæmeteria sunt loca, auctoritate Episcopi benedicta in quibus cadavera Catholicorum pie decedentium sepeliuntur." Reiffenstuel, Jus Can., lib. iii., tit. 28, No. 3.

mean time, a cross should be erected at the head of the grave to signify that the departed rests in Christ.”¹ Up to the ninth century, except in very rare cases, no one except bishops, abbots, priests, or pious laymen, could be buried in the church; but gradually this privilege was granted to others, as the clergy saw fit.² The ancient place of burial was in the yard or porch of the church, or in ground adjoining it.³ Most of the civil governments of Europe now forbid burials within the church. Hence, in France, even a bishop cannot be buried in his cathedral without permission of the government. Nor does the Roman Ritual favor the promiscuous burial of bodies in the church,⁴ for it says: “Where the ancient custom of burying the dead in the cemetery exists, let it be retained; and where it can be done, let it be re-established.” Everything which canonically desecrates a church will desecrate the cemetery, if it be adjoining, and therefore no one should be buried in it after desecration until it has been “reconciled” by a new blessing. But if the cemetery be apart from the church, the desecration of the church does not carry with it the desecration of the cemetery; nor does the desecration of the cemetery, even when it adjoins the church, imply the desecration of the church, “for the less worthy, or the accessory, does not carry with it the principal.”⁵ Where the same piece of blessed ground is divided into two parts by a wall, the desecration of one part does not carry with it the desecration of the other; the two parts, even though connected by a gate, are canonically considered separate and distinct cemeteries. In many Catholic cemeteries, however, there is no hedge or wall separating the consecrated portion from that set apart for the burial of the unbaptized children of Catholics.

The very important question now arises, who are excluded from Christian burial? The answer is clear in ecclesiastical legislation. Infidels, apostates, heretics, publicly and notoriously excommunicated or interdicted persons, suicides, duellists, public sinners who die impenitent, and sinners who die in the act of committing a crime, if the crime be certain and public. The words of the canon are as follows:⁶ “It is decreed in the sacred canons that we cannot

¹ St. Cyprian makes it a crime in Martial, a Spanish bishop, to have buried Christian children in profane sepulchres. Ep. 68.

² Grandclaudé, tom. ii., p. 388.

³ Ferraris, tom. ix., p. 27.

⁴ Constantine was buried, according to his own wish, in the vestibule of the Church of the Holy Apostles, at Constantinople. This was contrary to the general usage of the Christians to be buried in catacombs or in cemeteries out of town (Eusebius in Vita Const., l. iv., 60). Theodosius and Honorius followed his example, and were buried close to churches; so that, in the 6th and 7th centuries, the custom of being buried near the church had become common. Hence the meaning of “church-yard.”—*Dictionnaire des Antiquités Chrétiennes*—Martigny, Paris, Hachette, 1865, p. 610.

⁵ Cap. de Consecr. eccles., in 60 (Decretalium).

⁶ Cap. Sacris, 12 de Sepulturis (Lib. tertio Decret.).

hold communion with those dead with whom we could hold no communion while they were living, and that those who have been cut off from the unity of the Church, nor reconciled to her in the hour of death, should be deprived of ecclesiastical sepulture." The Roman Ritual enumerates those who must be excluded from Christian burial: "Pagans, Jews, and all infidels, heretics and their abettors, apostates from Christian faith, schismatics and persons publicly stricken with major excommunication, persons interdicted by name and those living in an interdicted place, while the interdict lasts; suicides, unless it can be shown that they were insane, or unless they give signs of repentance before death; duellists, even if they give signs of repentance;¹ public sinners who die unrepentant, children dying without baptism, and those who are publicly known to have neglected to receive the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist once a year, and who have given no signs of contrition before death." Where there is doubt the bishop or his representative should always be consulted.

There is no part of Church legislation which has been more bitterly attacked in modern times than this regarding the sanctity and exclusiveness of the cemetery. Monseigneur Gaume's pious and earnest book, the title of which is at the head of this article, was prompted by the bitter onslaughts made by French freethinkers on the sacred character of Christian burial. Modern French law, in great part, ignores it. The present "statesmen" of France, instead of trying to bring their country back to the greatness which it lost through infidelity and the last war with Germany, are degrading the name of liberty and of republic, by using them to minimize the influence of, if not actually to destroy, the Church, and are seeking every opportunity to trample on her laws concerning the sanctity of the cemetery. They have secularized and desecrated it everywhere, as they have the school. To such extent has this desecration gone that now, in French cities, it has become a practical necessity for the bishops to leave cemeteries unconsecrated, and for the priests to bless each individual Christian grave when made. In Belgium, also, the so-called "Liberals" have nullified canonical legislation on the subject. Any Belgian magistrate now, ordering a person unworthy of Christian burial to be interred in the unconsecrated part of a cemetery, is liable to be brought before the Civil Court, and fined or imprisoned. "Promiscuous burial" is the freethinker's cry, "and no exclusiveness;" *no "coin des reprouvés."*

It is but a short time since Baron Kervyn de Volkaersheke,

¹ The French theologians, following Gousset (Theol. Morale, tom. 2d, 636), permit ecclesiastical burial to the duellist who, before his death, publicly asks for the sacraments. This teaching, however, would be hardly approved at Rome.

burgomaster of Nazareth, near Ghent, for having ordered the corpse of a suicide to be buried in the unconsecrated part of the graveyard, was fined and imprisoned for eight days. But the Belgian Catholics, among the most gallant in Europe to fight for their religious rights, are organizing to abolish the present odious law and restore the ancient custom of Christian burial to its proper conditions.

It is with pleasure that an American Catholic turns away from these self-styled liberal governments in Europe,—not excepting England, whose judges in the Guibord case in Montreal gave a decision which overrides all canonical legislation regarding cemeteries,—to admire the good sense and natural equity which breathe through our State laws on this subject. The leading spirits who founded our republic were true rationalists, and believed in the natural law and the natural rights of man. No bitter hatred against Christianity characterized them. Even Paine, although a mere Deist, respected the belief of Christians, and was totally opposed to any interference with the rights and liberties of the churches. A European “Liberal” or “Rationalist” seems to become a demoniac the moment he finds a chance to persecute the Church. Not so with the fair-minded American rationalist. He respects Christianity, and of all the churches he respects most the one which holds to the supernatural in its entirety, and which is alone uncompromising in teaching and practice. It is hard to find a European liberal or rationalist who is not a priest-hater, while the most bitter American rationalist bows to the Catholic priest.¹ The reason of this is, perhaps, because the European freethinker is an apostate, while the American rationalist is simply in a state of negation; he never knew the truth. Be this as it may, American legislation is not anti-Catholic, although it may be sometimes un-Catholic. The rights of American Catholics are respected; their property put on a level with that of other denominations. The greatest amount of personal and corporate liberty is allowed; for it is the true American idea of government that the state shall interfere in nothing which is not absolutely necessary for the common weal.² To leave to citizens the largest individual liberty, civil and religious, to trust to their good sense and spirit of obedience to law, not to make them feel that a large standing army is necessary to keep them in order—this is the American way of ruling. This is clearly seen in the laws regarding cemeteries in nearly all the States of the Republic. Take those of the State of New York, for instance: “Every associa-

¹ We know that this is true of “Bob” Ingersoll. It was notoriously true of William Lloyd Garrison, “Thad.” Stevens, and is so of nearly all the “Transcendentalists.”

² There is one exception to this rule, and that is in education. The usurpation of the State in this matter is un-American.

tion (religious or other) incorporated may, from time to time, by its trustees, make such rules and regulations as it shall deem proper for the care, management, and protection of the cemetery lands and property, . . . the conduct of persons while within the cemetery-grounds, to exclude improper persons therefrom and improper assemblages therein, etc., . . . to prevent improper monuments, effigies, structures and inscriptions within the cemetery grounds." Further, the rules and regulations of the trustees bind the lot-owners.¹

Again, "the trustees shall from time to time make such ordinances as they shall think proper . . . and may enforce such ordinances by penalties not exceeding \$25."² Sanction is even given to the custom in Catholic cemeteries, of reserving a portion for unbaptized children, "the trustees shall reserve a reasonable portion of such ground (cemetery) for the interment of strangers and other persons."³ Such scandals as daily occur in Belgium and France, under sanction of law, in the burial of Freemasons, or persons otherwise under the ban of the Church, in consecrated ground against the will of the Church authorities, could not take place in the State of New York. No burial could be forced in a church here without the consent of its pastor. The scandal of Victor Hugo's funeral, and the consequent desecration of the Church of St. Genevieve, could not take place here. It was laid down as the law by the New York Court of Appeals, in the case of the Buffalo City Cemetery *v.* the City of Buffalo,⁴ "that a conveyance for burial purposes only confers upon the grantee a right to use for the purpose of interment. No such estate is granted as makes him an owner in such sense as to exclude the general proprietorship of the association. The association remains the owner in general, and holds that relation to the public. While subject to this, the individual has a right, exclusive of any other person, to bury upon the subdivided plot assigned to him. He holds a position analogous to that of a pew-holder in a house of public worship." He has a privilege, but is not absolute owner.

It was decided by the Supreme Court of New York, that the certificate of ownership of a plot or grave gives a right to use it for burial purposes "subject to and in conformity with the established rules and by-laws of the corporation;" and, "that where a party applies for a burial lot at a cemetery distinctively Roman Catholic, it is with the tacit understanding that he is either a Roman Catholic, and as such eligible to burial therein, or that he applies on behalf of those who are in communion with that

¹ Laws, 1874, chap. 245, § 4.

² Laws 1874, chap. 209, § 4.

³ *Id.*, § 5.

⁴ 46 New York Reports, p. 505.

Church."¹ Thus the State will not force the Church to bury in her cemetery any one whom she considers unworthy. Now contrast this legislation with that of France. "When the minister of religion, *for any pretext whatsoever*, refuses to bury a body, the civil authority, either as of right or upon the requisition of the family of the deceased, will call in a minister of the same religion, to fulfil those functions. In every case the civil authority is charged with the transfer and burial of bodies."² Thus, if a conscientious priest refuses to violate the laws of the Church, French liberty calls in some pliant tool to break them both at the funeral and in the burying-ground. This is a despotism of which even the most absolute and odious of the Bourbons was never guilty, and of which even Bismarck is not capable.

But although it would be a sin to bury in Catholic cemeteries any of those excluded by canon law, it does not follow that they are desecrated, and require "reconciliation" in the case of every such illegal burial. Those who knowingly bury in consecrated ground a person nominally excommunicated or interdicted, or a notorious heretic, are excommunicated. (Bull "*Apostolicæ Sedis*.") By burying others unworthy of Christian burial, sin is committed, but excommunication is not incurred.

If the party buried be excommunicated by name, the cemetery is desecrated.

But the burial of persons not excommunicated by name, or of heretics not denounced by name, does not desecrate a Catholic cemetery. The law is the same for the desecration of a cemetery as for the desecration of a church. "If notorious heretics be buried in the church, it is not considered to be desecrated, nor does it need reconciliation"³—re blessing or reconsecration. Notoriety no longer suffices to induce all the effects of excommunication. Since the Bull of Martin V., "*Ad evitanda scandala*," denunciation is necessary for that purpose. Hence, in places where Protestants and Catholics live together, the burial of the former in Catholic cemeteries, although illicit, does not desecrate them.⁴ Canonists

¹ Case of *Coppers v. The Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral*, reported in 21 Hun's Reports, page 184, etc.

² Art. 19 of 23d Decree of Prairial, year XII.

³ Ferraris, quoted by Craisson, *Jus Can.*, vol. iii., p. 481.

⁴ Grandclaude, vol. ii., p. 397. In the United States, the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore legislates, that where Catholic converts who own plots in non-Catholic cemeteries die, they may be buried ecclesiastically, and with a Requiem Mass, if their surviving relatives be non-Catholics. If the surviving relatives be Catholics, and have owned a plot in a Protestant or other non-Catholic cemetery, from the year 1853, their dead may be lawfully buried in it after a private burial service in the house; but no Requiem can be said for them without episcopal permission. Where Catholics own a family vault, they can bury their Protestant relations in it. (Dec. S. Cong. Inq., 30th March, 1859, quoted in the decrees of II. Balt. Plenary Council, edition 1875, pp. 202, 203.)

are not agreed as to whether certain other persons, excluded by law from Christian burial, desecrate the cemetery so as to require its reconsecration. In this matter much must be left, especially in this country, to the judgment of the head of the diocese. If, even in the Catholic countries of Europe, it has been found necessary to modify very materially the old canonical requirements in regard to sepulture, as well as to many other subjects, certainly in a new country like the United States, where the Church has never had a true canonical status, much should be left discretionary with the bishop. For experience begins to show that the more of the old canonical legislation we introduce, the less does it agree with our surroundings, or prevent scandals from becoming public.

In concluding this part of the subject we call the reader's attention to the solution of two moral cases in Gury's "*Casus Conscientiæ*."¹ In the first, a priest goes to the death-bed of a man who for years had refused to receive the sacraments, and who dies unrepenting. No one knows it but the priest. Yet he acts wisely in permitting ecclesiastical sepulture in this case to avoid scandal, for we should not refuse Christian burial to an impenitent sinner unless his impenitence is publicly known.

In the second case, a pious man, but prone to melancholy, is found one morning hanging by the neck, dead. The priest is called in. He hides the fact of suicide, and gives the body Christian burial. He does well, because, as the suicide was secret, it should not be published to the detriment of the man's fame and that of his family. For the law of the Church does not bind in such cases. Besides, as the man was known to be a practical Christian before his death, his taking-off should be attributed to insanity; and when such is the fact, the Church does not exclude suicides from Christian burial.²

III. But how stands the Catholic Church in regard to the revival of the pagan system of disposing of the dead—cremation? Can she tolerate it? Is there anything in it contrary to Catholic dogma or the essential discipline of the Church? The answer to these questions is, that the Church could tolerate cremation if she wished. She has the right of eminent domain over her own discipline. There is, indeed, a portion of that discipline of divine origin, and it she cannot change; but all things purely ecclesiastical, having been made by the Church, and those things in which our Lord has not forbidden alteration, can be by the Church modified or abrogated. She has abolished the old system of public penances,

¹ Tom. ii., p. 471, Paris edition, 1881. Gury quotes Cardinal Gousset as sustaining his decision in the first case.

² Does the private burial of a freemason or of an unbaptized child in a Catholic cemetery necessitate its reconsecration? R. *Scinduntur theologi*.

which prevailed for centuries, and the "Discipline of the Secret," which was the direct opposite of her present mode of dealing with certain portions of the sacred deposit of truth. While the discipline of the secret lasted, the text continually on her lips was, "Neither cast ye your pearls before swine,"¹ while now she says, "that which you hear in the ear preach ye upon the housetops."² She repeatedly dispenses in vows, and in impediments of marriage arising from consanguinity. She has abolished the custom of baptism by immersion, which was common even up to the time of St. Thomas Aquinas; and has withdrawn the use of the cup from the laity, and again in certain cases conceded it, in the administration of the Holy Eucharist. In these changes she adapts herself to circumstances, and is prompted always by what is best for the salvation of souls.

As to modifications of the custom and law of inhumation, there are not lacking instances. In the Capuchin cemetery at Rome and at Einsiedeln, the desiccated bodies of the holy fathers are placed above ground and in plain view of whoever wishes to look at them. Is not this an infraction of the custom of inhumation? Again, in Catholic Naples the practice of putting the corpses each day into one of three hundred and sixty-five pits in the old "Campo Santo," and then throwing quicklime on them to burn away the flesh, does not seem to be a literal following-out of the law of inhumation. In case, therefore, a great epidemic should occur, or some extraordinary case might arise which would justify cremation, the Church could and might permit it. When a Catholic dies at sea, he is buried in the water; necessity sometimes abrogates a human law; and great difficulty in carrying them out is always a cause for which the Church grants dispensation from her enactments.

But, having said so much as to the right or power of the Church to permit cremation, the moral question now arises whether, if a dying Catholic wished to be cremated instead of inhumed, and insisted upon *post-mortem* incineration, a priest could give him the sacraments? No! Such a man would not have the proper dispositions for receiving them. He would be in a condition of wilful insubordination to Church law and discipline. He would be asking what the Church refuses to grant. He would be disobeying or asking some one else to disobey the requirements of her sacred liturgy in a very important matter. In a word, although the Church may modify her burial service in certain extraordinary contingencies, it is certain that cremation is contrary to all her traditions and to all her legislation regarding Christian burial.

¹ Matth. vii., v. 6.

² Matth. x., v. 27.

"The Christians never gave in," says Alban Butler,¹ "to the customs either of preserving the bodies of their dead, like the Egyptians, or of burning them with the Romans, or of casting them to wild beasts with the Persians; but, in imitation of the people of God from the beginning of the world, buried them with decency and respect in the earth where, according to the sentence pronounced by God, they return to dust till the general resurrection."

With the single exception of the cremation of the body of Saul and his sons by the men of Jabes Galaad,² to prevent them from further contumely by the Philistines, all the burials of Jewish history, most of which are alluded to in the text of St. Augustine, already quoted from the "City of God," expressly imply inhumation. Even after the cremation spoken of in the first book of "Kings," the men of Jabes Galaad inhumed the bones in the wood of Jabes.

Eusebius gives a reason for the Christian aversion to cremation, which still holds good, because "they (the Pagans) did this (cremated) to show that they could conquer God and destroy the resurrection of the bodies, saying, now let us see if they will arise."³ It is notorious that the modern revival of cremation as a mode of burial is due to pantheists, materialists and other unbelievers in the resurrection of the flesh.

Even when the pagan Greeks cremated, they deposited the ashes of the dead in a grave, and over it "heaped a high earth mound."⁴ Schliemann found at Mycenæ graves of the heroic age, with complete skeletons of both adults and children, showing that cremation was not universal. In early times inhumation was the rule. The grave was dug by the nearest relatives, and the corpse buried in it.⁵ Thucydides⁶ tells us that the bodies of Athenians who had fallen in battle were put in coffins and buried.

According to Cicero, inhumation was older in Rome than cremation.⁷ Some noble Roman families never permitted their bodies to be burned, and Sulla is said to have been the first Roman who ordered his body to be cremated after death, lest his bones should be scattered by his enemies.⁸ The pontiffs of pagan Rome would not acknowledge a funeral to be complete unless at least a single bone cut off from the corpse, or rescued from the flames, had been deposited in the earth.⁹ It was a pagan superstition that those whose

¹ *Lives of Saints*, vol. ii., note to life of St. Callixtus, pope and martyr. London edition, 1833.

² 1 Kings, xxxi., v. 12.

³ Hist. Eccl., v. 1.

⁴ Guhl and Koner's *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, p. 288, speaking of Homer's description of the burial of Patroklos.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

⁶ Book ii., chap. 34.

⁷ *De Leg.*, ii., c. 22.

Pliny, *Hist.*, lib. vii., c. 54.

⁹ *Roma Sotterranea*, Northcote, vol. i., book 2, c. 1.

bodies were left unburied had to wander about for a hundred years. Horace alludes to this belief in the twenty-eighth ode of his first book of songs, in which he represents Archytas as begging the passing sailor for a few handfuls of sand for his unburied corpse.

“At tu, nauta, vagæ ne parce malignus arenæ
Ossibus et capiti inhumato
Particulam dare.”

Virgil's lines on the subject are familiar.¹

The early Christians, like the ancient Jewish patriarchs, ever showed their anxiety to be inhumed according to the Christian liturgy. Sometimes the living Christians tore the bodies of the martyrs from the flames in order to give them proper burial. St. Fortunata gave twenty pieces of gold to the executioner for rescuing her body from the flames and having it put in the earth.² The Catacombs were specially dug out by the Christians for burial purposes; although they had also many graveyards in the open air, set apart from the pagan burying-grounds. The ritual of funerals and the consecration of cemeteries all suppose that the corpse is to be inhumed. All the Fathers, in explaining the resurrection of the dead, speak of inhumation as the only proper Christian mode of sepulture, as it was, in fact, the mode in which Our Lord Himself was buried.³ Boniface VIII. (in C. I., tit. Sep., Extrav. Comm.) forbade all violent modes of disposing of the dead as savoring of barbarism. “The respect due to the human body requires that it should be allowed to decay naturally, without having recourse to any violent system;” so says Grandclaude, but this reason would seem to hold good against the Neapolitan custom of using quicklime as well as against cremation. A forcible argument against cremation is also found in the Catholic custom of preserving and honoring the relics of the Saints and putting their bodies or portions of them in the altar. It would be no longer possible to have the most important relics of future Saints if their flesh were to be consumed by fire.

The chief arguments in favor of cremation are from sanitary considerations. The cremationists say that inhumation poisons the air, and that cemeteries injure the healthfulness of the neighborhood in which they exist. But if proper precautions are taken, if the bodies are buried deep enough in the soil, as they must be, no danger can arise to the public health from the practice of inhuming the dead. The immense sewers which run through our

¹ “Centum errant annos, volitantque hæc littora circum,
Tum demum admissi stagna exoptata revisunt.”

—*Æneid*, 6th Book, v. 325, *et seq.*

² Dictionnaire des Antiquités Chrétiennes (Martigny, Paris), p. 608.

³ See Commentaries on I Ep. ad Cor. xv.

populous cities do not injure health if they are properly built, although decaying refuse and poisonous vapors fill them. Neither can cemeteries properly managed, in which the graves are deep, and which are generally remote from the town or city. Would not the public health be far more endangered if the reeking stench of burning bodies, arising out of crematories on every side, were to pollute the atmosphere? On a moist summer's day, when the winds are still, how long would it take to get the smell of the crematory out of the nostrils of the community? You may put the crematory in the country; but you have no more right to afflict the rustic than you had to incommode the citizen with your nuisance.

De Cavagnis, a Professor of Canon Law in Rome, gives against cremation another argument which is rather striking. "Humation," he writes, "renders it possible to inspect the corpse long after it has been buried, if suspicion of foul play should arise; whilst cremation would give testimony, and then only when carefully done, as to death by poison alone."¹

This affords, undoubtedly, a good legal argument against the new mode of disposing of the dead, but no such exceptional reason motives the Church's opposition to cremation. It is under her ban, because it is contrary to the letter and the spirit of her Liturgy, and to the universal custom of the Hebrew and Christian dispensation. "*Nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum sit.*"

¹ "Crematio ad summum venenii residua ostendit si rite fiat." *Institutiones Juris Canonici*—Can. Felix Cavagnis, Romæ, 1883, lib. iv., p. 162. As the difference between a medicine and a poison is frequently a mere question of dose, it is not always possible to detect criminal poisoning. Therefore De Cavagnis' exception is not medically correct. Many alkaloids are fatal in such exceedingly small doses that their separation by any process is frequently impossible.

RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF PAGANISM AND CHRISTIANITY UPON MORALS.

History of European Morals. By W. E. H. Lecky, M.A. New York. Appleton & Co. 1879.

The Gentile and the Jew. By J. I. Döllinger. London. Longman & Green. 1862.

MR. LECKY'S work is marked by much erudition. He sincerely aims at being impartial, but is somewhat tainted with the traditional anti-Catholic prejudices of his country. Like Gibbon, he often betrays an ill-concealed predilection for Paganism.

Dr. Döllinger is a mine of historic wealth. He always exhibits a calm, judicious mind, which commands the admiration and confidence of the reader.

Although unable to close our eyes to the deplorable decadence of morals in this, our day—a decadence over which preceding generations have been equally called to mourn in their own age,—yet the contrast of Pagan with Christian morality cannot fail to result in the triumph of the latter. This thought has led us to place the two in juxtaposition, that the comparison may afford consolation to those who, with only too just reason, grieve for the evils of the times.

I.

We may form some idea of the moral degradation of the Pagan world when we reflect that they had no heavenly ideal of exalted virtue to follow.

The heathen gods and goddesses were monsters of iniquity. Jupiter and Bacchus, Mars and Mercury, Venus and Circe, were the patrons of some particular passion. Every vice was canonized in the person of some divinity. Lust and drunkenness, war and theft, had each its respective patron deity.

The Pagans had a religious worship; but, unlike the Christian worship, it was not intended to exercise, nor did it exercise, any influence on the morals of the people.¹ They had their priests. But what could be expected of a priesthood that offered sacrifice to divinities whose crimes they avowed? The disciples could not be expected to excel their masters; water does not rise above its level. Moreover, moral teaching was not included among the priestly functions. To make man virtuous was no more the business of the priest than

¹ Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. i., p. 161.

of the physician or the tax-gatherer. The priest was a mere state official.

They had festival days, but they were devoted to debauchery and not to moral growth. They had numerous temples, but they were haunts of licentiousness; the voice of exhortation to virtue never resounded within their walls. They offered sacrifices to Mercury from gratitude for his having made known the knavery and artifices of their slaves, and the slaves offered him the first-fruits of their pilferings.¹ On the festivals of Bacchus prizes were given to the deepest drinkers.² In Greece and Rome the worship of Aphrodite was characterized by shameless impurity and unnatural crimes. Shrines consecrated to Venus were maintained at the expense of notorious courtesans. Ovid advises women to shun the temples of the gods, that they might not be there reminded of the lasciviousness of Jupiter.³

"It is a matter of general notoriety," says Tertullian, "that the temples are the very places where adulteries are arranged, and procuresses pursue their victims between the altars."⁴ In the chambers of the priests and ministers of the temple impurity was committed amid clouds of incense, and this more frequently than in the privileged haunts of sin.⁵ Prostitution was practiced as a religious rite in many countries, notably in Syria, Armenia, Babylonia, and Lydia.⁶

If such scenes were enacted in the temples, we may judge of the obscenities of the theatres. The quarrels of the gods, their adulterous gallantries, their robberies and their deeds of violence, were the favorite themes of the plays. The effects of these exhibitions on the impressible hearts of the spectators are vividly described by Juvenal.⁷ These representations were witnessed not only by the masses, but also by the Senate and Consuls, and even by the augurs and Vestal virgins, who had special seats assigned to them.

It should also be borne in mind that these popular amusements were regarded as religious acts, forming a part of the public worship. They were intended to appease the wrath of the gods and to propitiate their favor.

What mimic art presented in the theatre was reproduced in paintings on the walls of temples and private houses. Art was made the handmaid of vice. At every step the Greek and the Roman were confronted by lascivious portraits of their divinities. Religion became associated with lewdness in the mind of youth,

¹ Pausanias, v. 24, 1.

³ Trist., 2.

⁵ Minutius Octavus, c. 25.

⁷ *Sat.* vi., 67.

² Döllinger, *The Gentile and the Jew*, ii., 191.

⁴ *Apol.*, c. 15.

⁶ *Gentile and Jew*, vol. i., passim.

and the impure image was stamped upon the imagination, even before the heart was conscious of the poison it was imbibing.

We need not the pen of a Juvenal or a Tertullian to depict the abomination of Pagan art. A glance at the indecent pictures that have been unearthed from the ruins of Pompeii, reveals a moral depravity which the most prurient imagination can scarcely conceive.

If such were the gods, what must the mortals that worshipped them have been? If such crimes were represented as having been committed in heaven, what infamous deeds must have polluted the earth? If man, by his corrupt nature, has so strong a tendency to glide down the slippery path of vice, what momentum must have been given to his passions by the examples of the gods, of whose excesses he was constantly reminded? "What means," says Seneca, "this appeal to the precedent of the gods, but to inflame our lusts, and to furnish a license and excuse for the corrupt act under shelter of its divine prototype?"¹

After having feasted their eyes on wanton spectacles in the temples and theatres, the people hastened to the arena to slake their thirst for human blood. The gladiators must show no mercy to their antagonists; the sooner they dispatch one another, the more they delight the eager and impatient spectators. As soon as one victim has fallen, a fresh combatant enters the lists, till the amphitheatre runs with human blood. Cæsar once brought six hundred and forty gladiators into the arena.² Trajan, on one occasion, had ten thousand slaves engaged in mortal combat, and prolonged the spectacle for one hundred and twenty-three days.³ At another time, Agrippa caused fourteen hundred men to fight in the amphitheatre of Berytus in Syria. These sanguinary contests extended over the empire; they were witnessed by multitudes of both sexes and every grade of society; they served to stifle all sentiments of compassion and to inflame the most fierce and brutal instincts of the human breast. It was the special delight of Claudius to watch the countenance of the dying, for he took an artistic pleasure in observing the variations of their agony.

The revolting practice of disgorging food by artificial means, in order to gratify the appetite anew, was quite general among the upper classes in Rome. Cicero, in defending King Dejotarus from the charge of having attempted to poison Cæsar while he was his guest, incidentally reminds Cæsar, who was presiding on the bench, of having expressed a wish to dispose of his last meal on a certain occasion. Cicero's remark was not intended as a reproach any more

¹ *De Vita Brevi*, 16.

² Dio Cass. lxxviii., 15.

³ Suet. *Dom.*, 4.

than if he had alluded to Cæsar's having taken a bath or a nap ; for he was too dexterous an advocate to irritate the judge.

Juvenal lashes Domitian's gluttony by making the fisherman advise him :

“Haste to unload your stomach and devour
A turbot destined for this happy hour.”—(*Sat.* IV.)

The same poet thus describes the Roman matrons :

“All glowing, all athirst
For wine, whole flasks of wine, and swallows first
Two quarts to clear her stomach and excite
A ravenous, an unbounded appetite.”—(*Sat.* VI., Gifford's Trans.)

No president or lady of the land, if known to indulge in excesses so unnatural, could retain the respect of the American people.

The only teachers who might be supposed to have the capacity and authority to instruct the people and to check the current of immorality, were the philosophers. Some of them, indeed, guided by the light of reason, inculcated beautiful and sublime moral maxims ; but many causes rendered their influence for good scarcely perceptible among the people.

Their audience was generally composed of a narrow circle of literary men. They shrank from proclaiming their doctrines to the masses for fear of exciting public odium against themselves.

They had no well-defined and uniform moral code, and they were often vague and contradictory in their ethical teachings. They suggested no adequate incentives to the practice of virtue. They never employed the great argument of the Apostle: “This is the will of God, your sanctification.” The chief, indeed the only motive they had to offer for rectitude of conduct, was the intrinsic excellence of virtue and the deformity of vice.¹ But experience proves that the beauty of virtue and the hideousness of vice, unless fortified by higher considerations, afford a weak barrier against the encroachments of passion. If love, as they say, is blind to the defects of the lawful object of its affections, wanton love will little heed the repulsive character of the siren charmer.

There was no sanction attached to their moral precepts. They could not say, with the Christian teacher: “The wicked shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting,” for they were in a state of lamentable uncertainty regarding a future life. The ablest moralists among them connived at, and even sanctioned by their example, certain violations of temperance, chastity, and humanity that Christianity reprobates.

Plato, “the Divine,” condemned drunkenness, but tolerated it

¹ Cicero, in his admirable moral treatise, *De Officiis*, has no other inducement to offer for the practice of virtue.

on the feasts of Bacchus.¹ In his ideal republic he recommends infanticide and community of wives, and declares contempt for slaves to be the mark of a gentleman. He advocates the merging of the individual life into the public life of the state, by which personal liberty is lost and man becomes but a part of the great machinery of the state.² He congratulates the Athenians on their hatred of foreigners.

The leading philosophers were so much addicted to those unnatural crimes denounced by St. Paul,³ that parents generally forbade their children to have intercourse with them.⁴ And so low was the standard of morals that the indulgence of this passion was not regarded as reflecting any disgrace on the transgressor.

Aristotle was not free from this vice. He also approved abortion and infanticide. He advised the legal destruction of weak and deformed children. While denouncing obscene pictures, he makes an exception in favor of the images of such gods as wished to be honored by indelicate representations.⁵ He taught that Greeks had no more duties to barbarians (foreigners) than to wild beasts.⁶

Even the wise Socrates, if he is correctly reported by his apologist Xenophon, indulges in a license of speech and conduct that would be tolerated by no Christian teacher of our day.⁷

The elder Cato was noted for his inhumanity to his slaves.⁸ Salust, who advocated with eloquence an austere simplicity of life, was conspicuous for his rapacity.⁹

Seneca uttered sentiments worthy of the Apostle to the Gentiles. But, unlike St. Paul, "his life was deeply marked by the taint of flattery, and not free from the taint of avarice; and it is unhappily certain that he lent his pen to conceal or varnish one of the worst crimes of Nero."¹⁰

To sum up: The standard of pagan morals was essentially low, because the pagans had no divine model held up to them; they had no uniform criterion of right and wrong; the motives presented to them for the practice of virtue were insufficient; no sanction was appended to their moral law; their teachers were limited in their sphere of action; they were often inconsistent in their ethical instructions, and the best of them were stained by some gross vice.

II.

The superior excellence of Christian over Pagan morals is due, first, to the peerless life and example of the Founder of the Chris-

¹ *De Leg.*, Lib. VI.

³ Rom. viii.

⁵ Pol. vii.

⁷ *Mem. Socr.* iii., 13.

⁹ Lecky, vol. i., p. 194.

² Rep. iv., v., vi.

⁴ Plutarch, *De Educ. Puer.*, 15.

⁶ Lecky, *European Morals*, i., 229.

⁸ Plutarch, *Cato Major*.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

tian religion. Our Saviour never inculcates any duty that He does not Himself practice in an eminent degree. No matter how fast we may run on the road of perfection, He is ever before us. No matter how high we may soar, He is still above us, inviting us to ascend higher, as the eagle entices her young to fly. No matter how much we may endure in the cause of righteousness, we find Him laden with a still heavier cross and bearing deeper wounds. He sweetens the most unpalatable ordinances by the seasoning of His example. The beautiful maxims of Plato, Seneca, and Zeno lose much of their savor because their lives were not always conformable to their words. But we have no apology to offer for our Master. He alone is above reproach. He alone can say of Himself: "Which of you shall convict Me of sin?"¹

"It was reserved for Christianity to present to the world an ideal character, which, through all the changes of eighteen centuries, has shown itself capable of acting on all ages, nations, temperaments, and conditions; has been not only the highest pattern of virtue, but the strongest incentive to its practice, and has exercised so deep an influence that it may truly be said that the simple record of three short years of active life has done more to regenerate and soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers and all the exhortations of moralists."²

Jesus taught by example before He taught by words. We are drawn toward Him more by the charm of His life than by the sublimity of His doctrine and the eloquence of His words. The sermons of our Saviour inspire us indeed with esteem for virtue, but His conduct stimulates us to the practice of it. Never did any man speak as Jesus spoke. The most admired discourse that He ever delivered was the Sermon on the Mount. But even the Sermon on the Mount yields in force to the Sermon from the Cross. And if, like the Scribes and Pharisees, our Lord had restricted His mission to the preaching of the word, without illustrating that word by His glorious example, He never would have wrought that mighty moral revolution which has regenerated the world, nor would He be adored to-day by millions of disciples from the rising to the setting of the sun. When asked by the disciples of John whether He was the true Messiah, He laid more stress on His deeds than on His preaching. "Go," He says, "and relate to John what you have heard and seen. The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, . . . the poor have the Gospel preached to them."³

When we hear our Saviour saying on the Mount: "Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven,"⁴ we are

¹ John vii., 46.

³ Matt. xi., 4, 5.

² Lecky, *European Morals*, ii., 8-9.

⁴ Matt. v., 3.

impressed with the sublimity of His teaching. But when we *see* Him acting out His words: "The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests: but the Son of Man hath not where to lay His head,"¹—oh, then, we are made to feel the blessedness of voluntary poverty, we cherish and embrace our Teacher, who, when He was rich, became poor for our sake! When we hear Him say: "He that exalteth himself shall be humbled, and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted," we admire the virtue of humility. But when we *see* Him at the Last Supper laying aside His upper garment, girding Himself with a towel, pouring water into a basin, and washing the feet of His disciples, then that virtue assumes for us special attractions. When we hear Him say: "Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy," we are delighted with His doctrine. But we are more profoundly moved when we *witness* His compassion for the hungering multitude in the desert, and His mercy shown to the erring Magdalen. When He says: "If you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you," He is clothing an old commandment in new words.² But when He prays from the cross for His executioners: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," He gives a sublime lesson of forgiveness never before exhibited by sage or prophet.

When we listen to these words: "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, and persecute you, and speak all that is evil against you, untruly, for My sake," we are in admiration at His doctrine. But when we behold the innocent Lamb Himself accused of being a blasphemer, a seditious man, and a disturber of the public peace, we are consoled in our trials and calumny loses its sting.

Beautiful above the sons of men was Jesus in His glorious transfiguration; but far more beautiful is He to us when suspended from the Cross. The crown of thorns is more comforting to us than the halo that encircles His brow on Mount Tabor.

Our Saviour excels the philosophers as well in His moral teaching as in His personal virtues.

There is not a single principle of the natural law, there is not a healthy moral precept of sages or legislators, nor any commandment of the Decalogue, that is not engrafted on the Evangelical Code; for Christ came not to destroy, but to fulfil the law.³ The Christian religion appropriates all that is good, preserving the gold and eliminating the dross.

The moral teachings of our Saviour are as much superior to the Jewish law as the Jewish law itself surpassed all the Gentile

¹ Matt. viii., 20.

² Matt. v., 17.

³ See Eccclus. xxviii., 3, 4.

moral codes. The Christian religion is more searching, more exacting, more specific in its obligations than the Mosaic legislation. The latter regulated chiefly the exterior conduct, the former guides the movements of the heart; the one forbids the overt act, the other the evil intention; the one condemned the crime of bloodshed, the other prohibits the sin of anger; the one demanded retaliation for injuries received, the other enjoins forgiveness of injuries; the one required us to love our friends, the other bids us love our enemies. "You have heard that it was said to them of old: Thou shalt not kill. And whosoever shall kill, shall be in danger of the judgment. But I say to you, that whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment. . . ."

"You have heard that it was said to them of old: Thou shalt not commit adultery. But I say to you, that whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart. . . ."

"You have heard that it hath been said: An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say to you not to resist evil: but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other. . . ."

"You have heard that it hath been said: Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thy enemy. But I say to you: Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you; and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you:

"That you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven, who maketh His sun to rise upon the good and the bad, and raineth upon the just and the unjust. For if you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? Do not even the tax-gatherers the same? And if you salute your brethren only, what do you more? Do not also the heathen this? Be ye, therefore, perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect."¹

The intrinsic excellence of the Christian moral code is enhanced by its broad and comprehensive spirit adapting itself to all times and circumstances, to all races and forms of government, and sympathizing with every class of society.

Unlike the *national* religion of the Jews, the Christian religion proclaims the law of universal brotherhood. Unlike the sanguinary religion of Mohammed, which subsists only under despotic rule, and which demands the surrender of one's faith as the highway-man demands the traveller's purse, at the point of the sword, the Christian religion flourishes under every system of government, from an absolute monarchy to the freest republic. Unlike the school of the Pagan philosophers, which was restricted to a narrow circle of disciples, the Gospel of Christ is proclaimed to Jew

¹ Matt. v., 21-48.

and Gentile, Greek and barbarian, to bond and free. Like the air of heaven, which ascends the highest mountain and descends into the deepest valley, vivifying the face of nature, so has the Christian religion permeated every stratum of society, purifying and invigorating the moral world.

It has a message for the capitalist and the laborer, for the master and the servant, for the rich and for the poor. In the words of St. James, she warns the capitalist against the sin of labor-oppression: "Behold the hire of your laborers who have reaped down your fields, which by fraud has been kept back by you, crieth: and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth."¹ She admonishes the laborer to perform his work with fidelity, "not serving to the eye, as it were pleasing men, but doing the will of God from the heart."² The most enlightened political economist never formulated a sentence so simple, so comprehensive, so effectual, as is contained in these words: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." This principle, if properly applied, would solve every labor problem that perplexes the minds of statesmen.

The Church of God has always admonished the master, wherever slavery exists, to be kind and humane to his slave, reminding him that the Master of both is in heaven, and that He has no respect of persons.³

She has brought comfort and sunshine to the wretched home of the slave. She proclaimed his manhood when he was treated as a chattel. She told him there was no dishonor in his chains; that by baptism he was incorporated into the Christian family, and was delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of a child of God.⁴

She charges "the rich of this world not to be highminded nor to trust to uncertain riches, but in the living God who giveth us all abundantly to enjoy. To do good, to become rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate to others, to lay up for themselves a good foundation for the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life."⁵

She preaches words of comfort to the poor man. She has exploded the false maxim of the world that estimates a man's dignity by his dollars and his degradation by his poverty. She has declared that a man may be scant in this world's goods, and yet be rich and honorable in the sight of God.⁶ She cheers him with the old and familiar but always refreshing story of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, being rich, became poor for our sake, that through His poverty we might be rich.⁷

¹ St. James v., 4.

⁴ Rom. viii.

⁷ II. Cor. viii., 9.

² Eph. vi., 6.

⁵ I. Tim. vi., 17-19.

³ Eph. vi., 9.

⁶ James ii.

The exposition of practical duty, as we have seen in the foregoing pages, was wholly unconnected with the life of the Pagan priest and the religious ceremonies of the Pagan temple. Happily, the same cannot be affirmed of our Christian priests and temples. As Mr. Lecky justly observes: "To amalgamate these two spheres (of worship and morals), to incorporate moral culture with religion . . . was among the most important achievements of Christianity. . . . Unlike all Pagan religions, it made moral teaching a main feature of its clergy, moral discipline the leading object of its services, moral dispositions the necessary condition of the due performance of its rites."¹ The one great aim of our Christian ceremonial worship, of our Sacraments and Sacrifice, our preaching and our priesthood, is the advancement of personal holiness.

The moral power exercised by a good priest in his parish is incalculable. The priest is always a mysterious being in the eyes of the world. Like his Divine Master, he "is set for the fall and for the resurrection of many in Israel, and for a sign which shall be contradicted."² Various opinions are formed of him. Some say of him as was said of our Saviour: "He is a good man. And others say: no, but he seduceth the people."³ He is loved most by those who know him best. Hated or despised he may be by many that are strangers to him and to his sacred character; but he has been too prominent a factor in the civilization of mankind and the advancement of morality ever to be ignored.

The life of a missionary priest is never written, nor can it be. He has no Boswell. His biographer may record the priest's public and official acts. He may recount the churches he erected, the schools he founded, the works of religion and charity he inaugurated and fostered, the sermons he preached, the children he catechised; the converts he received into the fold; and this is already a great deal. But it only touches upon the surface of that devoted life. There is no memoir of his private daily life of usefulness and of his sacred and confidential relations with his flock. All this is hidden with Christ in God, and is registered only by His recording angel.

"The civilizing and moralizing influence of the clergyman in his parish," says Mr. Lecky, "the simple, unostentatious, unselfish zeal with which he educates the ignorant, guides the erring, comforts the sorrowing, braves the horrors of pestilence, and sheds a hallowing influence over the dying hour, the countless ways in which, in his little sphere, he allays evil passions and softens manners, and elevates and purifies those around him; all these things, though very evident to the detailed observer, do not stand

¹ *Hist. of European Morals*, ii., 2.

² Luke ii., 34.

³ John vii., 12.

out in the same vivid prominence in historical records, and are continually forgotten by historians."¹

The priest is Christ's unarmed officer of the law. He is more potent in repressing vice than a band of constables. His only weapon is his voice; his only badge of authority his sacred office. Like the fabled Neptune putting Eolus to flight and calming the troubled waves, the priest quiets many a domestic storm, subduing the winds of passion, reconciling the jarring elements of strife, healing dissensions, preventing divorce, and arresting bloodshed.

He is the daily depository of his parishioners' cares and trials, anxieties and fears, afflictions and temptations, and even of their sins. They come to him for counsel in doubt, for spiritual and even temporal aid. If he cannot suppress, he has at least the consolation of mitigating the moral evil around him.

We must not overlook the strong inducements that the Christian teacher holds out to his disciples for the practice of virtue in the pressing motives he offers for its due fulfilment. In this respect Christianity has a great advantage over all other systems of religion. The Stoic was incited to a moral life by a sentiment of duty; the Epicurean, by pleasure and self-interest; the Mohammedan, by the hope of sensual delights; the Jew, by servile fear; but the Christian is drawn chiefly by filial love. He is far, indeed, from excluding other motives. He, as well as the Stoic, is influenced by the intrinsic beauty of virtue and by the enormity of sin which he knows could be atoned for only by the blood of his Saviour. He is actuated in the pursuit of virtue by an enlightened self-interest; for he is taught that "Godliness is profitable to all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come."² He is moved by a salutary fear of future retribution. But his predominant motive for the practice of piety is love for his Heavenly Father, and love is the strongest of all moral forces. No one can deny that the devotedness of a child to a father is more tender, more profound, more disinterested, and more enduring than the devotedness of a servant to a master, or of a hireling to an employer. A son obeys his father with more alacrity than a servant does his master; and in disobeying his father, he not only transgresses parental authority, but does violence to the instincts of filial affection.

Now, the Christian Church is represented to us as a family whose *Father* is God, and whose members are His adopted children. "You are no more strangers and foreigners," says St. Paul, "but you are fellow-citizens of the saints and of the household of God."³ It is only in the Christian Church that God is habitu-

¹ *European Morals*, i., 152.

² I. Tim. iv., 8.

³ Eph. ii.

ally appealed to as Father, and that He admonishes us as His children.. We never find the ancient Gentile religions nor the Mohammedan people addressing God by the title of Father. And the same can be affirmed of the Hebrew people. We may search the Old Testament from Genesis to Machabees, and we shall not find the name of Father applied to God a half dozen times. He is called Lord, Omnipotent, Master, King, Judge, and Ruler, titles suggesting the reciprocal relations of authority and fear; not in a solitary instance is a prayer addressed to Him under the endearing name of Father.

Not so you, says the Apostle to the Christians of his time, "for you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry Abba, Father. For the Spirit Himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God, and if sons, heirs also."¹ "Behold," says St. John, "what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us that we should be called and should be the sons of God."² In addressing our prayers to heaven, what name is more common on our lips than the name of Father, and what prayer is more familiar to us than that most touching and comprehensive of all prayers, the *Our Father*? The name of Father is applied to God upwards of one hundred times in the New Testament, brightening every page and cheering every heart.

What an incentive to virtue is presented to the Christian that recognizes in the moral precepts not only the injunction of his Creator, but also the voice of his loving Father, the Archetype of all sanctity! And what peculiar malice sin should have in his eyes since it is not only an infraction of the law, but also a straining or snapping of those tender ties that bound him to his Father in heaven.

We shall conclude this article by briefly reviewing the moral influence of Christianity on the world at the two extreme stages of its existence—in the first and in the nineteenth century. "It is not surprising," says Mr. Lecky, "that a religious system which made it a main object to inculcate moral excellence, and which, by its doctrine of future retribution, by its organization, and by its capacity of producing a disinterested enthusiasm, acquired an unexampled supremacy over the human mind, should have raised its disciples to a very high condition of sanctity. There can, indeed, be little doubt that for nearly two hundred years after its establishment in Europe, the Christian community exhibited a moral purity which, if it has been equalled, has never for any long period been surpassed."³

The primitive Church was not without its blemishes. There

¹ Rom. viii., 15-17.

² I. John iii., 1.

³ Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*, ii., 11.

were occasional scandals, divisions, rivalries, envyings, strifes, acts of intemperance, and outbursts of litigious spirit, as is evident chiefly from the first epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians.¹ The luminous picture of Christian holiness had its shadows, but these shadows were few and far between. They were transient clouds flitting across the moral horizon. Far from dimming, they brought out in bolder relief the brilliant constellation of saints and martyrs that illumined the world.

The Pagans saw with admiration that the Christians, amid the licentiousness and sensuality that surrounded them, preserved their chastity. Like the three children in the fiery furnace, their robes of innocence were not scorched by the impure flames of wantonness that enveloped them. Amid drunkenness and dissipation, they remained temperate and mortified. Amid injustice, rapine, and general self-seeking, they were not only strictly honest and fair-dealing, but they also distributed their goods with a ready hand to their suffering brethren.

While the Pagans fled with horror from the breath of pestilence, the Christians buried their plague-stricken friends, and even their enemies. They surrendered their liberties and their lives that they might ransom or relieve their captive brethren.² No wonder that the Pagans exclaimed on witnessing such evidences of heroic charity: "See how these men love one another, how they are ready to die for one another, while we are consumed by mutual hate."³

In a word, amidst calumnies, contempt, insults, and persecutions, they were calm, patient, and self-possessed. They extorted praise from their enemies by laying down their lives for their faith not only with sublime fortitude, but with unutterable peace.

This peace was not the stern composure of the Stoic philosopher, nor the cold impassibility of the Mohammedan fatalist, nor the intoxicating delirium of the Epicure, but the serene joy of the Christian believer.

The exemplary lives of the primitive Christians served as a powerful auxiliary to the Apostles and their successors in the conversion of souls to Christ, and in swelling the ranks of the Christian family. The observing public were sensible that a religion which bore such celestial fruits must have been planted by the hand of God. They saw and they believed. The preëminent piety of the early Christians and their influence in drawing men to the Christian fold, are attested by one who cannot be suspected of blind partiality toward the Christian religion. "There has probably never existed upon earth," says Mr. Lecky, "a community

¹ I. Cor. i. and vi.

² St. Clem. i., Ep. to Corinthians, St. Cypr. Ep., 51.

³ Tertull., c. 39.

whose members were bound to one another by a deeper or purer affection than the Christians in the days of persecution. There has probably never existed a community which exhibited in its dealings with crime a gentler or a more judicious kindness, which combined more happily an unflinching opposition to sin with a boundless charity to the sinner, and which was in consequence more successful in reclaiming and transforming the most vicious of mankind."¹

But does Christianity retain its hold on the public conscience? Most assuredly it does. The name of Christ in the nineteenth century, as well as in the first, is the great battle cry of moral reformation. He has stamped His seal on the laws, the literature, the fine arts of the civilization of Europe and America. His voice is ever ringing among the nations of the earth. He has leavened the social mass. His spirit circulates through the veins of modern society. The precepts of His Gospel continue to regulate public morals. He is the Standard by which we approve or condemn our moral conduct. The number of those whose life is influenced by the teachings of Christ has increased a thousand-fold since the days of the Apostles; and though many have ceased to believe His doctrines of faith, they never cease to admire and praise His transcendent ethical precepts and counsels. The aroma of His sweet life still lingers among many who live outside the pale of the Church.

I have no desire to extenuate the gross vices prevailing among us, which are the more reprehensible, committed as they are in the face of an enlightened conscience. But after making every allowance for this moral depravity, it must be conceded by the most ardent admirer of Gentile civilization that the average morals of a Christian community are of a higher standard than were those of pagan Greece or Rome. The obscenities compelled among us to lurk in dark places, were perpetrated by them openly and without shame. The homage that public opinion pays to virtue is such that vice is not permitted to stalk abroad. Cæsar during his campaigns committed, without detriment to his reputation, unnatural excesses of gluttony and lust that would have consigned any American general to public infamy.²

Chastity is held in public esteem in Christendom; it was religiously prostituted in Paganism.

Lascivious paintings and statues that would not be tolerated in any public hall, and still less in a church in this country, were dutifully exposed in Pagan temples as an homage to the gods.

Unnatural crimes which are severely punished among us, were rarely prohibited by law in ancient Greece.

¹ *Hist. of European Morals*, i., 424.

² Sueton., *Cæsar*, 49.

The profanation of our Christian temples by acts of lasciviousness is unheard of among us ; with the Pagans the temples were favorite haunts of lust.

Lascivious dancing is reprobated by Christian ethics ; it formed a part of the religious rites among Pagans.

Lucretia was *their* highest type of female chastity. Christianity furnishes innumerable examples of women who suffered tortures and death rather than yield to the aggressor.

The augurs and Vestal virgins could publicly witness the most lascivious plays on the stage, and the butchery of the gladiators in the Flavian amphitheatre, without detriment to their sacred calling.

Imagine our Christian clergy and consecrated virgins frequenting the ballets and low theatres ! Could they do so without shocking the moral sense of the people and forfeiting all respect in the community ?

It is true, indeed, that the revelations of systematic crime in London, recently made by the *Pall Mall Gazette*, exhibit a state of moral turpitude hardly surpassed by Rome in the days of Nero. But Paganism was helpless to repair the evil. It had no remedial agencies at its disposal, nor any recuperative power to rise from the slough of sin. Its priests were silent. Its purest philosopher, Seneca, connived at, if he did not participate in, the corruptions of the court, and it sank under the superincumbent weight of its iniquity. The scandal of London, on the contrary, is exposed by the press ; it is denounced from hundreds of pulpits, and condemned by a healthy public opinion, so that members of Parliament, to screen themselves from public odium, are compelled to vie with one another in enacting laws for the repressing of immorality.

IRELAND'S NEW PROGRAMME.

THE stages of national advance in Ireland are as rapid and interesting as the convalescence of a patient with immense vitality. Perceptibly the voice grows deep and strong, the movements free and deliberate instead of fitful and feverish.

From a manacled rebel in the dock, defying his English judge with hopeless heroism, to a national leader of eighty or ninety organized members of Parliament, calmly treating for legislative independence for Ireland, is surely progress enough for twenty years.

The Nationalist Party of to-day represents Ireland—and much more; it is not only national, but strongly international. The foundation stones are the peasants, farmers, laborers,—the natural base; its ranks are filled with mechanics, shopkeepers, merchants, and professional men. It is led by a landlord and a Protestant, who is earnestly supported by the entire Catholic hierarchy and priesthood. It is all that a national movement ought to be in aim, sentiment, and practicality.

For the first time since 1782 all political parties and social classes that are truly Irish are facing in the same direction. The exceptions are the British officials and their dependents, with the Tory and Whig landlords, and the Orangemen. The position of this small but potential minority resembles that of the Northern officials in the Southern States—the “carpet-baggers”—a few years ago; and the resemblance continues when their stability and significance are examined.

There are radicals and irreconcilables in Ireland, of course; but they no longer stand away from and condemn the majority of their more conservative or less hasty countrymen. The revolutionary societies may still keep their organizations intact; but their members are learning a larger and healthier lesson by co-operating in the open agitations under the safe and natural leaders of the country. Michael Davitt has not abandoned his dazzling theory of the nationalization of the land; but he supports it as a proposition in social equity rather than a practical Irish remedy; and his full support is given to the Parliamentary party.

The stages resulting in this condition are peculiarly interesting. The first, and, perhaps, the hardest, thing to be done, was “to compel John Bull to listen.” Reason was futile; therefore Ireland invented her odd and audacious means of “parliamentary obstruction,” “boycotting,” and “no rent;” and England met these tactics with coercion, dragoon-rule, wholesale imprisonment of leading

Irishmen, unceasing police vigilance, arbitrary power in the hands of stipendiary magistrates, and arbitrary power over debate in the hands of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

But while England shook the sword with one hand, she had to offer concessions with the other. Cromwell's method of making silence and quiet in Ireland would hardly do for the nineteenth century—at least, any farther west than India or Egypt. Ireland has an extensive kindred in other countries; and the moral shield of the children probably saved the material head of the mother.

The milestones of Irish agitation are the concessions offered by England within twenty years. She has disestablished and disendowed the Irish Church; she has compelled landlords to make compensation to evicted tenants; she has enacted a law against rack-rents, and appointed commissioners to settle fair rents; she has struck off back rents by the Arrears Act; she has provided employment for the people in time of famine by the Public Works Act; she has offered a sop to the tenant farmers in the Land Purchase Act; she has largely increased the popular vote by the Franchise Act; and retained the full parliamentary representation under the Redistribution Act.

Every one of these reforms was bitterly opposed at first by the English majority; and it is amusing and instructive to turn over the files of the English papers and read the emphatic "Never!" with which each new Irish reform was received.

There was danger a few years ago of Ireland walking into a trap on the land question. It was urged by some honest Irishmen that the land question ought to be settled before the national issue was raised; that peasant proprietors already established would be the strongest supporters of the agitation for a Home Parliament. But the stream of events has been fortunately strong enough to carry the popular will past this seductive opening to the marsh—and the Irish farmers have not mortgaged themselves for life to the English Treasury. The only class now in favor of immediate peasant purchase are the landlords; and in their interest the English Parliament has passed the Irish Land Purchase Act, offering farmers three-fourths, and in some cases the whole of the purchase-money, on a Treasury loan secured by the holding. But the voice of warning has been heard and heeded, telling the farmers that the price of land in Ireland cannot be settled by the arbitrary will of the landlords who want to sell for fifteen or twenty years' rental, but that it has, like all other commodities, a fluctuating market value, the measure of which is the price per acre of American, Canadian, Austrian, and Russian wheat lands, *plus* the cost of freight to British markets. And the farmers are doing what wise men do when they want to get a fair bargain—waiting.

Step by step, through these morasses of local need, Ireland has advanced toward the national issue of Home Rule, successively attaching to the central line all kinds of interests and forces, until it has been recently said that "the Irish parliamentary leader is now, for the first time, also the leader of the whole people"; and that "he is the parliamentary leader only because he leads the people."

On the 24th of August, therefore, when Mr. Parnell announced in Dublin that Ireland had a "New Programme," the utterance was one of profound importance. "A programme and a platform with only one plank," said Mr. Parnell, "and that one, the plank of NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE."

The first question that the world will ask is: What is the meaning of "National Independence," as the Irish leader used, and as Ireland understands the word? Does it mean absolute separation from Great Britain, and the establishment of a new European nation?

In one word, the answer is: *No; it means a union with the British empire, such as Canada and Australia have, or somewhat similar to that which Ireland herself had from 1782 to 1800.*

Ireland's new programme is a demand for true union, instead of subjection. But at the start, it is met by English statesmen, politicians, and demagogues, who desire to prejudice the English masses against it, with cries of "Treason!" "Secession!" and "Dismemberment of the Empire!"

"It would establish within thirty miles of our shores another foreign country," said one of the most powerful Liberal leaders, if not the most powerful, the other day, in a public speech, "a foreign country animated from outside with unfriendly intentions toward ourselves." And he added these remarkable words: "I cannot admit that five million Irishmen have any greater inherent right to govern themselves than would have the five million persons who inhabit the city of London."

In the excitement of this answer the truth was inadvertently told, at least so far as the speaker was concerned: Ireland must either be a subject province or a "foreign country." The pretence of natural sisterhood and fair union is dropped.

If Ireland did want to be "a foreign country," surely "thirty miles from our shores" is a safe and respectable distance—farther than from England to France, and not to be compared to the mere river-and-mountain divisions of contiguous continental nations.

To any but an unprincipled special pleader it is obvious that "five million Irishmen" have the true "inherent right to govern themselves," which the "five million people who inhabit London" have not. The Irishmen have the "inherent right" of a separate

country, race, traditions, aspirations. God gave them Ireland, and it is theirs; the English people built London, and it is England's. Such an argument from an English statesman indicates two things: that the English opposition to Home Rule has not a fair arrow in its quiver, or it would fire it at the first attack; and that it will oppose the Irish demand with a malignity equal to its indefensibility.

Not a word has been said by the Irish representatives on which this charge of utter separation could be based. Even radical Irishmen, who would willingly fight for complete independence, have subsided with a self-control that is extraordinary, and to those who know them, pathetic. They acknowledge that it is the will of the majority of the Irish people to test the constitutional method of securing legislative independence, and, this secured, that they are willing to give it a fair trial. The most conservative and the most radical nationalists agree in this.

"The main end for which Ireland needs a native parliament," says Sir Charles Gavan Duffy, "is not to gratify the longing for autonomy, though no wise man will undervalue that sentiment; nor to engage in new political conflicts, but to administer national interests, which have long gone to wreck and ruin. Our resources are wasted, our trade and commerce in decay, and our people, after an exodus extending over forty years, still fly from the country for want of the guardian care of a legislature with adequate knowledge and sympathy."¹

"With me it is no new theory of to-day or yesterday," said the new Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Walsh, "but a settled and deeply-rooted conviction that for a remedy of the many grievances for the removal of which the people of this island have so long labored, there is but one effectual remedy—the restoration to Ireland of that right of which we were deprived now nigh a century ago by means as shameful as any that the records of national infamy can disclose."²

"Supposing," says Michael Davitt, "that we had an Irish Parliament or National Assembly, say a year, or two years hence, what would be the probable state of parties in such a native legislature? Beyond all doubt, as present indications go, Mr. Parnell would be sent for (let us say, by a new-departure Governor-General of Ireland, like Sir C. Gavan Duffy, for instance) to form a ministry for the rule of the country. Behind such a ministry as the Irish leader would organize there would be all the conservative interests and influences in Ireland—if not in active alliance, at least in friendly opposition, as against any revolutionary party, Socialist or Separatist, that might possibly have representation. . . . Mr.

¹ Recent letter to the Earl of Canarvon, Viceroy of Ireland.

² Speech in response to the address of the Corporation of Dublin.

Parnell was never a revolutionist, while he probably hates socialism as much as any other man bred in the atmosphere of aristocracy. The Catholic Church, which is essentially conservative and opposed to revolution, would be a powerful factor on the side of real law and order, when a state of things should disappear which now compels its bishops and priests to support an agitation policy by which alone justice can be won for their country. The commercial and professional [and landlord] classes might also be counted upon as Nationalist Conservative, while the 'territorial proprietors' and their following would, of course, swell the [conservative] parliamentary forces."¹

These are the expressions of three Irishmen representing the three chief elements of the national life—the educated upper class, the clergy, and the working people.

Mr. Parnell's outline of the functions and powers of the Irish Parliament distinctly indicates its union with the British Empire. "We shall require," he said, in his speech on August 24th, "*that power shall be given to our Parliament* to do those things which we have been asking the English Parliament to do for us." And he proceeded to enumerate the internal reforms which he had in mind.

Ireland can go before England on this record, and appeal to the popular sense of fair play against the misrepresentations of her enemies.

But there is danger visible ahead in the already half-formed resolution of the Liberal leaders to abrogate all law in Ireland, and answer the national agitation with a brutal "No!" They recognize the necessity of doing this in time, or of yielding. Ireland holds the winning cards, and must win, if the constitutional game be allowed to proceed. To avert further concern, the Irish representatives will have to "outsail and outpoint" the governmental statesmen, and carry their case directly to the English people. They will be listened to by the millions; and they will be supported by some of the ablest and best men in England. They need not use their own words even; let them cry out in the burning sentences of noble Englishmen like William Howitt: "From age to age they [the Irish people] have been insulted, trodden on, thrust out of their own soil and their own offices, and taunted with being 'alien in blood, language, and religion.' Great God!" continues this Englishman, "what business had we there? What business had we with their lands, their churches, their endowments? If we went as Christians to convert them, were violence and robbery and injustice the means? If we went to rule them, was it to be only by insult and slaughter? If we went to bind Ireland to Britain as a sister, was it to be only as

¹ In Dublin University Review for September, 1885.

an erring sister, whose fortune is to be flung into the streets and frowned on in her misery? In whatever character we *pretended* to go there, our eyes full of vengeance and our hands full of chains and plunder, betrayed us to the whole world as thieves and hypocrites." ¹

No Irishman has ever told the shocking truth about the "Irish" Parliament that voted the Union, in 1800, more fully than the latest English historian, Walpole, who calls it "the Parliament of the English Colony in Ireland." "It was never," he says, "in any sense, representative of the nation. It was the corrupt embodiment of a dominant race. It sold the birthright of a nation for its own selfish end." ²

But the vote of this "corrupt embodiment" will be the base of the English statesmen's argument against the Irish party in the coming struggle. They have no other ground to stand on. The tactics practiced to carry the Union by Castlereagh will, in all probability, be used again. Appeals will be made—we see them already begun—to the selfishness and timidity of the English trading, shipping, mining, and manufacturing classes. As before, these will be told that Irish competition means ruin. Cowardly and wicked though this statesmanship be, its practical success may be read with disgust in the history of the Irish penal and anti-trade laws as told by Lecky and other historians of the eighteenth century.

The outlook is this: There will be an immediate demand of the landlords and officials in Ireland for a renewal of the Crimes Act; they are already organizing for this end. The Liberal party, in retaliation for Parnell's support of the Tories, will favor this movement, or at least appear to do so. There is little doubt that the Liberals will carry Great Britain at the coming general elections: the two million new voters will settle it. But, regardless of English parties, Ireland will have at least 80 Home Rule members in the next Parliament. Ireland's struggle is going to be with the Liberal party, and the business interests of the middle class is the stone in the sling of the leaders. The Tories have done their work; they are on quicksands for their own land-owning aristocratic existence. If Ireland can get any help from them as she climbs the hill, she may use them; but she would be fatuous to depend on them, except for a breathing spell.

Should the Liberal party meet the Irish demand in the spirit of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's words, above quoted, and should that policy be adopted by the Government, Irish representatives will be face to face with a great danger.

¹ *The Aristocracy of England*, pages 272-3.

² *A Short History of the Kingdom of Ireland*. By Charles George Walpole, M.A.

Now, as in '98, the question would be settled for England if Ireland could be provoked or excited into violence. O'Connell, in 1843, declared that he had it on the authority of Lord Chief Justice Bushe and Plunket, and on that of the Parliamentary Committee's report in 1798, that the rebellion of that year "had been fomented by the English Government to hasten the Union." Could Ireland be goaded into such another outburst of despair, the trouble would be laid, for a generation at least, by a brief and bloody repression and a long period of disfranchisement. But there is not the least fear of general violence in Ireland. There is no need even for threats of organization for violent ends. This is what exasperation and injustice are meant to evoke. Ireland has a strong position at home, and she has representatives enough abroad to "see fair play" among the outside observers of the contest. She knows from experience that while England fights, tooth-and-nail and insolence, she knows when to yield. No country ever recognized the limit of her own interests more clearly.

In 1782, under an Irish pressure less than one-tenth of that now in movement, England granted to Ireland precisely what that country now demands—legislative independence. The scornful speeches of English leaders up to the moment of that yielding might have been stereotyped for such men as Mr. Chamberlain. Yet all the scorn and opposition vanished or were withdrawn when the Duke of Portland announced that the Government intended to concede the Irish demand of Parliamentary Independence. That announcement was far more unexpected than would be Mr. Gladstone's or even Mr. Chamberlain's to the same effect two or five years hence.

"I understand," said Henry Grattan, when the announcement was made in the Irish House of Commons by the Viceroy, "that Great Britain gives up, *in toto*, every claim to authority over Ireland—everything is given up unconditionally."

"Great Britain in 1782," said Burke, "rose above the vulgar ideas of policy, the ordinary jealousies of State, and all the sentiments of national pride and national ambition."

Grattan and Burke admitted too much, but the Irishmen of the present day are standing on their experience. Disfranchised Ireland under the Protestant Parliament of '82 was one thing; the Ireland of to-day, with its far-reaching moral force affecting England from all sides, is quite another. What Ireland gained in 1782, her Government held; what she gains now, her people will hold, and without fear of losing. Ireland has measured and recorded the English statesman's "Impossible!" and she knows that Lord North's in 1781 had at least as much significance as Mr. Chamberlain's in 1885.

Ireland's winning policy will be still one of agitation, peace and patience. Her enemies will play for passion; they will inflame the pride, prejudice, and cupidity of the English business element. But if Ireland's dispassionate answer be always ready—that she does not propose to dismember but to strengthen the Empire; that she only demands a chance to be loyal instead of disloyal; that she only wants to take care of her own neglected and ruined internal interests, like an American State in relation to the Federal Government; that she wants peace, prosperity, and friendship instead of revolution, poverty, and hatred.

That Ireland will have to pass under the rod once more before she succeeds, we greatly fear. That the Crimes Act or some such form of coercion will be passed by the next Parliament seems more than probable. It will be the last clutch of the dominant faction—the convulsion of the landlord class. But if Ireland can be hopeful and steadfast in this last trial, if she will not look upon this concluding evil as the first of a hopeless series, the end of her unhappiness is not far off.

The past twenty years ought to encourage her for future exertion and patience. She has come heart-whole to the present emergency. At the head of her forces to-day, as in the 12th century, shine the mitre and crozier; and no other struggling Catholic country but has sent its wise guides to the rear. A thousand years ago, when King Malachi defeated the Northmen, the faith of Ireland was not purer nor more fervid than to-day—yet those thousand years have been for Ireland a gulf of war, conquest, pillage, ceaseless rebellion and outrageous re-conquest.

Ireland to-day is stronger than ever. A marvellous political if not ethnological problem is the moral unity and devotion of her exiled children and their descendants to the third and fourth generation. A century ago, England had reduced the Irish to about 4,000,000 people, and they were nearly all in Ireland, disfranchised, disinherited, unrepresented, friendless, voiceless. To-day, it is safe to say that between 30 and 40 millions of people respond to the rise or fall of the Irish barometer—a force as great in number as England's own, and greater in its scattered moral influence. Organization has its opposing and mastering force in disintegration, when the atoms contain and continue the argument for justice. In Great Britain, the United States, Canada, South America, Australia, Africa, New Zealand and other British Colonies, there are millions of native citizens who feel and acknowledge their Irish blood and sympathies. The English statesman who would ignore this fact is shortsighted. The Irish race, bound by its traditions, beliefs and hopes, has at present a singular strength, and for the British Empire a tremendous progressive significance.

THE TRUE IDEA OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

Sancti Thomae *Opera*. Migne, Paris.

Æsthetik. By Reverend Joseph Jungmann, S. J. Herder, Freiburg.
1884.

TO our knowledge, all who can justly claim the title of æstheticians agree that the object of the fine arts is the *beautiful*. Every true work of art, whether it presents itself to us in solid matter, in color, in sound, or in language, is a representation of the beautiful in external form. The first question of the critic, therefore, must always be: Is the object which pretends to be a work of art really beautiful; and, if so, why is it beautiful? The most fundamental question in æsthetics, then, is: *What is beauty; or, what constitutes an object beautiful?* This question is not new. It is as old as philosophy. It occupied the minds of Aristotle, the prince of Greek philosophers, and of the "divine" Plato; and with it Socrates delighted to puzzle his flippant friends. Taking for our guide the few principles which can be gleaned from St. Thomas as bearing on the subject, and the excellent work of Father Jungmann, referred to at the head of this paper, we shall endeavor, if not to give a fully satisfactory answer, at least to establish some principles, from which a sufficiently probable solution may be obtained for the vexed and vexing question of the definition of beauty.

First, however, we may be allowed to make a passing remark on the learned work before us. Among the numerous monumental works of eminent Catholic writers published in Germany for the last twenty years Father Jungmann's *Æsthetik*, in our opinion, deserves a very high place, as it cultivates a field so far little explored by Catholic writers. And while the eccentric theories of German pseudo-æsthetics are being plagiarized and gradually carried into English and American literature and thought, it would be very desirable that learned Catholics of English tongue, who would have reliable information on the subject, should turn their attention to this truly classical work, in which the wild dreams of extravagant æsthetes are not only solidly refuted, but a sound system of criticism is established on the unshaken principles of true philosophy and the great models of Christian as well as pagan art. The author, who combines an exquisite taste formed by the prolonged observation of the best

works of art at Rome and elsewhere, with the most extensive reading of ancient and modern literature, has been for more than twenty years professor of *Æsthetics* and Sacred Eloquence at the University of Innsbruck, Austria; so that few might be said to have had such an opportunity of gaining a complete knowledge of the subject he treats. We will not, however, make the learned author responsible for all the opinions proposed in this paper, but we wish them to be taken for what they are worth from the evidences on which they are based. We shall even venture to differ from him in details of some importance.

Before attempting to build up a definition of the beautiful we shall make a brief review of those theories which, in our opinion, are utterly untenable. Though the science of *æsthetics* or *criticism* is of comparatively recent date, it has already, like the mother science of philosophy, undergone a complete series of metamorphoses, until at last it is presented to us as a philosophical structure reared upon the very unæsthetic basis of that melody wherewith our saurian grand-dams of old were wont to woo our semi-human grandsires in the primeval forests of the tropics. To such a degree have men "become vain in their thoughts."

The first among modern writers who has given a full treatise on the beautiful was *Edmund Burke*, the great orator and statesman, who in philosophy was a pronounced sensualist. In his juvenile essay on the "Sublime and Beautiful" he develops a theory, incidentally sketched by Addison in the *Spectator*, regarding the beauty of species, and extends it to beauty generally. According to Burke's views "beauty is some quality in bodies acting mechanically on the human mind by the intervention of the senses"; hence a material and sensible quality. "Beauty acts," he says, "by relaxing the solids of the whole body." "A beautiful object presented to the sense, by causing a relaxation of the body, produces the passion of love in the mind." We refrain from quoting the descriptions and illustrations of this process of relaxation, which are plastic almost to obscenity. From all his reflections on the beautiful it is manifest that he considered it as something merely *material*, that acted only *materially* on *material* organs and produced merely sensual effects, the sensual passion of love. The reader is much disappointed when he comes to a section headed, "Of Beauty," in which he expects to find the subject defined, but is only informed that beauty is the exterior quality of the sex which determines sexual love to one in preference to another—a definition which would have amused Socrates no less than that given by his friend, Hippias, when in his perplexity he answered that "a fair maiden was beauty." In fact, every intelligent admirer of the truly great Edmund Burke must sincerely regret that he

ever wrote the treatise on the "Sublime and Beautiful." However, if we may judge from his other works, and particularly from a brilliant and affective tribute which he paid to a fair but unfortunate queen, we may justly conclude that his better feelings corrected in practice those perverse principles which false philosophical theories had taught him. Had he clung in practice to his sensual theory of beauty, he never would have uttered the oft repeated sublime and thrilling complaint that the "days of chivalry are gone."

The English sensualistic theory of Burke was soon after introduced into Germany by *Baumgarten* and built up into a science, by him first called *Æsthetics* (*Æsthetica*). The very name itself (*αἰσθάνομαι, αἰσθησις, αἰσθητικὸς*) signifies sensitive impression, and *Baumgarten* defines "æsthetics, or the theory of the liberal arts: the science of sensitive perception." His disciple, *G. Friederich Meier*, true to his master's teaching, declares that every "perfection perceived by the senses is a beauty, and every sensible imperfection in like manner is an ugliness." And for illustration he adds: "Wine tastes *beautifully* and flowers smell *beautifully*; music sounds *beautifully* and a handsome face looks *beautifully*." In the same sense Burke makes smoothness an essential element of beauty, and informs us that "sweetness is *beauty to the taste*." The German æsthetician *Lemcke*, building on the same principles, goes still farther in the development of this sensualistic theory and identifies the beautiful simply with the sensual, the immoral, in its grossest manifestations. In reference to the degeneracy of paganism he says in his "Popular *Æsthetics*": "The decline of *moral life* began to make itself conspicuous. *Æsthetic life* stifled it by its *sensual* influence (*sinnliches treiben*). Sensuality suffocated morality. All dreamt only of pleasure and *æsthetic* enjoyment." He then goes on to describe the struggle of Christianity against "*æsthetic* enjoyment, the world of the beautiful and sensual pleasure," treating these three antagonists of Christianity as synonymous, and winds up with the complaint that in Christianity the beautiful was disparaged or even transferred to the supernatural and the Deity—a complaint which is both unhistorical and, as we shall have occasion to show, unphilosophical.

This sensualistic theory of the beautiful comes very convenient to modern evolutionism. For, if beauty is and always was a mere object of sense, they are freed from the difficulty of explaining why we have a sense of beauty while our undeveloped ancestors had none. *Æstheticians* of the sensist school, on the other hand, gave a hearty welcome to the theory of the ape as a firm basis for their sensual system. *Berg*, the most recent of German æstheticians, tells us in all seriousness that "the theories of Darwin have

thrown a clear light on the origin of beauty." "Through the results obtained by Darwin," he says, "we have finally arrived at a scientific theory of the beautiful." One flash of this "clear light" may suffice to enlighten the reader of its marvellous character. Berg, speaking of the æsthetic pleasure of music, informs us that the first object of vocal notes was to facilitate the association of the sexes. "Musical notes and melody have been applied by our semi-human ancestors at the time of mating. Now, as this musical courtship had been instinctively practiced for many generations, so the singing and hearing of musical sounds have been subsequently associated with now gentler, now more violent, pleasurable feeling, always arising from the passion of love." "The melody peculiar to some species of female apes has been more recently invented(?) as a means of decoying the male of the species." When we read such sublime nonsense uttered with the greatest composure in the name of science, philosophy and good taste, we feel disposed to exclaim with the prophet: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil; that put darkness for light and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter. Woe to you that are wise in your own eyes and prudent in your own conceits." While such theories find favor with critics we need not wonder that the bulk of our modern so-called polite literature is not only amatory in its character, but sentimental and sensual in the worst sense. So far have we come that the prejudice is almost universal that no literary composition written for entertainment, be it tragedy, comedy, or tale, can put any claim to artistic beauty unless it have an amatory plot.

Thus our English sensism and evolutionism have been exported and distilled in the alembic of German philosophy and are again contrabanded and vended in spicy doses for our æsthetic edification. A reaction, though not a healthy one, against those sensualistic theories has been brought about by the *idealistic and pantheistic* schools. "Schelling," we are told by an admirer, "has taken a new departure in æsthetics. For him it was reserved to give to the science of the beautiful an absolute basis. According to him we are to define beauty: The identity of the infinite and the finite, of the ideal and the real, of necessity and freedom, contemplated in sensible form." He throws a new incubus of impenetrable speculation on the subject, when he tells us that "wherever the individual (the real) is so congruous with the idea that the idea itself enters the real and is contemplated in the concrete, there beauty is to be found." These terms, we are told, contain a truth which deserves to be "treasured up" for the science of æsthetics. They are, doubtless, a valuable keepsake in a philosophical curiosity-shop. They have been "treasured up" by the followers of

Schelling, have obtained currency in text-books, encyclopædias and other ponderous works. They have been admired even by Catholic authors and adopted after being stripped of some of their pantheism. One of the latter formulates (Schelling's idea) thus: "The beautiful is the manifestation of God in His creatures"—the Divine idea "expressed, made visible or audible in a work of art." This proposition enunciates truth, though somewhat vaguely.

Peculiar is the theory of *Schiller*, and it seems to have been a favorite idea of Herder, Lessing, Goethe, and other German poets and æsthetes of that humanistic school. According to Schiller, beauty is the combination of the *ideal* and the *real*, or the harmony between matter and form. Whence, as this harmony is to be found preëminently in man, he concludes: "The beautiful is identical with the *human*." Therefore, *man alone* is truly beautiful; all inferior objects and the pure spirits are beautiful only metaphorically or by the appropriation of human qualities. *The human*, therefore, is not only *a* beautiful (object), but *the* beautiful. The ideal of the beautiful is woman. Thus we see that while the pantheism of Schelling changes the infinite God into finite sensible nature, the idealism of Schiller idolizes finite man and transforms him into the infinite God.

While sensualism, pantheism, and idealism have been thus indulging their morbid and phantastic reveries, there were not wanting Catholic philosophers who, following the principles of Plato, Aristotle and St. Thomas, and the doctrines of the Fathers of the Church, taught and wrote more correctly on the subject of the beautiful. Our great theologians, treating of the attributes of God, did not fail to enter fully into the nature of beauty as far as it was necessary to illustrate the beauty of Him who is the fountain of all beauty.

Cardinal Toledo, in his commentary on the "Summa" of St. Thomas, says: "Beauty, generally speaking, consists in a certain order and interior arrangement of the perfections of an object. Hence an object is called beautiful in reference to the intellect and to our perception; for it is the function of the intellect to delight in order, as it is the function of the will to delight in good."

St. Francis of Sales, in his treatise on the "Love of God," almost adopts the words of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas: "Though beauty and goodness," he says, "coincide to a certain extent, they are, nevertheless, not quite identical, for the good is that which appeases the appetite and the will, the beautiful that which pleases the understanding and the mind."

Cardinal Pallavicini, in his work entitled "Del Bene," writes: "The beautiful, in my opinion, is nothing else in reality than a special kind of the good, which in virtue of its intrinsic excellence

produces an agreeable apprehension of itself in the eye of the intellect."

Father Rogacci, on the "One Thing Necessary," defines beauty as a quality which renders the object in which it resides agreeable and delightful to the cognoscitive faculties.

Leibniz, who, though a Protestant, was eminently Catholic in his philosophic principles, gives a similar definition. According to him, beauty is the perfection of things which, inasmuch as it is apprehended, affects us with pleasure. This pleasure produced by the perception is its distinctive mark.

Another definition very popular among Catholic writers, attributed by some to Plato, by others to St. Augustine, is "*Splendor veri*." It appears, however, that this definition is not to be found in the works of either of these authors. And though it were genuine, we think it would not throw much light on the subject in question. Others love to define beauty as "*multiplicity or variety in unity and unity in multiplicity*;" but this definition, too, is vague, and, at most, enunciates some attributes of the beautiful.

The first Catholic writer (abstracting from those Germans who have based their theories on pantheistic and idealistic principles) who has written an exhaustive treatise on the beautiful was *Father Taparelli, S. J.*, one of the shrewdest and profoundest thinkers of modern times, who, in the years 1859 and 1860, contributed a series of masterly articles on the Beautiful to the *Civiltà Cattolica*, which were subsequently published in book form. Proceeding from the definition of St. Thomas, *Pulchra sunt quæ visa placent*, he conceives beauty primarily as the object of the cognoscitive faculties; and the beautiful as that the perception of which generates satisfaction, pleasure, delight in the same faculties. He then goes on to inquire into the causes of this pleasure and comes to the result that it is produced by the *conformity* of the objects with our various cognoscitive faculties, intellectual and sensitive.

He sums up his theory as follows: "Beautiful is that the contemplation of which delights, gives pleasure. Now, human perception is complex and comprises four grades. The first is sensitive perception. The various sensations are then concentrated in the interior sense; thence the imagination receives its representations, and from the imagination reason by its peculiar activity abstracts general ideas. The combination of these four degrees of perception forms the complete cognoscitive faculty of man. This latter complex faculty will consequently obtain complete satisfaction when each of the partial faculties finds its adequate share in the contemplation of the object, and when, moreover, each separate faculty contributes to give the supreme act of the intellect its completion, enabling it to move the will to proper action. Whence it

is manifest that beauty, though its natural end is the repose of the cognoscitive faculties, is destined by the Creator to facilitate right action.

“From these considerations it is not hard to define the proper essence and nature of that beauty in which the cognoscitive faculty may find its satisfaction. We have only to consult reason and experience as to what objects are congenial to each of these faculties, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, how these four grades of perception act in harmony to produce that complete satisfaction in the apprehending subject.

“With regard to the tendency of the perceptive faculties, the *exterior sense* requires beauty of tone (whether in color or sound), clearness of manifestation, variety and order of form in the object as to space and time (symmetry and rhythm). The *interior sense* is the more delighted the more numerous are the sensations which the exterior senses supply from the individual objects. The *imagination* creates new representations by combining and disposing the impressions received according to the wants of the percipient subject, and gives form and life to the complex beautiful object. Finally, *reason* is satisfied when all these mutual relations, taken together, and the order of their mutual relations to each other, present it convenient matter from which to form true, definite, affective, and touching representations.

“Beauty, then, is nothing else than the relation of the object to the sensitive perceptive faculties, and of these faculties again to the intellect. . . . Beauty in nature, as in art, consists always in this: *that the perceptive faculties find satisfaction both by the right relation of the object to them and their relation to one another, with a view to the end of perception, i.e., rational action.*”

The doctrine of Taparelli, which we could not give briefer or clearer than in his own words, has been adopted by most of the subsequent Catholic philosophers. Father Jungmann, however, feels himself obliged to depart from the teaching of the Roman philosopher, inasmuch as the former maintains that the pleasure derived from the contemplation of the beautiful has its seat not in the cognoscitive faculties but in the will, and consists in *perfect love* or, as he prefers to call it, *love properly so-called* (eigentliche Liebe) in contradistinction to love improperly so-called (uneigentliche Liebe) or imperfect love. This is a distinction common in theology between *amor rei propter seipsam* and *amor rei propter aliud*; the love of an object for its own sake and the love of a thing for the sake of something else. Thus we love health for its own sake (love properly so-called), medicine for the sake of health (love improperly so-called). Taking pleasure in this sense of love properly so-called, Father Jungmann defines beauty “*the intrinsic goodness*

of things, inasmuch as it renders them fit to be the object of complacency to the rational mind (Geist)."

Father Taparelli and his adherents, as we have seen, admit that the contemplation of the beautiful is productive of love, and thus "facilitates rational action"; but they deny that this love constitutes the essence of that pleasure produced by the beautiful. This pleasure is perfected in the cognoscitive faculties; the attraction of the will, or the love which thence arises, is only concomitant or consecutive, the fruit of the intellectual complacency.

This great variety of discordant definitions, even among the profoundest Catholic philosophers, is an evidence of the difficulty of the enterprise. The reason of this difficulty is obvious. First, beauty, like truth and goodness, being a transcendental quality and an analogous notion, does not admit of a *strict* definition *per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*, as philosophers term it; as there is no *genus* in which it can be said to be contained as a *species*. Like truth and goodness, therefore, it can only be described in its relation to the faculties of rational nature. Here again a new difficulty arises. While truth is defined in relation to the perceptive faculties, and goodness in relation to the appetitive, of which faculties they respectively form the proper object, the question is, to which of those faculties shall we refer that attribute or relation which we call beauty? To the rational or to the sensitive faculties? To the perceptive or appetitive? Or to the partial or entire assemblage of the faculties of rational nature? And if the latter obtain, whether coördinately or with a certain subordination of the inferior to the superior? Of what faculty or faculties is beauty the proper object? This question "makes cowards of us all." And yet this is the gist of the cause, in our opinion. He who will answer this question to evidence will, we think, have obtained the necessary results for a satisfactory definition of beauty. We cannot here attempt a final solution of this question, but will give it due consideration in the course of our brief analysis of the idea of beauty.

All are agreed that beauty is that quality of objects which *pleases the contemplator*, or, put more universally, *the apprehending subject*. "The fact that *the beautiful pleases* us," says St. Chrysostom, "has been, ever since the creation of the world, the cause why we distinguish the beautiful from the vulgar or ugly." And St. Augustine says: "Are you not seized with *pleasure* when you behold the universe? *Why?* Because the universe is *beautiful*." The same has been the teaching of the stoic school of philosophy, as well as of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, whose doctrine St. Thomas reproduces in various places, when he declares those things to be

beautiful which please the contemplator (*quæ visa placent*).¹ The same, as we have shown, is the teaching of Toledo, Pallavicini, St. Francis of Sales, Leibniz, Rogacci, and Taparelli, as well as of the sensualists and evolutionists, and it is admitted by modern æstheticians generally, however they may differ among themselves. The effect produced by the contemplation of the beautiful is well illustrated by the conduct of St. Peter, when, after beholding the glory of the Saviour in the transfiguration on Tabor, he in his ecstasy exclaimed: "*It is well to be here* ; here let us build three tents." Now, that quality of objects which produces this pleasure is called beauty.

But may not this quality be something merely apparent, subjective? The variety of contradicting tastes would seem to indicate this. What one calls beautiful another calls ugly ; and what is an object of delight and love to one, is the cause of disgust and abomination to another. As little as the eye creates, extenuates, or modifies the brightness of sun, moon, and stars, so little do subjective views and tastes add to or detract from the beauty of objects. Whether it is realized and appreciated or not, it continues all the same to be a *constant, real, inherent* quality, which will not fail to be rightly perceived and justly apprized as soon as it is brought to bear on sound and well-disposed cognoscitive faculties. The denial of the objective reality of beauty would imply the negation of the objectivity of all perceptive qualities. Beauty, therefore, is *something real*, part and portion of the objects to which it is attributed.

If we further inquire whether this quality which we call beauty is a sensible or an intelligible one, we must come to the conclusion that it is *intelligible only*, i. e., a simple quality that can be apprehended not by sense, but only by reason or intelligence. Sense perceives a material object that is beautiful, but the perception of beauty *as such* is the exclusive function of the intellect. This is the teaching of St. Thomas. In his commentary on the work of Dionysius, "*De Divinis Nominibus*," discussing the proposition of the Areopagite that beauty is the same as goodness, the Angelic Doctor distinguishes as follows : "Though goodness and beauty are the same in the subject (the same reality), they are, nevertheless, different in their relations; for beauty adds something to goodness, to wit, the relation to a faculty cognoscitive of beauty *as such*." But the perception of a quality *as such*, according to the terminology of St. Thomas, is the peculiar function of the intellect, not of sense. Besides, an essential feature of beauty in external objects, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, is order and symmetry. Now, according to all sound philosophy and familiar

¹ See *Sum.*, P. I, q. 5, a. 4, ad I.

experience, these are qualities that can be perceived only by the understanding or reason. The same conclusion follows from the fact that things spiritual and moral, which transcend all sensitive perception, and are the object only of reason and intelligence, as well as material things, are termed, and, as we shall show, actually are, beautiful. Therefore St. Augustine concludes: "Though many beautiful objects are *visible*, yet that beauty itself whereby they are beautiful is by no means visible." Cicero, the Roman interpreter of Greek philosophy, says: "No other animal (but man) perceives the beauty, grace, and symmetry of sensible objects."

Though beauty as such is an intellectual quality, yet, like truth and goodness, *it is also an attribute proper to sensible objects*. For who has not been struck with the beauty of the starry firmament, or the glory of the sun, when he goes forth at morning as the "bridegroom from his bridal-chamber," or goes down at evening into his golden couch? Who can contemplate the sea, whether it dashes its crested waves on the hollow-sounding beach, or reflects the azure sky from its glassy surface, without being enraptured by its beauty and grandeur? Who is insensible to the beauty of the landscape, varied with the numberless tints and hues of blossom, flower, and foliage, now expanding its rich waving fields to the eye, now furrowed with hill and dale, enlivened with the music of the rippling brook and the sweet carols of a thousand vying songsters? Who can resist the power of music, when it rushes in solemn sweeping accords from the "deep-laboring" organ or the rich human voice, and rolls in mighty volumes along the vaults and aisles of some sacred edifice? Then we forget ourselves, and seem to be rapt into some earthly paradise and say: "It is well to be here."

Yet the beauty of sun, moon, and stars, of heaven and earth, sea and land, with the gracefulness of the human frame, that masterpiece of divine workmanship, the sweet notes of music, and the charming imagery and rhythm of poetry, all the ideal creations of plastic art, are only a dim reflection, a shadow or an echo, of the beauty of the unseen, the spiritual, and supernatural. *The unseen is the proper region of the beautiful*. All the beauty of this visible world, and all those forms which human imagination can create, are, as it were, a handful of pearls taken out of the treasury of the spiritual and supernatural world, and strewn by the Creator's hand into a world of tears. This was the teaching even of pagan philosophy. "He who wishes to proceed rationally," says Plato, "must consider the beauty of the soul more excellent than that of the body." And again, Socrates prays: "O Pan, and all ye other gods of the place, grant that my soul may be beautiful and that my exterior may accord with my soul!" Plotinus, after

summing up the various objects that are considered beautiful in the visible world, adds: "The beauty of the soul, which consists of all manner of virtue, is a more real beauty than that of the objects above mentioned." And Cicero asserts that the wise man is truly beautiful, "for," he says, "the features of the soul are more beautiful than those of the body." "Could we but see the soul of the virtuous man," says Seneca, "how beautiful, how venerable, how resplendent with majesty and gracefulness would she appear to us!" The same is the teaching of the Holy Ghost, when He exclaims: "How beautiful is a chaste generation with glory!" We might quote the grandest passages from the Holy Fathers, who never cease to impress upon the faithful that all true beauty is "from within," has its seat in the soul and not in the exterior form; and exhort them to appreciate, cultivate, enhance this true interior spiritual beauty. "If a man wishes to be beautiful," says St. Clement of Alexandria, "let him adorn the soul, which is the most beautiful of man, and make it wax more beautiful from day to day." This argument the Fathers are wont to urge most frequently and forcibly on the fairer sex. "Not with the tints of delusive art should they embellish their faces," says the same Holy Father. "We will teach them another more rational art of decorating themselves. The highest beauty is the interior, as we have often said, when the Holy Ghost adorns the soul and diffuses His light upon it. Justice, prudence, self-control, love of whatever is good, modesty—the loveliest tint ever beheld—these are true ornaments. In their hearts they should wear their ornaments; by the beauty of the inward man they should commend themselves; for *in the soul alone is the seat of beauty and ugliness*. Therefore the virtuous man alone is truly beautiful and good."

Such is the teaching of philosophy and faith on inward beauty; and, in fact, it requires a considerable amount of degeneracy to make a man insensible of its attractions. The look of innocence, though residing in the most ordinary exterior, without the slightest ornament of art, is more attractive than the most fascinating exterior form; while outward graces, whether natural or affected, shrouding inward corruption, are alike abominable to God and man. Nay, we do not hesitate to say that material objects can be called truly beautiful *only inasmuch as they are capable, through the instrumentality of the senses, to lift up the mind to the contemplation of higher spiritual beauty*, to transport it into the proper region of beauty, the unseen. It is not the exterior delineations, the various hues and shades of color, that the true critic considers in a work of art; it is rather what is implied than what is expressed; the invisible and untouchable, not what can be seen, heard, and grasped; the *idea* rather than the material *form*.

Not all the objects of sense, however, are capable of effecting this intellectual elevation, but only the objects of the more perfect of the senses, which approach nearer to the immaterial—*sight* and *hearing*. Though the objects of smell, taste, and touch are sometimes qualified in language as beautiful, yet this must be pronounced as either an abuse of the term or, at least, an analogical or metaphorical use; for the organic affections produced by such objects of sense are little or nowise subservient to higher ideas, but are merely animal both in nature and tendency. Wherefore St. Thomas rightly considers it unphilosophical to call tastes and smells (to say nothing of the grosser sense of touch) beautiful.¹ Hence, if we speak of a beautiful viand, we must attribute beauty to the skill displayed in dressing it; if of a beautiful perfume, we speak from the analogy of the sensation to that produced by really beautiful objects; while to the object of touch, as such, we never give the predicate of beautiful, no matter how smooth and soft it may be. In this regard Edmund Burke fails not only against sound philosophy, but also against good taste, when he makes smoothness an essential element of beauty, and calls sweetness beauty to the taste.

We do not deny, however, that these inferior, sensible qualities, smoothness, sweetness, etc., in some cases add intensity to the effects of beauty, inasmuch as they give *agreeableness* and sometimes gracefulness to really beautiful objects; but those qualities do not enter the strict notion of beauty, and, if abounding to any great extent, they will only obscure and mar the effects of real beauty by appealing too strongly to sensuality, and thus impeding the free operation of the higher faculties, whose proper function it is to apprehend, and contemplate the beautiful. It is this intensity of sensation, to which nature is viciously inclined, which makes so many mistake the sensually agreeable for the beautiful, and mere animal passion for genuine sentiment and true love. This error has always been and still is the most powerful agent for the perversion of good taste, and the most prolific source of false sentimentality, in the writing and reading world, and, we might say, in the whole domain of art.

Though the proper seat of the beautiful is the unseen and spiritual, yet in our present composite state it is the sensible that makes most impression on us. Our knowledge of things proceeds from the senses. These are the portals through which truth is brought home to the higher faculties. The intellect, though independent of the imagination in its nature and existence, is, in our present state, dependent upon it in its operations. Hence, our minds can

¹ See *Sum.*, P. I-2 ae., q. 27, a. 1, ad. 3.

rest with ease only upon such truths as have corresponding or kindred representations in the imagination. Therefore there can be no poetry without imagery, and all the arts consist in representing ideas, intellectual or moral, in sensible form. Poetry and art, in general, are only an expediency invented by nature herself to bring truth and goodness home to us in a way suited to our natural imperfection. The pure, separate spirits do not require the medium of exterior form for the contemplation of spiritual objects. They apprehend and contemplate them directly, and yet there is no doubt but they realize and enjoy the beautiful in a much higher degree than we do, with all the parade of imagery and sensible representation. The fact, therefore, that we cannot rest with pleasure on mere speculative or transcendental objects is only incidental to our present composite nature, and *does not argue*, as some think, *that only the sensible is beautiful*. On the contrary, the more truth and goodness recede from the material, the more perfect they are, and, consequently, the more beautiful. The apparent lack of beauty is in our manner of apprehending them. Nay, as we shall see, it is a canon of æsthetics as well as metaphysics, that the more simple, immaterial, spiritual, an object is, other conditions being equal, the more beautiful it must be pronounced. On this principle might be based the scale of beauty as well as that of perfection.

From the considerations thus far made, it may be established that *beauty is a simple, intelligible quality, which, though residing in sensible and intellectual things, has its principal seat in the latter as in its proper subject*. If we now further inquire into the cause of that pleasure which is produced by the contemplation of the beautiful, the only reason which can be assigned for it is *the special conformity* of those objects which are called beautiful *with rational nature*. Wherever the mind is brought to bear on an object that reflects its own perfections in a greater or lesser degree, it will be found to rest upon that object with a complacency proportioned to the degree in which its own perfection is expressed in the object, provided it be presented to it in a manner congenial to its nature.

With regard to sensible objects, it is a common experience that the mind rests with pleasure on such as exhibit life, activity, movement, regularity, order, aptitude, completeness, simplicity, unity with variety combined, symmetry, harmony, durability, strength, firmness, light, brightness, perspicuity, etc. The more these qualities are combined in due order and proportion, and presented in any object, the greater will be the complacency with which the mind will rest in its contemplation. Now, what is the cause of this complacency? We can find no other than the special conformity of such objects with the mind, or with rational nature. The living, simple, spiritual, intellectual, ever-active, imperishable mind sees

in such an object its own image and likeness. And, if ever, surely here the axiom attains: *Simile simili gaudet*.

It would lead us too far if we endeavored to show in detail the special analogy of those objects which are considered beautiful with rational nature. That our views on this point, however, may not seem new, we may be permitted to give some authorities from ancient philosophy in confirmation of our assertion. "The beauty of exterior objects," says Plotinus, "strikes us at first glance. Our minds, as soon as they perceive them, are affected with pleasure. They embrace them as something they recognize. The mind becomes, as it were, one with beauty; but, if it perceives something ugly, it shrinks from it, disowns it, refuses to recognize it; because *an ugly object does not harmonize with it*, is foreign to it. This fact," he continues, "we explain as follows: The mind is, of all things, the most perfect. Now, if it perceives something which is *akin to*, or has even a trace of *kindred* with, itself, it is filled with joy and rapture." Thus, the same philosopher explains the beauty of light, color, brightness, from their likeness to the spiritual mind of man. *Gold* was considered by the ancients as a natural symbol of the spiritual soul and its perfections and moral excellence, on account of its simplicity, purity, and durability. Hence, the Neo-Platonist, Hierocles, says: "Gold is something pure, not mixed with dross, as other bodies. Wherefore we justly attribute to the holy, pure and innocent soul the name of *golden*." In fact, the more the spiritual is exhibited or symbolized in material objects, the more beautiful they are and the greater intellectual enjoyment they afford, a circumstance which can be attributed only to their special conformity with rational nature. We may add that the same doctrine is set forth by St. Thomas.¹

Let us further examine in what this conformity of the beautiful with rational nature consists. There is only a two-fold relation of conformity possible—with the understanding and the will. There is no third imaginable. Now, to which of these two faculties does the beautiful, as such, address itself? Notwithstanding the authority and arguments of the learned author before us, we are still inclined to the opinion that this conformity of the beautiful to rational nature, primarily at least, consists in its relation to the intellect. Our reasons are the following:

First, St. Thomas, as often as he speaks of beauty in its relation to rational nature, clearly intimates that it is the object of the cognoscitive faculty, not of the appetitive, and thus draws the distinc-

¹ See *Sum.*, P. I a, q. 5, a. 4, ad I.

tion between beauty and goodness, that a thing is called beautiful in order to perception ; good, in order to appetite or desire.¹

Secondly, many of those qualities which we call beautiful, though they belong to the objective constitution of beings and form part of their intrinsic goodness, yet, in that precise regard in which they are beautiful, seem to be the objects of the understanding, not of the will. Such, for instance, are order, proportion, rhythm, harmony, variety, etc. We are unable to perceive how the sound of music, or the rhythm of poetry, or the exterior proportions of an edifice, or a certain blending of colors, can be the object of love or desire, except as far as their perception affords *delight to the understanding*.

Thirdly, it is a common experience that very many are charmed by the intuition of beauty, without being to any degree ethically affected. Thus, the voluptuary admires the beauty of virtue and innocence, but is not drawn beyond their fruitless contemplation. The infidel cannot but appreciate the beauty of the Christian Religion and Christ's Church, while he reviles and persecutes both. In fact, it is a characteristic phase of modern infidelity that many who would flatter themselves that they are Christians, are satisfied with the mere æsthetic aspect of Christianity, without embracing the substance ; whose Christianity, in other words, is merely intellectual or speculative, not practical ; a matter of taste, not an object of the will or desire. Hence, we find infidel poets and artists not rarely seeking their inspirations from Catholic subjects and ideals, while they openly profess their disaffection to the principles and practices which they cannot help admiring from an æsthetic standpoint. Now, if æsthetic pleasure had its seat in the will, and beauty addressed itself mainly to this faculty, such æsthetes, of whom there is a considerable number, who are deliberately disaffected to almost all that essentially constitutes the beautiful, could never be said to realize the pleasures of the beautiful. "Their will would be continually at war with itself, " a house divided against itself, a Beelzebub casting out Beelzebub." Such a contradiction exists, indeed, in many, but not to the extent of excluding the essential enjoyment of the beautiful, which would be the case if beauty were the object of the will.

We do not, however, maintain that beauty affects the intellect only. It is, primarily, the object of the understanding, but, *secondarily, the object of the will*. The will is naturally moved to desire or abhorrence, to love or hatred, of every object that is brought home to the intellect, and, as the intellect apprehends a special conformity in every beautiful object, the will cannot but be

¹ See *Sum*, P. 1 a, q. 95, a. 4, ad 1 ; P. 1-2 ae, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3 ; P. 2-2 ae, q. 125, a. 2, ad 1 ; *In lib. Sent.* 1, d 31 ; q. 2, ad 4 ; *In Dion.*, cap. 4, lect. 5.

more or less strongly affected, according to the degree of conformity apprehended, and the degree of intensity with which it is apprehended by the understanding. Beauty is, therefore, preëminently a *cause* and a most powerful *motive of love*; and the enjoyment of the beautiful is but very imperfect, if the will cannot adhere to it while the mind contemplates it. It is only when the will, as well as the understanding, finds its rest in the beautiful object, that the measure of æsthetic pleasure is full. Every beautiful object, then, we must conclude, is lovable; but it is not its loveliness that renders it beautiful in the first instance, but its special conformity with the intellect, whereby its loveliness is more forcibly brought home to the will.

If we proceed to inquire into the *ultimate cause* of this special conformity of beautiful objects with rational nature, we must needs come to the Divine Intellect and Essence Itself. Things are conformable to rational nature inasmuch as they are conformable to their prototypes in the Divine Intellect. These divine ideas have different degrees of conformity, according to the various grades of perfection with which they represent the Divine Essence. The more perfectly, therefore, an object represents the divine perfections or shadows forth the image of the Creator, the more conformable it is to rational nature, the most perfect likeness of God's own Essence; and, consequently, the more beautiful it must be said to be. This consideration led Father Patavius, one of the sublimest intellects of his time, to define beauty simply "the conformity of an object with its ideal or prototype." "Beautiful," he says, "is that the perfection of which gives us pleasure because of its close conformity with its ideal or prototype." Though this definition is deficient in precision, it expresses a truth which leads us to the very fountain and ultimate cause of true beauty—the conformity of objects proximately with the divine ideas, and ultimately with the Divine Essence. The Divine Essence is the last and highest norm of beauty as of truth and goodness. It was the image and likeness of His Essence that God saw in His creatures when, contemplating them after the creation, He pronounced them to be good (*zald*). Hence St. Thomas says: "The beauty of the creature is nothing else than the likeness of divine beauty communicated to things." If we then discover a conformity with our rational nature in beautiful objects, and rest with pleasure in their intuition, it is because they bear the likeness of Him to whose "image and likeness" we have been moulded in creation as the most perfect expression of His Divine Essence.

From this conformity of beautiful objects with the Divine

¹ In *Dion.* cap. 4, lect. 5.

Essence we may determine the *scale of beauty*; the source and fountain of all beauty—substantive beauty without mixture of imperfection—is *God*, the incomprehensible Truth and Goodness. From Him emanates, as from its exemplar and efficient cause, all beauty in the material and spiritual, natural and supernatural order. Must not He Himself, then, possess in an infinite degree that beauty which He has so liberally communicated to His creatures? And as beauty is an unmixed perfection, which implies no imperfection, must not God possess it in its truest sense? As God is infinite truth and goodness, therefore, so He is unspeakable beauty—that only beauty which can fill every understanding, and satiate every will; and that not only for a brief instant, but for all eternity. In Him alone rational nature can find absolute and perpetual rest, never-ending enjoyment and consummate happiness.

“No man is so stupid,” says St. Gregory Nyssen, “as not to perceive as a self-evident truth, that the substantial, primordial, and only true *beauty*, splendor, and goodness is no other than God, the Lord of all things.” We might also largely quote Pagan philosophy in proof of this statement.

Equal to God in beauty as in substance is His *Only begotten Son*, the true “figure of His substance and splendor of His glory,” who, clothed with our humanity, was “fair above the children of men.” “Our Redeemer,” says Clement of Alexandria, “is so beautiful that He alone deserves to be loved by us who can love nothing but true beauty. He is the true beauty, for He is the light.” “The prophet calls the Redeemer glorious in His beauty,” says St. Basil, “considering His Godhead. It is not His external beauty that he celebrates, for we have seen Him, and there was no comeliness or beauty in Him. His exterior was without charms and unnoticeable before the children of men. It was manifestly by the divine love of the invisible glory that the prophet was charmed when he contemplated its splendor, when its rays were shed upon him and its beauty enraptured his soul. Whenever this beauty is revealed to the heart of man, it finds everything that it has hitherto loved ugly and contemptible. For did not the Apostle reckon everything as dirt to gain Christ after he had contemplated Him glorious in His beauty?”

Next to the Son of God in beauty stands that woman whom He had chosen before all ages to be *His mother*. She is the blessed among women, full of grace, the first fruit of creation, the mother of beauteous love, all fair without spot or stain. She who goeth forth like the rising dawn, fair as the moon and beautiful as the sun; the woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars; the great ideal to

whom all true artists have looked up for inspiration. Need we wonder that she has been for eighteen hundred years the constant and inexhaustible theme of song and the grandest object of painting, sculpture, and architecture? Where is the true master-poet, painter, or sculptor, who has not plied his genius to glorify her beauty?

Second to Mary, the mother of God, and Queen of Heaven, are those holy *Angels and Spirits* who have been admitted to the presence of God in His heavenly courts, and who are "like to Him because they see Him as He is."

If we turn from the mansions of glory, the heavenly Jerusalem, and descend to our own orb, there we find highest in beauty the *Church of Christ*, His mystical body, the perfect image of the heavenly Jerusalem, that city built on unshaken foundations on the holy mount, His immaculate spouse, whom He has "cleansed to Himself in the laver of water in the word of life, that He might present her to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot nor wrinkle nor any such thing, but that she might be holy and without blemish." Here we find all the elements of true beauty, unity, multiplicity, harmony, brightness, purity, spirituality, supernatural and divine life, etc., a heavenly beauty which consists not in, but is only symbolized by, marble structures and golden and silver vessels, and rich apparel, and sweet incense, and gorgeous ceremony.

In the beauty of the visible world, *man*, created to the image and likeness of God, doubtless occupies the first place. In him we distinguish two different species of beauty: the one exterior, common in kind with that of other animals, though of a much higher order; the other internal or spiritual, which, as we have shown, far transcends the former. The exterior beauty of man consists in form, stature, symmetry, complexion, life, activity, gracefulness, etc.; the interior, in his intellectual and moral endowments and accomplishments, especially in the supernatural array of the sanctified and virtuous soul. Both these species of beauty, as the whole composite nature of man, coalesce into one. Ordinarily speaking, the exterior of man, if taken in its entirety, gives a fair picture of the interior, intellectual and moral character. The Holy Ghost Himself gives testimony of this fact. "A glad heart maketh a cheerful countenance." "The heart of the wise man shall instruct his mouth and shall give grace to his lips." "The wisdom of man shineth in his countenance." "The attire of the body and the laughter of the teeth and the gait of the man show what he is." St. Clement of Alexandria on this point says: "Even the beauty of the body is nothing else but virtue, which is visible in the features, and pours out its grace upon them; it is nothing else than the loveliness of innocence, the goodness of the heart, which trans-

figures the face of man. No one doubts that the beauty of animals consists in that perfection which their nature requires. What makes man perfect is justice, wisdom, fortitude, and the fear of God. *Beautiful*, then, is the wise, the just, in short, the good man." These sublime qualities of the soul once manifested, and they cannot remain long concealed, will throw a halo of beauty over the most ordinary form that will far transcend any degree of outward charms; while a fair exterior cannot long cloak the hideousness of a corrupt heart, which, when once revealed, will only be the more disgusting from its contrast with the pleasing exterior form. Nothing creates a more implacable disgust than outward tinsel, especially when it makes pretensions to reality.

From this view of personal beauty it will be evident to the reader how grossly the majority of our novel writers err against good taste when, pandering to passion and vanity, they luxuriate in hair-splitting descriptions of the female form. The truest description of real beauty we have met, we believe, has been that traced by the genial pen of Cardinal Wiseman in his "*Fabiola*." The subject of the picture is the angelic figure of St. Agnes. "When Lyra turned to leave the room, she was almost startled at seeing, standing in bright relief before the deep crimson door-curtain, a figure which she immediately recognized, but which we must briefly describe. It was that of a lady, or rather a child, not more than twelve or thirteen years old, dressed in pure and spotless white, without a single ornament about her person. In her countenance might be seen united the simplicity of childhood with the intelligence of maturer age. There not merely dwelt in her eyes that dove-like innocence which the sacred poet describes, but often there beamed from them rather an intensity of pure affection, as though they were looking beyond all surrounding objects, and rested upon One, unseen by all else, but to her really present and exquisitely dear. Her forehead was the seat of candor, open and bright with undisguising truthfulness; a kindly smile played about her lips, and the fresh, youthful features varied their sensitive expression with guileless earnestness, passing rapidly from one feeling to the other as her warm and tender heart received it. Those who knew her believed that she never thought of herself, but was divided entirely between kindness to those about her and affection for her unseen love."

Tracing the image of the Creator in nature, we find three degrees of perfection, and consequently three grades of beauty. The highest of these is the animal kingdom, in which life, spontaneous locomotion, and sensation are added to material organism and vegetation. The second is the vegetable world, which is endowed with organic structure and the inferior functions of life, but bereft

of sense. The lowest in the line of beauty, as well as perfection, is brute nature or matter. We do not contend that in nature always the degree of beauty coincides with that of perfection; but that, other conditions being equal, the greater their perfection the greater their beauty, *i.e.*, if they possess in a prominent manner those attributes which render them conformable to rational nature, or more expressly bear the imprint of the likeness of the Creator. Anything that disturbs this conformity, or obscures this imprint, renders them less beautiful, however perfect they may otherwise be. This fact may be illustrated by comparing the horse and the lion with the elephant and the bear. Every one will pronounce the horse more beautiful than the elephant, and the lion more beautiful than the bear, not because one is more perfect than the other (for each is perfect in its own species), but because the one has those qualities which assimilate it to rational nature, the other lacks them. For this very reason many objects are standing symbols of certain mental and moral excellences or defects, according as they show forth a conformity or difformity with perfect rational nature. Thus the dove symbolizes simplicity; the lamb, innocence; the eagle, nobility of soul; the lion, magnanimity; the violet, modesty; the lily, purity; while, on the other hand, the peacock is the representation of vanity, the owl and the ape the symbols of intellectual and moral deformity. This symbolism may also be traced in the material world, as in gold, iron, fire, water, oil, salt; various figures, colors, and sounds. It is well known how extensively the Church in her liturgy makes use of these allegorical significations of objects and actions; and even Christ has availed Himself of this natural symbolism in His teaching and miracles, as well as in the institution of His sacraments. This symbolic meaning of things is by no means arbitrary or conventional, but is altogether based on the conformity or difformity of material or visible things with spiritual or rational nature, which is the foundation on which beauty and ugliness are based.

From what we have so far said the reader will perceive that we do not admit any *real*, but only a *logical distinction*, grounded in subject, however, *between beauty, truth, and goodness*. Beauty is nothing else than truth and goodness so presented to rational nature that it may discover in them a special conformity to itself, and thus rest upon them with a pleasure worthy of, and congenial to, a rational being. Hence truth, metaphysical, logical, and moral (where there is question of a historical fact), as well as goodness, physical and moral, form the necessary substratum of the beautiful; for rational nature, if acting rationally, must necessarily shrink from anything that lacks these fundamental attributes. Whence it follows that whatever is untrue, unreal, inconsistent, unsubstantial;

whatever is immoral in itself, in its adjuncts, or consequences, no matter how gorgeous, imposing, and attractive the garb may be in which it is clothed, cannot be called beautiful. It is only ignorance, prejudice, or passion that can attribute beauty to mere outward show without substance, or with a vicious substance.

If we now finally try to establish a *definition* of the beautiful, or of beauty, on the principles thus far established, we must say that *the beautiful is the true and the good so constituted as to bear a special conformity to rational nature, and thus afford congenial pleasure to the higher rational faculties.* The abstract quality of beauty may accordingly be defined: *The objective truth and goodness (or reality) of things so constituted as to render them in a special manner conformable to rational nature, and thus apt to afford congenial delight to the superior faculties of the rational contemplator.*

The patient reader, who has so far accompanied us in our investigation, may now ask: Is, then, everything beautiful? Shall we call the ape and the toad and the bat and the grasshopper and the rattlesnake and the crocodile, and the many species of noisome vermin that creep and swim on our globe, beautiful? All these have their objective reality, truth and goodness; are conformable as well with their prototypes as with rational nature, and may, consequently, according to our definition, claim to be beautiful. The same difficulty urges itself upon the young novice in metaphysics, when he is first surprised with the proposition: *omne ens est bonum.* The first thing he asks himself in blank amazement will be: "Is, then, Old Nick himself good? Are the mosquitoes *good?*" To this question we answer that everything, inasmuch as it has objective truth and goodness, has some real beauty, if we could only perceive in it all its bearings. Were we not restricted to the use of organic faculties in the perception of material objects, we would, undoubtedly, apprehend some beauty in all God's creatures proportioned to their objective reality, and reap a corresponding pleasure from their contemplation. God, when He created them, "saw that they were good," and was well pleased. Could we but see them in that same divine intellectual light, we would willingly, and without repugnance, indorse the judgment of the All-wise Creator, and say that they are good. The reason why we pronounce some things simply ugly is, that their conformity to our rational nature, though actually existing, is so obscured by seeming or real difformity, that it is feebly, if at all, brought home to our minds. The conformity of beautiful objects with our rational nature must be such that we can easily apprehend it without laboring to abstract it from numerous imperfections or difformities. If the difformity of an object with our rational nature, whether real or apparent, is preponderant or striking, so as to overcast its beauty, we call it

simply ugly, or not beautiful, no matter how much objective perfection it may conceal beneath its repulsive form. Another reason why we call many objects ugly, is the fact of their being disagreeable to sense. But disagreeableness is by no means incompatible with true beauty. The practice of virtue, or death for a noble cause, is naturally disagreeable to sense, though, doubtless, beautiful and sublime.

A further fact that seems to militate against our explanation of the beautiful is the natural aversion of most men to the contemplation of metaphysical or abstract truths. This fact, as we have already hinted, has its cause in our composite nature, and consequent imperfect manner of apprehension through the instrumentality of sense. Hence we contemplate abstract truths of the sublimest character without being in the least æsthetically affected; but let the magic pen of Dante, Shakespeare, or Milton, only touch them and clothe them in the imagery of poetry, and we rest upon them with unspeakable delight. And yet, if we ask ourselves what the poet has added to those truths, which seem to us to be "airy nothings," we find that it is only "a local habitation and a name"—a "habitation" but too narrow to contain their substance, and a "name" that expresses but half their meaning. The poet lends nothing to truth by his imagery, but only subtracts from it through his inability to give it full expression. His sole work is to bring truth home to us in a way that is more congenial to our imperfect nature, by a direct appeal to the senses and the passions. Truth itself eminently contains all the beauty and charms of poetry, as soon as it is brought to bear on a mind which, in its perfection, can dispense with the expedient of imagery. Hence all goodness and perfection are beautiful, and that in the same degree as they approach the infinite goodness and perfection.

As beauty consists in a conformity with rational nature, so *ugliness*, which is the contrary of beauty, consists in a difformity with the same. Ugliness may, therefore, be defined: *The imperfection of an object, so constituted as to exhibit a difformity with rational nature, and thus produce a disagreeable impression on the contemplating mind.* Ugly, then, is everything that is untrue, *i. e.*, inconsistent in its attributes, illogical, discordant with truth in theory or fact; ugly is everything that lacks the moral or physical perfection due to its nature. Besides, all those things that are connected with disagreeable associations, moral or intellectual; all those things that symbolize moral or mental depravity or imperfection, are, for the reasons stated above, termed ugly, though they may be objectively true and perfect in their species.

Akin to the ugly is the *comical or ridiculous*. Wherein this attribute properly consists has puzzled the greatest intellects to

determine. Cicero says that he is not ashamed to confess his ignorance on this point. Aristotle, however, maintains that the ridiculous consists in a certain imperfection or ugliness, but harmless and inoffensive. And, in fact, these elements will be found in everything that is truly comical. In every really laughable object, character or manifestation, an imperfection, incongruity, or oddity, must be forthcoming; but as soon as this defect becomes painful, hurtful, or offensive, in any degree, to the contemplator, the subject in which it resides, or a third party, it thereby ceases to be ridiculous. The comical or ridiculous, therefore, may be defined: *A deformity or inconsistency with right reason, so harmless and inoffensive, however, as not to produce any disagreeable impression on the mind of the contemplator.* The sensation that arises from the contemplation of the ridiculous is generated by its striking contrast with right reason, which shocks us without making us grieve. The nature of that pleasure which results from this sensation seems to be mainly, if not wholly, organic or sensitive; for it is not easy to perceive how the higher faculties could rest with any degree of pleasure on such objects as are strikingly repugnant to them. It is interesting to read St. Thomas on this question. "As bodily labor," he says, "brings on bodily fatigue, so mental labor produces fatigue of the animal faculties (*fatigatio animalis*). Now, as the fatigue of the body is dispelled by bodily repose, so this fatigue of the animal faculties is dispelled by repose of the soul. But the repose of the soul is pleasure. . . . Therefore a remedy must be applied against the fatigue of the animal faculties by means of some pleasure from the cessation of rational exertion." And after illustrating his principle by the trite example of the bow that's always bent, he concludes: "Such words and actions (indifferent, of course, as to morality) in which *only delight (repose) of the animal faculties is sought, are termed ridiculous or jocose.* And, therefore, it is necessary to indulge in them sometimes for the repose of the mind."¹

In these words the Angelic Doctor seems clearly to intimate that the pleasure derived from the ridiculous has its seat in the animal faculties, the nervous system; while the operations of the higher faculties are, as it were, suspended. He also assigns the object and limits of the ridiculous or comic. They serve, and should be indulged in, only as a necessary or expedient relaxation from more serious studies or pursuits. As soon as the comical exceeds those bounds, it ceases to be rational in its tendency, and leads to dissipation and frivolity.

There remains for us to say a few words on the *sublime*, which is wont to be considered in connection with the beautiful. From

¹ *Summa*, 2-2 ae., q. 168, a. 2.

our explanation of the beautiful it will be seen that it does not exclude the sublime, but rather includes it as a special kind. The sublime is the highest species of the beautiful. Those objects or phenomena are considered sublime which manifest in a special manner the greatness, power, infinity of the Creator, and thus fill the contemplating mind with admiration and awe. To this class of things belong, first of all, God Himself and His attributes; in the second place, extraordinary manifestations of moral and supernatural power in His rational creatures; and, lastly, the more powerful and striking phenomena of nature. The impression produced by the sublime is caused by the contrast of our own littleness and weakness with the infinite greatness and power of God, whether manifested directly, by immediate Divine interference, or indirectly, when communicated, and manifested in a higher degree in His creatures. This impression, however, is far from being always the sentiment of fear, as was the opinion of Edmund Burke. It is, as we have said, admiration, arrangement, awe, reverence, and even love, towards the Supreme Goodness, Greatness, and Omnipotence; while fear is always a sentiment that arises from the apprehension of impending evil. A sea storm is no less sublime to him who, from the shore, contemplates the mountains of water breaking upon the cliffs, than it is to him who is tossed upon the heaving bosom of the deep; though the latter is naturally affected with fear, while the former is perfectly secure from danger. All agree that the opening verses of Genesis are sublime; yet one's conscience must be ill at ease to read those words with fear and not with reverential awe of the great Creator of heaven and earth. So also the words of the beginning of the Gospel of St. John are justly considered sublime; but, far from affecting with fear, the sublime effusion of the Evangelist is eminently calculated to inspire the devout reader with confidence, gratitude, and love.

It might be further asked here, *whether evil can be called sublime*. Modern infidel æstheticians answer in the affirmative. Satan in Milton, Prometheus and other Titanic characters are, in their estimation, eminently sublime. Nay, some, as Schiller, go so far as to say that the highest degree of sublimity is despair and its too frequent attendant, suicide; while others, as Vischer and Krug, pronounce rebellion against God—blasphemy—the summit of sublimity. That such theories are propounded in the name of philosophy and good taste, and find credit in educated spheres, is a sad sign of the times. Need we wonder to meet so much morbid weariness of life even in the better circles of society? Need we be astonished to see suicides multiplying from day to day?

“Who then would bear the whips and scorns of time?”

Who should hesitate to sink into the highly æsthetic virtue of despair and then seek relief in the sublime tragedy of suicide? Who would not then become the disciple of the blustering blasphemer, Bob Ingersoll, the sublimest figure of them all?

From our definition of the sublime it may easily be seen that evil, as such, cannot fall within its compass. Evil is not strength, but weakness; creates not admiration and awe, but disgust and horror; it cannot, therefore, be considered beautiful. If a morally evil character have some sublime traits, great strength or mental penetration, these attributes become only the less sublime the more they are bent on evil. Thus they only manifest their weakness, and cease to claim our admiration, though they may awaken our compassion. The impression of the sublime, however, may be produced by such fiendish and blasphemous creations as Milton's Satan, not from any strength or greatness that is manifested in their blasphemy and malice, but by the contrast of their impotent rage and hatred with the infinite power and unchangeable happiness of the Almighty. But in despair and its offspring, suicide, no one who has learned to analyze the motives of the human heart can see anything but blank cowardice or insanity, the cloak in which they are generally shrouded from public infamy.

A well-known species of the sublime is the *tragic*. It consists, on the one hand, in the manifestations of extraordinary moral strength and resignation in bearing the scourges of adverse fate, or, rather, the deserved visitations and chastisements of Divine Providence, in bowing in submission under the all-powerful hand of God; on the other hand, in the justifications of Divine Providence, which avenges wrong with unswerving justice. Every tragic event is an illustration of the truth: Man proposes, God disposes; or, Revenge is Mine, and I will repay—truths which, if forcibly brought home to us, cannot fail to produce the impression of the sublime.

It would be a pleasant task to illustrate the sublime with examples from literature, sacred and profane; but, as we feel that this paper has already grown rather long, we resist the temptation and break off our considerations. Should our treatment of the beautiful seem little in keeping with the subject, we would ask the indulgent reader to remember that we had to deal with first principles of an abstruse nature, rendered doubly obscure by the airy speculations of undisciplined philosophy—principles which do not lie within the flowery field of the beautiful, but which, in our judgment, form the only unerring way to the region of true beauty. What with the wanton aberrations of human genius, the fundamental principles of æsthetics in their present state might be compared to the impenetrable thicket that surrounds Milton's "Paradise."

“ As one continued brake, the undergrowth
Of shrubs and tangled bushes had perplexed
All the path of man and beast that passed that way.”

But if the student has once threaded his way to the Orient gate,

“ Before him with new wonder now he views,
To all delight of human sight exposed
In narrow room, Nature's whole wealth, yea more,
A Heaven on earth.”

IN MEMORIAM.

CARDINAL MCCLOSKEY.

JUST as the present number of the REVIEW was about to be published, the sad announcement reaches us of the death of John, Cardinal McCloskey, Archbishop of New York, in the seventy-sixth year of his age.

Born in Brooklyn on the 10th of March, 1810, and called to his rest on the 10th of October, 1885, his long period of ministerial life and ecclesiastical dignity forms an important link between the early days of American Catholicity, then just emerging from its previous state of weakness and childhood, and her present condition of matured growth, robust health, and vigorous strength. In his boyhood he could not find in his native city a church wherein he could assist at the Holy Sacrifice, nor a priest at whose hands he could receive the Sacraments, but had to cross over the river, frequently with great inconvenience and some risk, to hear mass in one of New York's two churches, or enjoy the blessings of confession and Communion. God signally rewarded the fidelity with which the young Samuel and his fervent family, who had destined him for the ministry, maintained their faith and cherished its pious obligations in spite of all obstacles. The life of this holy child, as he grew up to man's estate and to venerable age, ran parallel with the prosperous growth of the American Church. Brooklyn has now within her precincts a bishop, with more than a hundred priests, and nearly as many churches and chapels; New York has replaced her two insignificant churches by an archiepiscopal see, two hundred priests, and over a hundred magnificent temples of the True Faith. If in his youth he knew and felt the trials and privations to which the Church amongst us was subjected, his last days were cheered by the splendor to which she had attained, adorned and honored by the ecclesiastical dignities which she had it in her power to confer.

His sacred studies, which were begun in the Seminary of Mount St. Mary's, that has given so many bishops to the American Church, and completed in Rome at a riper age, by a two years' course of theological study at the Gregorian University, commonly known as the Roman College, and by daily intercourse with the illustrious theologians of the Eternal City. If his proficiency in sacred science was not given generally the prominence it might well have commanded, we must attribute this rather to the prelate's

modesty and humility, that delighted to conceal gifts which, if allowed a chance to display themselves, would have secured the admiration of all. His natural powers and cultured mind were most clearly visible in his discourses, written or extemporized, in which he showed to the best advantage. The dignity and grace of manner, the quiet, gentle, but most persuasive style of oratory that carries conviction to every hearer, were peculiarly his, as all who had the good fortune to hear him can bear witness.

But all these gifts and endowments were as nothing compared to the beauty of his noble soul, which was the seat of all those virtues that render a man acceptable before God and dear to his fellow-men. If we had to mention only one trait of his character, we should select what perhaps was the most conspicuous, certainly the most edifying—the admirable blending in him of dignity, which repelled none, with a sweetness and charity that attracted all. The poet deemed these two things incompatible:

“Non bene conveniunt nec in una sede morantur
Majestas et amor,”

and perhaps with his heathen notions he could not well think otherwise. But in the soul of our deceased prelate, where Christian virtue had solid roots, they coexisted in wonderful union. In him were coupled the majesty of a prince, which inspired no fear, but exacted reverence of all, with the simplicity and amiableness of a child. So that we may justly style him, in the words of Holy Writ, “beloved of God and of man”—“*dilectus Deo et hominibus.*”

The watchful, provident eye of Rome could not long overlook the merits of the young ecclesiastic, whom it had first learned to know within the portals of the Holy City. He was gradually raised to her honors. He was first Bishop of Albany, then Coadjutor and subsequently Archbishop of New York, and finally Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, the next dignity to that of Vicar of Christ. All, Catholic and Protestant, applauded his exaltation; for all felt that in no worthier representative could the American Church receive honor at the hands of the Father of the Faithful. The meek way in which he bore his honors disarmed even prejudice itself; and the unanimity of the non-Catholic press in praising the record of his life and extolling his memory, is perhaps without precedent in our ecclesiastical annals.

He is gone, full of years and of merits; but his work lives after him, and his name will be a blessing to generations yet unborn. “ETERNAL REST GIVE UNTO HIM, O LORD, AND LET PERPETUAL LIGHT SHINE UPON HIM!”

BOOK NOTICES.

CHRIST AND CHRISTIANITY. Studies on Christology, Creeds and Confessions, Protestantism and Romanism, Reformation Principles, Sunday Observance, Religious Freedom and Christian Union. By *Philip Schaff*. New York: Scribner's Sons. 1885.

This is a strange and, in some respects, very interesting volume. Its title is a misnomer. It might just as well have been almost anything else. It is made up of essays, lectures, and discourses, read or delivered through a series of years, on different occasions and various topics connected with the religion of Christ. But, instead of being "studies," they would more truthfully be characterized as dreams, or essays designed to conceal the real position of Protestantism, and apologies for heresy and error.

Indeed, according to the notion which runs through every paper and essay of the volume, there is no such thing as heresy on the part of persons who profess and love Jesus Christ. No existing religious society or organization, according to the ruling idea of the author of these papers, has the true faith, that is, the Christian faith, in its entirety, yet each one, holding some Christian truth, or one-sided aspect of a divinely revealed truth, is entitled to call itself a church, and has a right to recognition as a member of the happy family of warring, jarring "Christian denominations."

This, according to the author, is a great advantage. For no one man, and no one Christian denomination, nor, indeed, all the various "churches" taken together, of any one age, have in their belief the whole truth of divine revelation. Each one, consequently, is defective, and to a greater or less extent erroneous. But "the church," being made up of the aggregate of all who profess to believe in and love the Lord Jesus Christ, never has possessed the Christian faith in its entirety, and consequently has never taught it, and never will until the consummation of all things. For "there is nothing perfect under the sun," and never will be till the end of time.

Each division of the "church," therefore, represents a "distinct type of one Christian religion." Each has "characteristic excellences and defects." Thus, "the Greek Church represents ancient Christianity in repose; the Roman Church, mediæval Christianity in conflict with liberal progress; Protestantism, modern Christianity in motion." The Protestantism "is subdivided into three main divisions, the Lutheran, the Anglican, and the Reformed. These are again subdivided into a large number of separate organizations, and to these must be added "several large and influential evangelical associations, as the Independents, the Methodists, the Baptists, which are offshoots of the Reformation of the sixteenth century, and especially of the Church of England since the Toleration Act of 1689."

All these different and differing "churches," each affirming what others deny, and each denying what others affirm, "are branches of Christendom." They "are the growth of history, and embody the results of centuries of intellectual and spiritual labor."

We pause here for a moment to direct attention to the significant phrase, "the growth of history!" These few words furnish the clue to

all the contradictory lucubrations of this volume. Following its author to the strict logical conclusion of his argument, every form and phase of religious opinion that has ever been broached is legitimate and good, because it was or is the outgrowth "of history," and embodied, however imperfectly, and however fragmentarily, some aspect or other "of Christian truth."

We pass this by, however, and return to our exhibit of the author's ideas. It is worth while to set forth a condensed statement of his expressed estimates of "the Greek Church" and of "the Latin Church," in one of his discourses, by way of contrast with his well-known anti-Catholic bigotry, and with his other declarations in this volume respecting the Catholic Church, on the one hand, and Protestantism on the other:

"The Greek Church," says the writer of this volume, "produced most of the ancient fathers, from the apostles (with an uncapitalized *A*) down to John of Damascus, and elaborated the œcumenical doctrines of the Holy Trinity, and the Incarnation, with a vast body of invaluable literature which must be studied, even to this day, in every school of theological learning. Hers are the apostolical fathers, the apologists, exegetes, divines, historians, and orators of the early church; hers a long line of martyrs and saints; in her language the apostles and evangelists wrote the inspired records of our religion; to her we owe nearly all the manuscripts of the Greek Testament and the Septuagint," etc. She is "stationary, immovable," but Dr. Schaff fails to tell us that she is so, so far as she is so, because she has sundered herself from the only true centre and ruling source of Christian life and progress, the Holy Roman See. Nor does he note the fact, that though seemingly "immovable," and actually petrified, yet there has been motion within her, as within an iceberg, or a mass of silex when exposed to changes of temperature, disintegrating into fragments. Thus we have the so-called "ancient Greek Church" severed and separated into independent antagonistic "communions" in Russia, and Greece, and Turkey, and subject to the dictation of the secular sovereigns of each of these countries, and even of the separate semi-Turkish and semi-independent countries of what until recently was known as "European Turkey." All this the writer of the papers comprised in this volume overlooks. He tells us that "the Eastern Church held fast to her traditions during the dark centuries of Saracen and Turkish oppression" (forgetting, strangely, the countless heresies she has fostered, and ignoring her present slavery to the secular powers of each country in which she exists), and that "she looks forward (of which there is not the slightest evidence) to a day of freedom and resurrection, which may God grant."

As for "the Latin Church," it gave us "the works of the great African father, Augustin, which inspired the thinking of schoolmen, mystics, and reformers, and the Latin Bible of Jerome, which, for many centuries, interpreted the Word of God to the Western nations. She saved Christianity and the Roman classics through the chaotic confusion of the migration of nations; she christianized and civilized, by her missionaries, the barbarian races, which overthrew the old Roman empire, and she built up a new and better society on the ruins of the old. She converted [to what? If to Christianity, then she was and is the true and sole Church of Christ] the Anglo-Saxons, the Franks, the Germans, the Scandinavians; she built the Gothic cathedrals, founded the mediæval universities, and educated such schoolmen as Anselm and Thomas Aquinas, and such mystics as Bernard and the author of the inimitable *Imitation of Christ*."

And this, be it remembered, amid the disorders and confusion of the so-called "dark ages."

But the writer has not yet reached his climax. "Even the Reformers of the sixteenth century," he adds, "are her children, baptized, confirmed, and ordained in her bosom, though she cast them out as heretics with terrible curses, as the Synagogue had cast out the apostles." It would have been the simple truth, had he added, as the *Apostles* denounced and cast out heretics in *their* day. She dates from that congregation to which St. Paul wrote his most important epistle. Why did not the writer add, from "that congregation" which St. Peter founded and ruled? He admits this in his Church History. "She stretches in unbroken succession through all ages and countries; she once ruled nearly the whole of Europe; and, though deprived of her former power in just punishment for its abuse (?), she still guides for weal or woe millions of consciences, and is full of zeal and energy for the maintenance and spread of her doctrine and discipline in all parts of the globe."

After all this, declared with proper rhetorical emphasis to "the Eighth General Conference of the Evangelical Alliance, held at Copenhagen, September 2d, 1884," and now republished, it would seem hard to understand how the speaker and author of the volume before us (a Protestant, speaking and writing for Protestants) could vindicate Protestantism satisfactorily to himself and his fellow Protestants. Yet he has done it to his own professed self-approval, and according to his statement, eliciting "enthusiastic" expressions of "cordial approval," "oral and written," from "the distinguished (Protestant) ministers and scholars before whom his discourse was delivered." Of Protestantism, he says:

"The *various* Protestant churches have the unspeakable advantage of evangelical freedom (!); of direct access to the fountain of God's grace; of unobstructed personal union and communion with Christ," etc. "The Reformation emancipated a large portion of Christendom from the yoke of human traditions and spiritual tyranny, made God's book the book of the people, secured the rights of nationality and private judgment in the sphere of religion, and gave a mighty impulse to every department of intellectual and moral activity. Protestantism pervades and directs the freest and strongest nations in both hemispheres; it carries the open Bible to all heathen lands; it is cultivating with untiring zeal every branch of sacred literature, and popularizes the results of scientific research for the benefit of the masses; it favors every legitimate progress in science, art, politics, and commerce; it promotes every enterprise of Christian philanthropy; and it is identified with the cause of civil and religious liberty throughout the world."

If this characterization of Christianity be correct, it effectually shuts out the recognition which Dr. Schaff accords to the Greek Church and the Roman Catholic Church as severally representing distinct and genuine types of Christianity. If the eulogium he has pronounced upon Protestantism be well founded, then his commendations, even with the qualifications he has made, of the Greek Church and "the Latin" have no foundation. Whatever they did in the past, they have no mission to-day. They are but obstacles in the way of the spread of Christian truth and Christian freedom, and of "the emancipation of their adherents from the yoke of human traditions and spiritual tyranny." If Protestantism alone gives "unobstructed personal union and communion with Christ," then the "Greek" and the "Latin" Churches are obstructions to that union and communion, and, as obstructions, should be torn down and destroyed. Yet Dr. Schaff professes to "look hopefully for a reunion of 'the three sections of Christendom,' and a feast

of reconciliation of the churches." A reunion and reconciliation of what? Of "spiritual tyranny" with "evangelical freedom," of "human traditions" with "the open Bible," of "direct access to the fountain of God's word and of God's grace" with "human traditions" and "obstructions to personal union and communion with Christ"!

How Dr. Schaff can look forward to such a monstrous combination, to a "reconciliation" of what it is impossible to reconcile, is hard to understand. And how could he hope for it, were it possible?

There is only one way in which this could become possible—if we may speak of an impossibility becoming possible—and that is by the utter sacrifice of truth and of true faith. Herod and Pilate became "friends." But it was because each of them, to gratify his pride and ambition, consented to crucify our Divine Lord. And much in the same way Dr. Schaff professes to "look hopefully for a reunion of Christendom." He professes to expect that one common belief among all who call themselves Christians will be brought about by an indiscriminate destruction of all antagonisms between truth and error, by an entire elimination, in fact, of all real, moral differences between them. Instead of "*one faith*," there will be a countless host of beliefs, and each belief will be as true as the others; that is, none of them will be entirely true. In other words, there will be no true belief and no real faith.

"Every church," according to Dr. Schaff, "has its 'characteristic excellences and also its characteristic defects.'" "Nor need one wonder at it; there is nothing perfect under the sun." "Every church has the right and duty to defend its own belief and practice, and everybody should belong to that denomination which he conscientiously prefers." "Denominationalism or Confessionalism has, no doubt, its evils and dangers, and is apt to breed narrowness, bigotry and uncharitableness. But the worst we can say of it is that, in the present state of Christendom, it is a *necessary* evil, and is overruled by God for the multiplication of regenerating and converting agencies."

"Denominationalism" and "Confessionalism" are the terms Dr. Schaff employs to designate the existence of countless sects and schisms, each maintaining a separate organization, and each professedly holding to its own declared creed over against all others. In one sense, the existence of "Denominationalism" is, indeed, a *necessary* evil. It is necessary as verifying the declaration of our Divine Lord that "false teachers" would arise, who would preach false Christs, and deceive, were it possible, "the very elect." But Christ also adds the warning, "follow ye *not* after them." It is "*necessary*," as Christ declared, "that it must *needs* be" that "scandals should arise." But *this necessity* does not diminish the force of the *woe* HE pronounced upon those through whom they might arise.

Dr. Schaff continues his double-faced apology for "Denominationalism," by declaring that "it is not the best state, but it is far better than a dead or tyrannical and monotonous uniformity." And yet the unity of the Church, which he styles "dead or tyrannical and monotonous uniformity," Christ prayed should ever exist and the Apostles enjoined those to whom they wrote never to depart from, and sects and schisms, which Dr. Schaff styles Denominations, the Apostles denounced as attempts to rend the Body of Christ.

Dr. Schaff's liberality, in recognizing various sects as Christian denominations, and heresies as only different "aspects" of the same truth, is so broad as to include Lutheranism, Calvinism, Arminianism, Socinianism, Arianism, and all their countless progeny of sects. But there is one religion for which he can find no room in his happy family

—that of "*Romanism*." "Protestantism," he says, "stands or falls with the Bible. Romanism stands or falls with the Papacy. . . . We must, therefore, maintain the true infallibility of God's Word against the pretended infallibility of the Vatican, which, like Phariseeism, obscures and paralyzes the Bible by human additions. A union with Popery is as impossible as a union of apostolic Christianity with the Jewish hierarchy which crucified the Saviour under the plea of orthodoxy and zeal for the ancestral religion."

THE HISTORY OF ST. MONICA. By *M. L'Abbé Bannard*, Vicar-General of Orleans. Translated from the French by Rev. Anthony Farley, St. Monica's Church, Jamaica, L. I. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co.

At first thought it seems very strange that the life of this great saint should have remained unwritten until our own times. A model Christian wife and mother, one whose heart was wrung with agony through long years by a faithless, licentious, brutal heathen husband and a sensual, erring, though affectionate son, as only a pure wife's and loving mother's heart could be wrung, yet her trust in God, her faith and patience, her fortitude and devotion never failed. Through them and her unceasing prayers she snatched both husband and son from sin, and, even in her own lifetime, was rewarded with the joy of witnessing the conversion of the one from the unbelief and vices of heathenism, and of the other from the blinding influence of pernicious errors, skepticism, intellectual pride and sensuality to the Christian faith. Living, as she did, in the same age with St. Athanasius, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Jerome, St. Gregory of Nazianzen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Basil, St. Ambrose, St. Damasus, St. Ephraim, St. Hilary of Poitiers, St. Martin of Tours, and a host of other holy saints, a catalogue of whose names, even, would crowd this page, it seems strange that more than a thousand years should have been allowed to elapse before her name was solemnly enrolled in the Church's Calendar of Saints, and altars arose in her honor in the Church's cathedrals. It was not because her name and virtues were forgotten, and her memory had passed away with her departure from earth. They had all been imperishably embalmed in the copious references made to her in the writings of her illustrious son, in sacred tradition and in the frequent encomiums passed upon her by other distinguished saints, doctors, and ecclesiastical writers. Deep love and veneration for St. Monica have ever existed in the hearts of the Church's faithful children: Yet, as we have already said, more than a thousand years elapsed between her death and canonization, and upwards of four hundred years more passed away before her Life was written.

But God's ways are not the ways of men, and the Church, guided and directed by Him, knows how to wait as well as how and when to act. As a wise master of a house she guards and preserves her treasures, not displaying or employing them indiscriminately, but bringing them forth and putting them to use at the proper times for so doing.

St. Monica's remains were destined to be left in the tomb prepared for her on the seashore at Ostia, marked by a small marble monument, for some centuries,—her name and memory cherished and venerated there and soon throughout the Christian world,—yet no public cultus was rendered to her. Then they were quietly transferred, from fear of desecration during the invasions of the Lombards to the Church of St. Andrea at Ostia, and buried beneath the altar in a deep vault whose existence was known only to the priests of the church. There they lay undisturbed for a still longer period of time, until the sore needs of subsequent ages should lead the Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, to search for and open the closed

tomb, place the sacred relics upon her altars, and assign to Monica her place in the ranks of the Saints.

This great work was reserved in the Providence of God for Pope Martin V. Nor is it now difficult to discover the reason why. Few Popes have suffered as did this Pontiff. True, his exaltation to the Holy See put an end to the great schism of the West. But he also beheld the painful scenes of the Council of Constance, which paved the way for the scandals of that of Basle. He saw Wycliff, and John Huss, and Jerome of Prague appearing, and the horrors of the Hussite war. Doubtless, too, from the height of St. Peter's throne, and with the luminous assistance of the Spirit of God, he perceived the evil days which, despite God and His Church, were coming upon the world through the apostasy miscalled the "Reformation," which was then rapidly approaching. It was at this critical time that, guided by one of those divine inspirations which are frequently communicated to Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church, Pope Martin V. ordered a search for the relics of St. Monica and their translation to Rome.

Miracles of the highest order accompanied and followed this translation. Simultaneously with the translation of her remains, Pope Martin V. issued the Bull of her canonization, April 27th, 1430. But another hundred years or more were destined to pass away before St. Monica had either church or chapel, though devotion to her was constantly increasing. Then, when Martin Luther had passed away, and his pernicious doctrines were threatening to defile and corrupt all Christendom, another seal, as it were, was added to the glorification of St. Monica by the erection of a grand basilica in her honor. Since then love and devotion to her have spread, deepened, intensified.

In all this the hand of God is evident. During the Middle Ages the sanctity of the marriage relation, and the reciprocal obligations of husbands and wives, of parents and children, were acknowledged, even though the obligations themselves were not always faithfully observed. But after Luther and Calvin and Henry VIII. had, each in his own way, sowed the seeds of heresy, schism, and lust, and Christian wives trembled for their husbands, and Christian mothers for their sons, thinking of the dangers that beset them, then God, in His Church, placed conspicuously before Christians the glorious memory and example of St. Monica, to increase their faith, strengthen their hope, and encourage them to be earnest, and constant, and believing in prayer.

In like manner we can trace the Providence of God in reserving for our own age a compiling of the Life of St. Monica distinct from, though not independent of or separate from, the Life of St. Augustine; for that were impossible. Heretofore her name and memory, her virtues and life have been chiefly associated with him. But even had he never attained the eminence he reached as one of the greatest Doctors of the Church and most glorious Saints, there would be lessons, highly significant, important, and salutary, for Christian wives and mothers to learn from St. Monica's life; lessons, too, especially suggestive and encouraging to them in our present age; lessons that come directly home to Christian wives of faithless husbands, and to Christian mothers of wayward sons; lessons of patience and suffering; of earnest, constant prayer; of abiding faith and hope, and tearful, tireless supplication to God; of trust in Him even in the darkest gloom, and of the power of a perfect Christian example and a mother's undying love.

All these lessons the volume before us sets forth in strong light. It is written in charming style, and cannot fail to interest and benefit all

who read its pages. Would that it might find its way into every family in our land.

PARADISE FOUND: The Cradle of the Human Race at the North Pole. A Study of the Prehistoric World. By *William F. Warren*, S.T.D., LL.D., President of Boston University, Member of the American Oriental Society, etc., etc., etc. With Original Illustrations. Boston; Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1885.

In his preface the author of this work anticipates and endeavors to guard against preconceptions which the title of his book might easily give rise to. He says: "The book is not the work of a dreamer. Neither has it proceeded from a love of learned paradox. Nor yet is it a cunningly devised fable, aimed at particular tendencies in current science, philosophy, or religion. It is a thoroughly serious and sincere attempt to present what is to the author's mind the true and final solution of one of the greatest and most fascinating of all problems connected with the history of mankind."

The author acknowledges that the suggestion that primitive Eden was at the Arctic Pole "seems at first sight the most incredible of all wild and wilful paradoxes." On the other hand he contends that "within the lifetime of our own generation the progress of geological study has relieved the hypothesis of a fatal antecedent improbability." He believes, too, that "many of the most striking" of his alleged proofs, both in the physical and anthropological domain, are precisely the latest of the conclusions of the most modern of all sciences.

The question of the location of Eden has, in his opinion, a high practical importance, and to the "believer in Revelation, or even in the most ancient and venerable Ethnic Traditions," his volume "will be found to possess uncommon interest." This opinion he supports with the following remarks, which, regarded as a statement of the direction in which Non-Catholic opinion has been and still is steadily moving, are certainly true:

"For many years the public mind has been schooled in a narrow naturalism, which in its world-view has as little room for the extraordinary as it has for the supernatural. Decade after decade the representatives of this teaching have been measuring the natural phenomena of every age and place by the petty measuring-rod of their own local and temporary experience. So long and so successfully have they dogmatized on the constancy of Nature's laws and the uniformity of Nature's forces that of late it has required no small degree of courage to enable an intelligent man to stand up in the face of his generation and avow his personal faith in the early existence of men of gigantic stature and of almost millenarian longevity. Especially have clergymen and Christian teachers and writers upon Biblical history been embarrassed by the popular incredulity on these subjects, and not infrequently by a consciousness that this incredulity was in some measure shared by themselves."

"To all such," the author believes, "and indeed to all the broader-minded among the naturalists themselves, a new philosophy of primeval history—a philosophy which for all the alleged extraordinary effects provides the adequate extraordinary causes—cannot fail to prove most welcome."

In this spirit the author sets himself to the performance of his self-assumed task. In his attempts to accomplish it he sweeps over a wide range of subjects and brings together and arranges under distinct heads an amount of antiquarian erudition, as well as of knowledge of the latest results of

modern scientific investigations, which makes his work highly interesting, apart from its immediate object. For the Darwinian school of thought, and the advocates of the theory that primitive man was a savage, he has nothing but contempt, declaring that in their mutual contradictions they have effectually refuted their own theories, and "have shattered their own party into an indefinite number of mutually antagonistic factions. . . . The modern Babel is worse than the ancient. To one surveying at the present time the different departments of science which relate to Man, it would seem as though in each the breakdown of the theory of primitive human brutishness were complete, though not yet publicly proclaimed and acknowledged."

Whatever may be thought of the author's theory, and whether any interest whatever be felt in the question he discusses and endeavors to solve, the book itself, from the style in which it is written and the materials for thought upon various subjects which it contains, is highly interesting.

THE WORKS OF ORESTES A. BROWNSON; Collected and Arranged by *Henry F. Brownson*. Vol. XVIII. Containing the Fourth Part of the Political Writings. Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, Publisher. 1885.

The political writings of Orestes A. Brownson are of great and permanent value. Even in those which contain his ideas when he was a rationalist groping in the dark, and with eyes shut to the clear light thrown by Divine Revelation upon social and political questions, there is an evident simplicity of purpose, a sincerity of intention, an earnestness of desire to discover and set forth truth, and truth only, conjoined with a clearness, directness, and power of argument which make those writings worthy of careful examination by those who desire to understand the principles on which human society and civil government are based, and the manner in which they influence the welfare of peoples according to their correct or incorrect application to the various interests and relations which human society comprehends.

That there are errors, some of them dangerous and pernicious, in some of these writings,—we mean particularly those which were put forth when Dr. Brownson was a rationalist,—is to be expected. But these errors are the result not of false logic but of the false premises upon which the author built his conclusions. And even these writings are valuable for the incisive, exhaustive criticisms and refutations they contain, of the sophistry and false reasoning of other writers on the same subjects which the writer exposes and refutes. But what Dr. Brownson wrote on political questions after he became a Catholic (such as are contained in the volume now before us) have a still higher value. They are lucid and acute logical discussions on the basis of Christian principles of various questions, which are inseparably connected with social economy, civil government, its institutions, its relations to the social, industrial, moral, and spiritual interests of mankind, the mutual comity of nations, and other questions of primary importance. For in them are found the results of long and careful reading and research and reflection by a mind naturally acute, penetrating, and severely logical, guided in its reasonings by the Christian faith.

The volume before us contains a part of these latter writings. The first two hundred and twenty pages of it are occupied by a treatise on "The American Republic, its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny." In this treatise Dr. Brownson first discusses, from the Christian point of view, the origin of good government, its basis, constitution, and devel-

opment. In the course of this discussion he successively examines the following theories. First, government "originates in the right of the father to govern his child;" second, "in convention, and is a social compact;" third, "in the people, who collectively taken are sovereign;" fourth, "government springs from the spontaneous development of nature;" fifth, "it derives its right from the immediate and express appointment of God;" sixth, "from God through the Pope, or visible head of the spiritual society;" seventh, "from God through the people;" and eighth, "from God through the natural law."

After this preliminary discussion Dr. Brownson proceeds to examine the origin of political power in the United States, the Constitution of the United States, the relation of the several States to the United States, the doctrine of secession, the reconstruction of the States that seceded from the Union, the chief political tendencies of the people of the United States and their destiny, political and religious.

Following this treatise the volume contains twenty articles on political topics of direct concern to our own country, or on questions growing out of events in Europe, and particularly those connected with the revolutionary movements in Europe during the last fifteen or twenty years. These articles are interesting and valuable, both as historical studies and also on account of the philosophic acuteness and logical precision with which the subjects treated are examined and commented on.

THE WAR OF ANTICHRIST WITH THE CHURCH AND CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION.

A Review of the Rise and Progress of Atheism: Its Extension through Voltaire; Its Use of Freemasonry and other Kindred Secret Societies for Anti-Christian War; The Union and the "Illuminism" of Masonry by Weishaupt; Its Progress under the Leaders of the First French Revolution, and under Nubius, Palmerston and Mazzini; the Control of its hidden "Inner Circle" over all Revolutionary Organizations; Its Influence over British Freemasonry; Its Attempts upon Ireland; Oaths, Signs and Passwords of the Three Degrees, etc. The Spoliation of the Propaganda. Lectures delivered in Edinburgh, in October, 1884, by *Monsignor George F. Dillon, D.D.*, Missionary-Apostolic, Sydney (Australia). Dublin: M. H. Gile & Son. 1885.

We hope the reader will not be deterred from perusing this book by the length of its title,—as long as an ordinary preface,—for it contains most valuable information, imparted in a very lively and attractive style, and on a subject, too, with which Catholics are not at all as well acquainted as they ought to be. This is due not so much to their unwillingness to inform themselves as to the lack of suitable books in English for them to derive the information from. To the many of them who are familiar with the French language most excellent works are within reach,—the three octavo volumes on *Secret Societies*, compiled and edited by the Jesuit Father Deschamps and M. Claudio Jannet, and the abridgment of this, in one duodecimo volume, by MM. Jannet and Louis d'Estampes. But to the great mass of readers these works must long remain an unexplored field, unless, indeed, some enterprising publisher be found, who will assure more than the usual generosity (?) of remuneration to a competent translator.

Under these circumstances Monsignor Dillon's work is a great boon, timely by all means, if not too late to save many from the ways of error and social and religious wreck. The work, too, is for the most part well done, there being but few blemishes, and these insignificant and unimportant. The very length of the title is a recommendation, for it shows at a glance the main divisions of the subject treated; a subject, than which there is none more important in the whole range of

modern history, which it is impossible to understand thoroughly with a deep knowledge of the workings of secret societies.

The pages under consideration contain, as indicated, the substance of two lectures delivered in Edinburgh a year ago. One of these lectures is given almost as it was spoken, and the other, that on secret societies, has been greatly expanded, for it now fills 164 large octavo pages. "It was not," the author tells us, "so much in the hope of directing Protestants from Freemasonry as in the desire to show to Catholics that all kinds of secret societies were as bad as, if not worse than, Freemasonry,—were, in fact, united with and under the rule of the worst form of Freemasonry,—that the lecturer essayed to speak at all upon the subject." If Protestants heed his warning, so much the better; but he thought it his duty to warn Catholics, and so, in order to make his warning reach a larger audience than he could gather in any lecture-hall, he determined to put his labors in their present form. We notice, here and there, indications of hasty preparation; but, in a new edition which we hope soon to see appear, and that, too, in a more convenient and cheaper form, these blemishes need not appear. Considering, however, that these lectures, notwithstanding the great subsequent expansion of one of them by the insertion of long quotations that were merely referred to in the delivery, are mere "casual discourses, not formal and exhaustive treatises on the subjects upon which they touch," they are admirably instructive productions. It is a great convenience that they are divided up into parts with separate headings for these subdivisions, and that copious notes have been added where they were necessary to illustrate the text. Thus a clear exposition is given of the whole matter treated. Far more ground is covered here than was gone over in his famous Dublin Catholic University lectures on Freemasonry by Professor James Burton Robertson, though he dealt far more exhaustively with as much of the subject as he undertook to elucidate; but his work is now, we believe, out of print, and many of his views and theories have become antiquated.

In his first lecture Monsignor Dillon, under the title, *The War of Anti-christ with the Church and Christian Civilization*, treats "the whole question of secret atheistic organization, its origin and nature, its history in the last century and this, and its unity of satanic purpose in a wonderful diversity of forms." Beginning with some general remarks on the Encyclical *Humanum Genus* and the present condition of secret societies, he proceeds to give an account of the rise of Atheism in Europe, of Voltaire, Freemasonry in its origin and development, in the "Union" and the "Illuminism" of Adam Weishaupt, the "Convent" of Wilhelmsbad, Cabalistic Masonry or Masonic Spiritism, the French Revolution, Napoleon and Freemasonry, its condition after his fall, the kindred secret societies in Europe, the Carbonari, the permanent instruction of the "Alta Vendita," the famous letter of Piccolo Tigre, the intellectual and war party in Masonry, Lord Palmerston as a Freemason ruler, the war of the intellectual party, the war party under Palmerston, the "International," the Nihilists, the "Black Hand," etc., Freemasonry in England, Fenianism, the sad ending of the Irish conspirators, the triumph of Irish faith, and, lastly, Catholic organization, including the Total Abstinence societies. Here is an unusually rich supply of food for reflection, and any reader can digest it at leisure.

Seeing the work contains so much that is good, it may seem to some that we are hypercritical in pointing out the few faults, or rather what we consider to be such. In our judgment, the translations from the French are entirely too literal; the value of the documents as evidence is neither enhanced nor preserved by putting them in indifferent or bad English.

Any one versed in two or three languages knows how often an idiom in one makes sheer nonsense when rendered, word for word, into another. Again, why not say Convention rather than "Convent" of Wilhelmsbad? for such the mischievous gathering was in the true sense of the word. It is misleading to say that Voltaire, "by position and education, should have been an excellent Catholic." On the contrary, it was his early Jansenist preceptor's training that spoiled him, bending his mind in a wrong direction, and blunting his moral sense, so much so that when he afterwards became a pupil of the Jesuits, all the professors in the college except one, an aged member of the Society, were soon convinced that he would develop into a dangerous character. Our author makes a slip in referring to the Bishop of Grenoble as Monseigneur Ségur; he should say Monseigneur Fava, who has written a most valuable pamphlet on "Freemasonry"; the celebrated blind prelate's productions are of a different character. But these things weigh only as a feather against the rich mine of gold in the book.

We have room only for a mere mention of the second lecture in this volume,—that on the spoliation of the Propaganda, which is equally excellent and interesting. He elucidates the state of the question, tells the history of the institution from its beginning, describes the urban college, the library and the printing office, the former resources and the work of the Propaganda, the persecution it has suffered, the present state of the case, and measures to meet the difficulty. "Every fact stated has been carefully authenticated," and the reader is made "fully acquainted with a great wrong done to one of the most beneficent Christian institutions in the world by the greed and anti-Christian hate of the Infidel Revolution."

FATHER HAND: Founder of All-Hallows Catholic College for the Foreign Missions. *The Story of a Great Servant of God.* By Rev. John MacDevitt, D.D., Professor of Introduction to Scripture, Ecclesiastical History, etc., All-Hallows College, Dublin. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1885.

All-Hallows College is the largest Foreign Missionary College in the world. Yet it was founded only about forty-two years ago by a priest who, as regards earthly resources, was one of the poorest of the poor, and in a country which, whatever its natural resources may be, is inhabited by a people who, though rich in faith, are poor as regards the wealth of this world, so that their very name is suggestive of extreme poverty and destitution.

These facts are surely significant in no slight degree. They prove that, in our times as in past times, the declaration of the Holy Ghost through St. Paul, that God continually exhibits to mankind a plain proof of the divine origin and continuance of His Church, in that He chooses "the weak things of this world" and those which the world regards as "mean" and "contemptible" to confound and overcome all its vainly imagined wisdom and might. They show, too, that the ardent zeal and self-sacrificing charity which characterized the Apostles and their immediate followers continue to-day in the Church of Christ and animate her faithful children as in days of old. Moreover, they prove that Ireland, the "isle of scholars" when all Europe was plunged in darkness, the "isle of saints" when faith was corrupt and zeal lukewarm and morals were lax in other countries, the "isle of martyrs" when elsewhere thousands became apostate to save their lives, their wealth, or their political or social positions, is still animated by the same spirit which won for her those glorious titles.

The story, therefore, of the founder of All-Hallows College in Ireland, an institution designed from its inception to send the message of salvation to all English-speaking peoples throughout the whole earth, cannot be too interesting in the highest degree to all who have any apprehension of the truth that the characteristic spirit of Christ's religion is that of self-sacrifice and divine charity, seeking to return good for evil and to bless especially those who are at enmity with us.

This is the story told in the volume before us, and well is it told by the learned and devout writer. It is the story of how a boy, discouraged by his father, though encouraged by his pious mother, struggled, despite poverty and seemingly insuperable difficulties, first to prepare himself for the sacred office of the priesthood; and how, when by dint of heroic perseverance the prospect of ecclesiastical distinction became bright before him, he turned his back upon it, and chose a life of poverty and self-denial instead. It is the story of how this poor, self-sacrificing priest, convinced that his design was approved of God, labored and strove, despite the seemingly prudential advice of almost all the then Bishops of Ireland, to give up what they regarded as an impracticable scheme, and they declining to support it, yet persevered with firm faith until his plans were crowned with success and those who at first opposed his undertaking become its warm supporters. It shows, too, what a faithful, devoted priest who labors in the spirit of his divine Lord and Master, and is willing to sacrifice himself entirely to the greater glory of God and the advancement of true religion, can accomplish in a very short time. For Father Hand, the founder of an institution which has sent and is still sending faithful, devoted missionaries of Christ into every country on earth in which English-speaking people are found, died in the thirty-ninth year of his age, in the eleventh of his sacred ministry, and after having presided over his Missionary College only four years.

But the interest of the volume before us even goes beyond all this. Incidentally yet clearly and strongly, it sometimes suggests, and sometimes graphically describes the condition of the Irish people, their previous history, the close relations existing between the Irish people still remaining in their native land and those who have migrated to other countries, and other kindred topics.

THE ART OF ORATORICAL COMPOSITION, BASED UPON THE PRECEPTS AND MODELS OF THE OLD MASTERS. By *Rev. Charles Coppens, S. J.*, Professor of St. Louis University. 1885. New York: The Cath. Pub. Society Co. London: Burns & Oates.

Great stress is necessarily laid in our schools, of every grade, upon perfection in oratorical composition. That art has always been understood to be, as Ennius called it, the *Flexanima omnium regina rerum*, and the precepts of the ancients have never been superseded as the soundest principles upon which to build a system of efficient training of mind and speech. The unbroken sway which the old classics have held in our higher schools is a proof of this, to which Leo XIII. has lately added the peculiar weight of his recommendation. If, therefore, there were no other reason than a recent tendency among us to drift away from these approved landmarks, we should heartily recommend the above work, founded on the teachings of the best among the old model orators and philosophers. It is a clear, didactic exposition, with such illustrations from modern sources as will make it practical under our circumstances.

But it is also a text-book, which is saying something apart from its

general merits, as teachers will understand. The multiplicity of branches which are necessarily taught in our higher schools makes it desirable that the texts confine themselves, as far as is possible, to giving a skeleton, as it were, of the science to be taught in a judicious exposition of its principles, with such examples as are essential, but without any unnecessary speculations, or even such explanations as should be left to the teacher or the inductive reasoning of the pupil; and it is expected that the different parts of a course will, at the end, if rightly combined, supply one another to a complete whole. We cannot enter into the details of certain excellences of this book, though the subject itself might warrant our speaking of it at length if the space here allowed it. But we call attention to the Second Book, "On the Invention of Thought." Blair considered it impossible to reduce this branch of the oratorical art to any satisfactory system of precepts, and hence passes it by. Our author, following the indications of the ancient models, succeeds admirably.

There is one feature we would take exception to, though it does not in any perceptible way impair the usefulness of the book. We mean the apologetic tone which its author occasionally adopts throughout his work. Such expressions as, "if any one be inclined to find fault with us," etc. (page 52); "it is not here intended to write a treatise," etc. (page 194); "the precepts of this book are written for pupils," etc. (page 203), should, in our opinion, be avoided in a book which is intended as an authority for the young. Least of all has Father Coppens reason to guard himself against distrust, for he amply proves his strength by the grasp he has of the masters in his profession.

But these are trifles in comparison to what the book is as a real help to one of the most fruitful branches in our educational curriculum. For Seminaries, we find here the entire course from preparatory school to the class of sacred eloquence in theology. We understand, moreover, that the practical usefulness of the work has been tested in several of the Jesuit colleges before it appeared in print. This, together with the long experience of its author, is an additional guarantee of its merits.

THE PROTESTANT FAITH: or, Salvation by Belief. An Essay Upon the Errors of the Protestant Church. By *Dwight Hinkley Olmstead*. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1885.

If any evidence were wanting of the rapidity with which the Non-Catholic world is falling into utter disbelief, Protestantism leading the way, this book would furnish a striking proof of it. Nor does the force of this evidence by any means depend on the writer's personal position in the estimation of the Non-Catholic public. His essay was read substantially in its present form before the Young Men's Christian Union of New York in 1856, and afterwards, on two other occasions, in 1860. In 1874 it was published, and now it is republished. It is written avowedly for the purpose of proving that human opinion, which the writer confounds with faith, is involuntary, and consequently is neither meritorious nor the reverse, and that it matters not what an individual believes or disbelieves. Yet at the same time, with strange inconsistency, he expresses "the hope that his book will be of service to persons whose minds are disquieted by modern doubts." But why doubts should disquiet or can disquiet if an individual has no control over "his beliefs and opinions," it is not easy to understand.

In the author's exhibition of what the Protestant Faith is funda-

mentally, he naturally first refers to the "Reformation." It is interesting here to note how completely he sweeps away in a few sentences the current delusion and misrepresentation that Protestantism is a restoration of "primitive Christianity." He says boldly and unqualifiedly that the conflict between the Church and Protestantism was "a conflict between the authority of Councils and the individual judgment." According to his avowed opinion, "the Lutheran Reformation was an intellectual rather than a religious movement. From it nothing has been gained directly for religion; nothing except what has resulted from independence of thought, free speech, and the present heterogeneous character of the Christian world, for even this last is progress. . . ." "That the occasion and essential feature of the Reformation was an assertion of the right, or rather the recognition of the necessity of private judgment and interpretation, as opposed to the authority and dictation of the Church, it will not be difficult to show from the writings and disputations of Luther himself."

The statements of the writer are unquestionably true, but he uses them as starting-points from which to go down into deeper depths of error. It is not worth while to follow him in his argument. Suffice it to say that the conclusion he reaches is that "the performance of duty consists in neither believing nor disbelieving, but in being true to one's self, in a continual advancement towards the highest ideal," which simply means in the end worship of self.

OUR OWN WILL, AND HOW TO DETECT IT IN OUR ACTIONS: Or Instructions Intended for Religious, Applicable also to all who Aim at the Perfect Life. By the Rev. J. Allen, D.D., Chaplain of the Dominican Convents of the Sacred Heart in King Williamstown and East London, South Africa. With a Preface by Right Rev. J. D. Richards, D.D., Bishop of Retimo and Vicar Apostolic of the Eastern Vicariate of the Cape Colony. New York, Cincinnati, St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1885.

This little work, as its title-page says, is chiefly intended for Religious. At the same time all who desire to make progress in the spiritual life can read it with great profit. It is full of plain and practical lessons applicable to the every-day life of all who are in earnest in the service of God.

The author has had long and large experience in the direction of Religious and has evidently studied the subject he treats, closely and profoundly. Like a skilful physician he carefully diagnosticates the symptoms of the disease he seeks to cure and applies the remedies required for its eradication. As he tells us in his preface, he does not enter into the questions regarding grace that are freely disputed over by theologians, his sole desire being to help those who are striving for perfection to avoid and overcome the difficulties which arise from natural faults and weaknesses.

The number of books that have been written on the state of perfection and how to attain it is very great. Yet comparatively few of them are well-suited in all respects to English-speaking readers. Most of them are translations from different European languages. Of necessity, therefore, even their translations retain the coloring of the peculiar characteristic ideas and modes of thought of the peoples for whom they were primarily intended, and consequently are to a certain extent foreign to and diverse from those of English-speaking countries. Their style, also, is often too involved and too exalted, and, it may be, too polished and refined. The work before us is free from these defects. It is plain, simple, direct, and practical, and well calculated, as we have already

said, to benefit the laity who peruse its pages, by pointing out the secret workings of self-will in their daily lives and showing them how to bring their wills into accordance with the holy will of God, as well as to guide Religious in their efforts to attain perfection.

A LITERARY AND BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY, OR BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH CATHOLICS. From the Breach with Rome in 1534 to the Present Time. By *Joseph Gillow*. Vol. I. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Catholic Publication Society Company.

The volume before us is the first of a projected series of five in which he intends to complete the work he has undertaken. His purpose is to present, in the most ready and convenient form for reference, a record of the literary efforts, the educational struggles, and the sufferings for religion's sake of the Catholics in England from Henry VIII.'s breach with Rome, and the beginning of the consequent English schism, down to the present time.

Since the publication, in 1737, 1739, and 1742, of the three volumes of Catholic biographical history known as Dodd's Church history, which is only brought down to 1688, no successful attempt has been made to publish a complete collection of biographies of eminent English Catholics. Yet during the intervening period an immense amount of valuable material has been collected, and many valuable works, restricted to particular periods of the interval, or particular classes of persons or places, have appeared.

The scope of a Biographical Dictionary, comprehending notices of so large a number of persons, necessarily admits of only abridged and condensed accounts of their lives. Yet the work before us proceeds on the plan of giving the most interesting and important details tending to exhibit the characters and actions of the individuals mentioned. The writer states in his preface that nearly every Catholic family in England will be mentioned, and that he will endeavor to "elucidate family history as much as the circumscribed character of the work will permit." To English Catholics and those in other countries of English Catholic descent the work will have a special interest in the genealogical information it contains. Antiquarians, too, will find in it much that will repay perusal. Apart from all this, however, the work is an important aid to the student of general English history, and valuable, also, for reference.

MOVEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN BRITAIN DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. ST. GILES'S LECTURES. By *John Tulloch*, S.T.D., Senior Principal in the University of St. Andrews. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1885.

This volume consists of eight lectures, in which the author undertakes to describe the chief movements of religious thought in England and Scotland during the first sixty years of the present century. He classifies these movements as follows: "Coleridge and His School;" "The Early Oriel School and Its Congeners;" "The Oxford or Anglo-Catholic Movement;" "Movement of Religious Thought in Scotland;" "Thomas Carlyle as a Religious Teacher;" "John Stuart Mill and His School;" "Broad Church: F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley;" "Broad Church (continued): F. W. Robertson and Bishop Ewing."

The subjects thus enumerated are treated in a historical rather than a critical manner. The author, it is true, attempts to show the relation of each movement and the leading ideas of the chief personages in each movement, with reference to the general religious thought of England and Scotland. But he is deficient in philosophical acumen, and, moreover, is un-

consciously influenced by his own rationalistic turn of mind which brings him into close contact and sympathy with Liberalism and Broad Churchism. He labors in his account of the "Oxford Movement" to do full justice to Newman. Yet such remarks as the following show how entirely unable he is to appreciate him: "With all the *apparent* frankness of the *Apologia*, . . . the full history of Newman's religious opinions will only be known when we know more of the steps of his transition from Evangelicalism to High Churchism, and how far he took Liberalism on his way;" and, "It would be far too long to discuss it [Newman's *Grammar of Assent*] here. I have elsewhere examined it, and found it at the root—as I think all who probe it critically will find it—to be only a process of make-belief."

The subjects which the author treats are interesting, but his treatment of them is confused and superficial.

MEDITATIONS ON THE MYSTERIES OF THE HOLY ROSARY. From the French of Father Monsabré, O.P., by *Very Rev. Stephen Byrne, O.P.* New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company. 1885.

The two names appearing on the title-page of this little volume are so well and favorably known, the one throughout the Universal Church, and the other to all American and Irish Catholics, that they, of themselves, should be recommendation enough of the book. It is unnecessary to say that a work from the pen of the greatest of living French preachers is well written. The translation, too, is both faithful and elegant.

We have not here, however, all of Father Monsabré's work on the *Holy Rosary*, which, in the original, has gone through twelve editions. He has published seven series of *Meditations*, only three of which are given at present to English readers. We hope the present venture will meet with enough success to insure the early translation and publication here of the remainder.

In the first two series of *Meditations* given here, entitled *Jesus in the Rosary*, and *Mary in the Rosary*, the eyes of the soul are opened to the contemplation of Jesus and Mary in the joyful, sorrowful and glorious phases of their blessed lives, while in the third series are gathered the fruits of each Mystery of the Rosary. Attached at the end of the little volume is a magnificent document relating to the Rosary, the Encyclical of our present Sovereign Pontiff, Leo XIII., given on the 1st of September, 1883, along with his other letters to the same effect. The publication of these, rightly remarks the translator, "may be said to constitute a new epoch in the history of this devotion."

SISTER SAINT PIERRE AND THE WORK OF REPARATION. A Brief History, by the *Very Rev. P. Janvier*, Director of the Priests of the Holy Face at Tours. Translated by *Miss Mary Hoffmann*. With a Preface, by the *Right Rev. Mgr. T. S. Preston, V.G., LL.D.* Published for the Benefit of the Discalced Carmelites of New Orleans. With an Appendix of Prayers and Devotions for the Confraternity of the Holy Face. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company. 1885.

This work, as its title indicates, is a translation of the brief *Life of Sister Saint-Pierre*, which was published by the Rev. Father Janvier at Tours, in 1882, with the approbation of his Archbishop. It has the *imprimatur* of the Archbishop of Tours, and the translation is approved by the Archbishops of Baltimore and New Orleans, and by other Prelates. It gives the principal facts in the life of the saintly Carmelite,

and it cannot fail, we think, to be read by pious Catholics with profit and edification.

The Confraternity of the Holy Face (to promote the growth and extension of which is one of the objects of this volume) was established at St. Dizier in 1847, and at Tours in 1876. It has been enriched by indulgences granted by Pius IX., of blessed memory, and Leo XIII., gloriously reigning. With this high sanction, the Confraternity has also been introduced and established in the United States.

Its chief objects are, first, to repair the outrages committed against the Divine Majesty of God by blasphemies, the profanation of Sunday, and the feasts of the Church; second, to obtain the conversion and salvation of blasphemers and profaners; third, to preserve youth and the family from the fatal effects of these scandals.

To obtain this threefold end, the Confraternity proposes to render a special *cultus* of prayer, adoration and love to the most Holy Face of our Divine Lord, outraged and disfigured in His Passion. The Confraternity is placed under the patronage of St. Michael and St. Louis. It takes for its models the Immaculate Virgin Mary, the Apostle St. Peter, and the pious Veronica. Trinity Sunday is its principal feast; the second one is that of the Holy Name of Jesus; and for particular those of the Saints above mentioned.

The latter part of the volume consists of a number of appendices which contain the rules of the Confraternity, and also a number of devotions admirably calculated to promote its special objects.

TRIBUTES OF PROTESTANT WRITERS TO THE TRUTH AND BEAUTY OF CATHOLICITY. By *James J. Treacy*, Editor of "Catholic Flowers from Protestant Gardens," etc. New York: F. Pustet & Co.

It is surprising what a wealth of unwilling testimony the editor of this beautiful little volume has collected in these four hundred 12mo pages. Veritable Balaams he makes out of some of the most illustrious men in the whole wide range of modern literature. An admirable conception was this, of showing at a glance what a large share of praise, often grudgingly given, the Church has extorted from her enemies. Nearly all the extracts which Mr. Treacy has made are short, but all are directly to the point. The volume is characterized by great variety, both as to the author and subject; here, indeed, it seems to us, the compiler has exercised the soundest judgment as well as the keenest critical acumen, for he could easily fill such a volume alone with articles on the same subject by various Protestant writers, or on a variety of subjects by the same author. But, in the work which he here presents to the public, there are not two extracts on the same topic; and, for the sixty-four subjects treated, he gives us specimens of the best efforts of forty-nine writers, nearly all of them preëminent masters of style. Among them we find Lord Brougham, Edmund Burke, Carlyle, Cobbett, E. A. Freeman, James Anthony Froude, Grotius, Guizot, Laing, Lecky, Leibniz, Longfellow, Macaulay, Mackintosh, Maitland, Mallock, Prescott, Robertson, Ruskin, Smiles, and others of hardly less note. It is impossible to read this book without deriving great profit from the perusal.

We have been greatly pleased to notice, by an announcement in the public press, that it has received the highest recognition of Papal approval, and its editor the special blessing of the Holy Father, along with a material as well as the spiritual favor from the same source.

THE LIFE OF JEAN JACQUES OLIER, Founder of the Seminary of St. Sulpice: By *Edward Healy Thompson, M.A.* New and Enlarged Edition. London: Burns & Oates. 1885.

None of the great French ecclesiastical reformers has been so fortunate in his biographer as was M. Olier in the late M. Faillon, who, however, as his English adopter, Mr. Thompson, remarks in the preface of the volume under consideration, "enjoyed one inestimable advantage, as compared with M. Olier's previous biographers, in having access to the *Memoirs* which the servant of God composed in obedience to his director, the Père Bataille; a task which he performed with all the simplicity and sincerity of a child." By the aid of these *Memoirs*, M. Faillon was enabled, just before his death, to make great improvement on the earlier editions of his work, which, by this means, has become a masterpiece. Unfortunately, its author did not live to see it published in its perfect form, in 1873, as he died shortly after he had completed the preparation for the press of its last pages. To almost exactly the same extent is the present edition of Mr. Thompson's biography, which is grounded almost entirely, as we have said, on the great work of the Abbé Faillon, now consisting of three volumes, an improvement on that by the same well-known writer with which English readers have heretofore been acquainted. Every sentence in these six hundred pages is worth careful perusal, and the whole narrative is a deeply engrossing episode of a most important period in Church history. We obtain here a clear idea of the evils of the time, the corruption of morals following in the wake of heresy and war, the obstacles to reform, and the heroic efforts with which it was at last effected. That was the age of St. Vincent de Paul, Cardinal de Berulle, Father de Condren, Father Bernard, called "the Poor Priest," the Abbé Bourdoise, and others scarcely less eminent. But, notwithstanding the immense labors of these Apostles, there were more than enough abuses left for the Abbé Olier to correct, and right nobly he performed the great and holy task set him by Divine Providence. How much one man, who earnestly sets himself to his task, and yet dies at the comparatively early age of forty-nine years, can do, may be learned, and with pleasure, by the perusal of the work here under notice. It tells not only how the Seminary of St. Sulpice at Paris, the fruitful mother of many a worthy offspring both in the old and in the new world, came into being and grew to maturity, but also how the Faubourg St. Germain of Paris was changed, by the exertions of one man, from one of the most immoral and disorderly places to a parish of model conduct and exemplary piety. Some other important events are incidentally narrated here, such as the story of Jansenism in the first period of its crooked career. But most directly interesting to Americans is the account of the foundation of the colony and Seminary at Montreal.

LECTURES DELIVERED AT A SPIRITUAL RETREAT. Edited by a Member of the Order of Mercy, Authoress of the Life of Catherine McAuley, Life of St. Alphonsus, etc., etc. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. London: Burns & Oates. 1885.

These lectures, as we learn from the preface, were written out from memory many years ago by a Sister of a convent in the South of Ireland, immediately after their delivery by a holy secular priest who spoke without notes or memoranda. Copies of them have been so frequently asked for from time to time that, acting on the advice of the late Archbishop of New Orleans and after having them carefully examined by a learned ecclesiastic, they are now published under the *Imprimatur* of His Eminence, the late Cardinal McCloskey.

NATURE AND THOUGHT. An Introduction to a Natural Philosophy. By *St. George Mivart*. Second Edition. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co. 1885.

This book is intended to clear up some of the confusion that has gathered around the discussion of those deeper problems which underlie all science, and to establish a basis for a Natural Philosophy on the ground of the concord of the world of Nature with the world of Thought.

It deals chiefly with the problem of certainty, and refutes satisfactorily many of the sophisms of the skeptical philosophy of the age.

After an introductory chapter, in which the writer briefly reviews the different opinions entertained about the origin of ideas and the basis of human knowledge, the main subject of the book is discussed under the following questions:

1. "Can we have absolute certainty about anything, and if so, what is the criterion, and what are the grounds and motives of all certainty?"
2. "Can we have a certain knowledge of an external world existing independently of ourselves such as physical science postulates?"
3. "Can we know universal and necessary truths, and if so, what is the bearing of such knowledge on the questions of man's nature and origin?"
4. "Can we learn the purpose of human life and attain to such a knowledge of a First Cause as may reconcile the existence of Nature, as we see it, with the declarations of Conscience?"

THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT REV. JOHN ENGLAND, Bishop of Charleston, S. C. With Memoir, Memorials, Notes, and Full Index. By *Hugh P. McElrone*. In two Volumes. Vol. II. Baltimore: The Baltimore Publishing Company. 1884.

This second volume of this selection from the works of the late Bishop England is made up of addresses and papers written by him on Infallibility, Intention, Penance, Celibacy, Liberalism and Liberality, Calumnies on Catholics, Dispensation, The Bulls of the Crusades, Transubstantiation, American Catholicity, The Papacy and Feudalism, True Basis of Republicanism, and the Republic in Danger. Nearly all of them are controversial in form, as are indeed the greatest part of Bishop England's writings, owing to the times in which he lived and the circumstances in which he was placed. As such they throw a clear light upon those times, their occurrences and characteristic spirit. But apart from this, they have a high value in the clearness and ability with which the truths relating to the subjects treated are set forth.

The title chosen by the compiler of these volumes, "Works of the Right Rev. John England," etc., is delusive. For these volumes do not by any means contain all his works. Nor do they furnish a just or adequate idea of his personal character, the extent of his labors, or his ability as a writer and theologian.

ELEMENTS OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. A Text-book for High Schools and Academies. By *Elroy M. Avery, Ph.D.*, Author of a Series of Physical Science Text-books. Illustrated by more than 400 Wood Engravings. Sheldon & Company, New York and Chicago.

This is a very well arranged text-book. The definitions and explanations are clear and concise; the illustrations are well executed and distinct, and an unusual number of practical problems are given to test the knowledge of the pupil. The chapters upon the subjects of magnetism and electricity are particularly full and detailed.

ALETHEIA; OR, THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH ON THE ALL-IMPORTANT QUESTION OF DIVINE AUTHORITATIVE TEACHING. An Exposition of the Catholic Rule of Faith, Contrasted with the Various Theories of Private and Fallible Interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures. With a Full Explanation of the Whole Question of Infallibility, and Application of the Principles to the Development of Christian Doctrine according to the Needs of the Times. By the *Right Rev. J. D. Ricords, D.D.*, Bishop of Retimo, and Vicar Apostolic of the Eastern Vicariate of the Cape Colony. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. London: R. Washburne. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1885.

The copious title of this work, which we have copied, states so fully its scope and purpose that further explanation seems needless.

It seems somewhat strange that of the works recently published to combat the leading errors of our times, two of the very best as regards the form in which the arguments are put, the most readable and best adapted for popular use, come from South Africa, a region which, it might be supposed, is far removed from the general current of the world's thought. Yet this is the case. One of these books is comprised in the volume before us. The other, from the pen of the same author,—"Catholic Christianity and Modern Unbelief,"—we noticed in a previous number of the REVIEW.

The writer carefully avoids all display of scholastic learning and theology. He adapts himself, as far as possible, to the prevailing tastes as regards style and the methods of thought of our times. His statements of truths are clear, brief, and terse, intermingled with illustrations that may amuse while they also instruct, and genial anecdotes, incisive exposures of fallacies, and vigorous direct reasoning from acknowledged principles. His work is emphatically a work for the times, and we hope it will have a wide circulation.

MARY IN THE GOSPELS; OR, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF OUR BLESSED LADY AS RECORDED BY THE EVANGELISTS. By *Very Rev. J. Spencer Northcote, D.D.*, Provost of Birmingham. Second Edition. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company. 1885.

Father Northcote's little work is so well known, and its merits are so fully acknowledged, that an extended notice of it is needless. It confines itself to but one part, and that a small but very important part, of Mary's history—the notices of her in the Gospels. Examining these one by one, he clearly shows that the fewness and brevity of the references made to her by the Evangelists and the seeming indifference to her of her Divine Son on several occasions are not only inconsistent with her exalted position and dignity; they bear a like relation to her and her exaltation, which the humiliation and passion of our Lord bear to His glorification.

WOMEN OF CATHOLICITY: Memoirs of Margaret O'Carroll, Isabella of Castile, Margaret Roper, Marie de L'Incarnation, Marguerite Bourgeoys, Ethan Allen's Daughter. By *Anna T. Sadlier*, Author of "Names that Live in Catholic Hearts," etc., etc. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1885.

Although published under a different title from that of "Names that Live in Catholic Hearts," this work forms a second volume of Miss Anna T. Sadlier's series of Catholic biographies. The persons whose lives and characters are sketched in it have been judiciously chosen. They were, each of them, in their respective spheres valiant women, and their names will live as long as the qualities which constitute goodness and

greatness are admired. A study of their lives, too, reveals the fact that while they were richly endowed with rare natural gifts, yet that the secret of their preëminence was something beyond and above these natural gifts; that it was a supernatural element, divine grace ennobling and purifying all they did and said, which raises them far above all mere human eminence. This, as the admirable mother of the author says in her preface, is the "golden thread" that runs through the lives of all the biographical sketches contained in this volume, and distinguishes them from other women renowned in history.

Miss Sadlier unites in these sketches a careful study of her subjects and strict adherence to historic truth with an animated and attractive style. These qualities make her writings both interesting and instructive.

OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. Dictated Portions of the Lectures of *Hermann Lotze*. Translated and edited by *George T. Ladd*, Professor of Philosophy in Yale College. Boston: Ginn, Heath & Co. 1885.

No good purpose is to be served by the publication of such a book as this. While professing to inculcate belief in God, the chief aim of the author seems to be to discredit the scholastic proofs of the existence of the Supreme Being and in favor of revealed religion. The natural and philosophical religion which he teaches is scarcely even Deism. Nor is it worth while for orthodox Christians to go to this volume for objections; they will find them set forth much more clearly in their own books, with the advantage of having the answers appended. It is well that his style is so obscure and his expression of ideas so vague that few will have the patience to read him very far. Better it were had not this stuff been translated; nay, even, had it been left in the note-books of the unfortunate students who had to take down from the lecturer's dictation.

THE BLOOD COVENANT; A PRIMITIVE RITE AND ITS BEARINGS ON SCRIPTURE. By *H. Clay Trumbull, D.D.*, author of "*Kadesh Barnea*." New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1885.

The writer of this book is a great reader, but a very small thinker. He has made a collection of facts from the customs of the Jews, of barbarous Asiatic, African and American tribes, respecting their notions, customs, etc., as regards blood, but, as for any intellectual or moral purpose his volume subserves, we are entirely at a loss to understand.

THE CATHOLIC HOME ALMANAC FOR 1886. New York, Cincinnati and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers.

The third yearly issue of this publication is before us, and, from a cursory inspection of its contents and workmanship, we think it deserves even warmer praise than the two former issues previously received. Got up in convenient form, it contains an enormous amount of matter for the mere trifle that it costs. It is also profusely illustrated, and the cuts are nearly all excellent. Besides the usual calendar and the astronomical calculations for next year, we find in it some fine poetry and bits of prose fiction, with which biographical and historical sketches are judiciously mingled. At the end is a summary of the important events in American Church History, occurring between July, 1884, and July, 1885.

PRACTICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE SUFFERINGS OF OUR LORD; OR, LESSONS OF THE PASSION. From the French of Cardinal de la Luzerne. By *Very Rev. S. Byrne, O.P.* Boston, Mass.: Thomas B. Noonan & Co. 1885.

These reflections are not a superfluous addition to the large amount of what has been already written on the Sacred Passion of our Divine Redeemer. Cardinal de la Luzerne was one of the most solid and practical thinkers of modern times, and the volume before us possesses these characteristics. The meditations and reflections it contains will be of great profit to all who read them devoutly.

A TROUBLED HEART, AND HOW IT WAS COMFORTED AT LAST. Notre Dame, Ind.: Joseph P. Lyons. 1885.

This is a narrative, originally published in the *Ave Maria*, of the struggles and experiences, long and severe, of one who passed through different phases of Protestantism and Rationalism, and finally found peace in the true faith and the bosom of the Holy Church.

BRAVE BOYS OF FRANCE. A Story of the late War in Europe. Boston: Thomas B. Noonan & Co. 1885.

A volume of interesting stories suitable for boys.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

INSTRUCTIO SPONSORUM, lingua Anglica conscripta ad usum Parochorum; Auctore Sacerdote Missionario. Cum permissu Superiorum. St. Louis: B. Herder. 1885. 12mo., pp. 31.

ENGLMANN'S LATIN GRAMMAR. Improved and edited by *P. Augustine Schneider, O.S.B.* Cincinnati: Anton Bicker. 1885. 8vo., pp. 425.

IRENE OF CORINTH. An Historic Romance of the First Century. By *Rev. P. I. Harold.* Toronto: Hunter, Rose & Co. 1884. 12mo., pp. 298.

PROBLÈMES ET CONCLUSIONS DE L'HISTOIRE DES RELIGIONS. Par *l'Abbé de Broglie*, Ancien Elève de l'Ecole Polytechnique, Professeur d'Apologétique à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. Paris: Putois-Cretté. 1885. 12mo., pp. 416.

INSTITUTIONES MORALES ALPHONSIANÆ, seu Doctoris Eccl. S. Alphonsi Mariæ de Ligorio Doctrina Moralis ad usum scholarum accommodata, cura et studio *P. Clementis Marc.* Congr. SS. Redempt. Romæ: Ex typographia Pacis. 1885. Large 8vo. Tom. I., pp. 911. Tom. II., pp. 837.

ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY. Comprising Logic and Ontology, or General Metaphysics. By *Rev. Walter H. Hill, S. J.* Seventh Revised Edition. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1885.

THE IRISH AND ANGLO-IRISH GENTRY WHEN CROMWELL CAME TO IRELAND; or, a Supplement to Irish Peerages. By *John O'Hart.* Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1884.

THE TRUTH ABOUT JOHN WYCLIF. His Life, Writings, and Opinions, chiefly from Evidence of his Contemporaries. By *Joseph Stevenson, S. J.* London: Burns & Oates. 1885.

THE VIRGIN MOTHER OF GOOD COUNSEL. By *Mgr. G. F. Dillon, D.D.* New (cheap) edition, with illustrations. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1885.

LITTLE MONTH OF THE SOULS IN PURGATORY. Translated from the French of the author of "Golden Lands," by *Miss Ella McMahon.* New York, Cincinnati and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1886.

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